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During the first 180 years of the Bill of Rights, the constitutional
guarantee most frequently and aggressively enforced by the Supreme
Court was the seventh amendment' right to a jury trial in civil cases.
Prior to 1968 the Court regularly granted review in several cases each
year to consider the sufficiency of the evidence to support a disputed
jury verdict, and in the overwhelming majority of the more recent cases
* Assistant Counsel, NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc.; Lecturer in
Law, Columbia University. B.A. 1962, M.A. 1963, Johns Hopkins University; B. Phil. 1965,
Oxford University; L.L.B. 1968, Yale University.
I. The seventh amendment provides: "In Suits at common law, where the value in
controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact
tried by jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to
the rules of the common law."
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did so to reinstate a civil jury verdict that had been overturned by an
appellate court. For the last twenty years, however, the Supreme Court
has systematically declined to grant review in any case asserting that
such a seventh amendment violation had occurred.2
This Article seeks to assess the treatment of civil jury verdicts by
the federal courts of appeals during the two decades in which the
Supreme Court has refused to scrutinize the actions of the circuit
courts. Part I summarizes the manner in which the Supreme Court,
prior to 1968, aggressively enforced the seventh amendment. Part II,
focusing on a one-year period between the fall of 1984 and the fall of
1985, describes the actions of the courts of appeals in resolving the 208
reported cases in which a party challenged the sufficiency of the
evidence to support a jury verdict. That analysis demonstrates that
appellate reversals of jury factfinding, once a relatively rare event, are
now occurring in almost half of all such federal civil appeals. Part III
describes the standards currently being utilized by federal appellate
courts in passing on requests for judgments nonobstante veredicto
(judgment n.o.v.) and explains how those standards diverge from pre-
1968 Supreme Court precedents. Part IV discusses the criteria now
relied on by the appellate courts in overturning jury verdicts as
excessive and analyzes the manner in which those criteria differ from
the approach that prevailed prior to 1968.
I. INTRODUCTION: SUPREME COURT ENFORCEMENT OF THE
SEVENTH AMENDMENT PRIOR TO 1968
In the early years of the Republic, an era when judicial implemen-
tation of most constitutional rights was relatively rare, the courts at-
tached singular importance to enforcing the seventh amendment. In
1819 Justice Johnson admonished that where a citizen's seventh amend-
ment rights had been violated, "the claims of the citizen on the protec-
tion of this court are particularly strong."3 Writing in 1830, Justice
Story observed that the framers of the Bill of Rights had regarded as
especially vital the inclusion of a guarantee of jury trials in civil cases:
The trial by jury is justly dear to the American people.... One
of the strongest objections originally taken against the consti-
tution of the United States was the want of an express provi-
sion securing the right of trial by jury in civil cases. As soon as
the constitution was adopted, this right was secured by the
2. See, e.g., Cobb v. Nizami, 851 F.2d 730 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S.Ct. 1177
(1989).
3. Bank of Columbia v. Okely, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 235, 240 (1819).
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seventh amendment of the constitution proposed by4
congress ....
Justice Story described as the "more important" portion of the amend-
ment the second clause, which provides that "no fact tried by jury shall
be otherwise examinable in any court of the United States than accord-
ing to the rules of common law."
5
When the seventh amendment was originally adopted there simply
was no procedure which a party could utilize to bring before an appel-
late court any objection to the sufficiency of the evidence to support a
civil jury verdict. In the early nineteenth century a losing party could
rely on such an objection only as a ground for a new trial,6 and the
Supreme Court consistently held that a trial judge's action in granting
or denying a new trial was a matter of absolute discretion and could not
be reviewed on appeal.7 Over the course of the nineteenth century,
however, two new procedural devices, directed verdicts and judgments
n.o.v., evolved in the trial courts for disposing of cases in which there
was a fatal lack of evidence. The granting or denial of a directed verdict
or judgment n.o.v., unlike the disposition of a motion for a new trial,
was not regarded as within the absolute discretion of the trial judge'
4. Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 446 (1830).
5. Id. at 447.
6. "The only modes known to the common law to re-examine.., facts [tried by a jury]
are the granting of a new trial by the court where the issue was tried ... or the award of a venire
facias de novo, by an appellate court, for some error of law which intervened in the proceedings."
Id. at 448. A venire facias de novo was an order directing a new trial. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1727 (4th ed. 1951). Parsons held that, because the appellate courts were without power to examine
the sufficiency of the evidence, it was not error for a trial court to refuse to direct that the testimony
at a trial be transcribed. Parsons, 28 U.S. at 449.
7. Fairmont Glass Works v. Cub Fork Coal Co., 287 U.S. 474,481 & n.3 (1933) (citing
cases). Cf. United States v. Johnson, 327 U.S. 106, 111 (1946). In Parsons, Justice Story suggested
it might well be unconstitutional for Congress to authorize an appellate court to grant a new trial
based on a perceived insufficiency of the evidence. Parsons, 28 U.S. at 449.
8. The first Supreme Court decision to suggest the existence of review authority on the
part of the appellate courts was Hepburn v. Dubois, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 345, 376 (1838). In 1840,
however, the Court indicated that the appropriate procedure for testing the sufficiency of the evi-
dence was a demurrer to the evidence, a procedure which precluded the moving party from offer-
ing any evidence of its own to the jury. Bank of Metropolis v. Guttschlick, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 19, 31
(1840). During the subsequent 30 years the Supreme Court repeatedly held that it lacked any
authority to consider the sufficiency of the evidence considered by a jury and that only a trial court
asked to consider a motion for a new trial could hear objections to the sufficiency of the evidence.
Zeller's Lessee v. Eckert, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 228, 298 (1846); Prentice v. Zane's Ass'n, 49 U.S. (8
How.) 470, 486 (1850); Hyde v. Stone, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 170, 176 (1857); Barreda v. Stone, 62
U.S. (21 How.) 146, 167 (1858); Mills v. Smith, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 27, 32 (1869); Fowler v. Rath-
bone, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 102, 119 (1871). Hepburn's suggestion that the appellate courts could
overturn a jury verdict for lack of evidence was revived by Improvement Co. v. Munson, 81 U.S.
(14 Wall.) 442,447 (1871), and Sioux City & Pac. R.R. v. Stout, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 657, 661 (1874).
As late as 1879, however, the Court continued to express its earlier view that the appellate courts
had no authority to consider objections to the sufficiency of the evidence. New York Cent. R.R. v.
Fraloff, 100 U.S. 24, 31 (1879); United States Express Co. v. Ware, 87 U.S. 543, 545 (1875).
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and therefore became an issue which could be reviewed on appeal. Thus
the emergence of directed verdicts and judgments n.o.v. inevitably
brought requests that federal appellate courts evaluate the sufficiency of
the evidence on which jury verdicts were based.9
The first such case to reach the Supreme Court appears to have
been Hepburn v. Peters in 1838.10 The defendants in that action had
sought a directed verdict11 and subsequently asked the Supreme Court
to overturn the jury's verdict in favor of the plaintiff. The Court unani-
mously refused to disturb the jury's verdict, quoting at length Justice
Story's account of the framing of the seventh amendment,' 2 and de-
nouncing the defendants' argument as a request "to transcend the limits
prescribed to our action on questions of fact." 3 During the 130 years
that followed, the Supreme Court decided over 150 other cases in which
a party sought to attack the sufficiency of the evidence to support an
adverse jury verdict.14 A majority of those cases were heard on writs of
certiorari, 5 the Court repeatedly exercising its discretionary jurisdic-
tion to reverse attempts by appellate judges to overturn the factual de-
terminations of juries.
In the years between 1938 and 1968 the Supreme Court was partic-
ularly active and vigilant in protecting the factfinding prerogatives of
juries from incursions by appellate judges. 6 During these three decades
9. In the decades following Improvement Co. and Sioux City, the Court used its review
authority only to overturn district court decisions granting directed verdicts or judgments n.o.v.
Jones v. East Tennessee R.R., 128 U.S. 443 (1888); Kane v. Northern Cent. Ry., 128 U.S. 91, 92
(1888); Gardner v. Michigan Cent. R.R., 150 U.S. 349, 361 (1893). Cf. Slocum v. N.Y. Life Ins.
Co., 228 U.S. 364, 376-97 (1913) (reversing appellate court order granting judgment n.o.v.). It was
not until 1926 that the Supreme Court itself overturned a jury verdict on the ground that the trial
court should have directed a verdict. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. v. Mills, 271 U.S. 344, 347
(1926).
10. 37 U.S: (12 Pet.) 345 (1838).
11. Id. at 350.
12. Id. at 376.
13. Id. at 375.
14. The 52 such cases decided since 1938 are described infra at text accompanying notes
17-24. An earlier 34 Federal Employers Liability Act (FELA) cases are cited in Ferguson v.
Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 352 U.S. 521, 548-58 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). The
author has identified 69 additional Supreme Court cases in which a party asked the Court to grant
or uphold, because of a claimed failure of proof, a directed verdict or judgment n.o.v.
15. All of the post-1938 cases and all of the post-1918 FELA cases were heard on writs of
certiorari.
16. There is one noteworthy period when the Supreme Court departed from this prac-
tice. Between 1925 and 1943 the Court repeatedly overturned jury verdicts; most of those verdicts
involved either industrial accidents or veterans' benefits, two of the most politically controversial
issues of the era between the world wars. Brady v. Southern Ry., 320 U.S. 476 (1943); Galloway v.
United States, 319 U.S. 372 (1943); Bailey v. Central Vt. Ry., 319 U.S. 350 (1943); Pence v. United
States, 316 U.S. 332 (1942); Lumbra v. United States, 290 U.S. 551 (1934); Story Parchment Co. v.
Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555 (1931); Atchison, T. & S. Fe Ry. v. Toops, 281 U.S.
351 (1930); New York Cent. R.R. v. Ambrose, 280 U.S. 486 (1930); Chicago, M. & St. P. R.R. v.
Coogan, 271 U.S. 472 (1926); St. Louis-San Francisco R.R. v. Mills, 271 U.S. 344 (1926); see
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the Court granted certiorari in twenty-five cases in which a federal court
of appeals, because of an asserted lack of evidence, had overturned a
jury verdict. The Supreme Court voted to reinstate the jury verdict in
twenty-four of these twenty-five cases, thus sustaining the jury's origi-
nal determination in ninety-six percent of the cases. 7 A similar practice
was followed with regard to state jury verdicts in actions filed under the
Federal Employers Liability Act (FELA). 18 The right to a jury trial was
regarded by the Supreme Court as an essential part of the remedy pro-
vided by FELA, 9 and the Court expressly applied to appellate review
of state jury verdicts the same restrictions utilized in federal cases.2"
Between 1938 and 1968 the Court granted certiorari in twenty-seven
FELA cases in which state appellate courts had overturned jury ver-
dicts, and reinstated twenty-five of those verdicts.21 During this period,
when the Supreme Court agreed to hear a total of fifty-two cases in
which an appellate court had reversed a jury verdict or approved a di-
rected verdict, the Court granted certiorari in only two cases in which a
petitioner sought to challenge a jury verdict that had been upheld by the
lower courts.22 Justice Douglas explained the Court's practice of regu-
larly agreeing to hear these cases as being required by the "vigilance we
should exercise in safeguarding the jury trial-guaranteed by the Sev-
enth Amendment and part and parcel of the remedy under [the
Ferguson v. Moore-McCormack Lines Inc., 352 U.S. 521, 543-44 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissent-
ing) (citing cases). The Roosevelt appointees dissented in the later cases, and in Lavender they
assembled a new majority to return to the practice of sustaining jury verdicts.
17. A majority of these cases involved actions to enforce FELA. Lists of those FELA
cases can be found in Harris v. Pennsylvania R.R., 361 U.S. 15, 20-25 (1959) (Douglas, J., concur-
ring) and Ferguson v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 352 U.S. 521, 549-58 (1957) (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting). The Supreme Court has also granted certiorari to reinstate jury verdicts in cases
arising under the Clayton Act (Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685 (1967)), the
Sherman Act (Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide Corp., 370 U.S. 690 (1962)), the Jones Act
(Salem v. United States Lines Co., 370 U.S. 31 (1962)), and in cases which were filed in or removed
to federal court because of diversity of citizenship (Mercer v. Theriot, 377 U.S. 152 (1964)). A
complete list of the 52 cases referred to above is on file with the Wisconsin Law Review.
18. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1982).
19. Rogers v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 500, 508 (1957); Bailey v. Central Vt. Ry.,
319 U.S. 350, 354 (1943).
20. The Court's analyses of FELA verdicts made no distinctions between state and fed-
eral verdicts. See, e.g., Rogers v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 500 (1957) (state verdict); Webb v.
Illinois Cent. R.R., 352 U.S. 512 (1957) (federal verdict); Herdman v. Pennsylvania R.R., 352 U.S.
518 (1957). Justice Harlan wrote a single dissenting opinion in all three cases, as did Justice Frank-
furter. Herdman, 352 U.S. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting), id. at 524 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
Later in the 1957 term the Court summarily reinstated five state FELA verdicts and two federal
FELA verdicts, in each case citing Rogers. See, e.g., Shaw v. Atlantic C.L. R.R., 353 U.S. 920
(1957) (state verdict); Thomson v. Texas & Pac. Ry., 353 U.S. 926 (1957) (federal verdict).
21. See supra note 16.
22. New York, N.H. & H. R.R. v. Henagan, 364 U.S. 441(1960); Great Northern Ry. v.
Leonidas, 305 U.S. 1 (1938). It appears that the Court granted the petition in Great Northern
primarily to decide whether the defense of assumption of the risk was available in a FELA case.
Great Northern, 305 U.S. at 2-3.
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FELA]."'2 3 In Rogers v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co., the Court in-
sisted that "[s]pecial and important reasons for the grant of certiorari
... are certainly present when lower federal and state courts persistently
deprive litigants of their right to a jury determination. '"24
The Supreme Court's active role in enforcing the seventh amend-
ment was at times criticized by a minority of the Court. In 1943 Justice
Roberts dissented from the granting of certiorari to reinstate a FELA
jury verdict, arguing that the Supreme Court "d[id] not sit to redress
every apparent error"2 5 in taking a case from a jury. Five years later in
Wilkerson v. McCarthy, Justice Frankfurter agreed that the jury verdict
there at issue should not have been overturned by the court below, but
also argued that the Supreme Court ought not grant certiorari to ad-
dress the fact-bound issues raised by such seventh amendment claims.26
In 1957 Justice Frankfurter reiterated that objection in Rogers v. Mis-
souri Pacific Railroad Co. 2 7 and thereafter dissented from the granting
of certiorari in almost all28 of the right to jury trial cases heard by the
Supreme Court between 1957 and his retirement in 1962. Between 1962
and 1968, Justices Stewart and Harlan occasionally criticized the prac-
tice of hearing such cases,2 9 but voiced no such objections in other in-
stances. ° In the fall of 1968 the practice of policing lower court intru-
sions on the authority of civil juries was sufficiently accepted and
routine that when the Supreme Court granted certiorari in International
Terminal Operating Co. v. Nederl, it summarily reversed a Second Cir-
23. Harris v. Pennsylvania R.R., 361 U.S. 15, 17 (1959) (concurring opinion). See also
Moore v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 340 U.S. 573, 574 (1951) (certiorari granted "to determine
whether the province of the jury had been invaded by the action of the District Court" granting
judgment n.o.v.); Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U.S. 53, 71 (1949) (Douglas, J., concurring) (court's
actions have been necessary to restore "[tihe historic role of the jury").
24. Rogers, 352 U.S. at 510. See also Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U.S. 53, 69 (1949)
(Douglas, J., concurring) (FELA "was not given a friendly reception in the courts.... [D]oubtful
questions of fact were taken from the jury and resolved by the courts in favor of the employer").
25. Bailey v. Central Vt. R.R., 319 U.S. 350, 354 (1943) (Roberts, J., dissenting). Justice
Frankfurter joined in this dissenting opinion.
26. Wilkerson, 336 U.S. at 65-68 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
27. 352 U.S. at 524-58 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). See also Dick v. New York Life Ins.
Co., 359 U.S. 437, 447-63 (1959) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
28. Justice Frankfurter dissented in a total of 21 such cases. See, e.g., Davis v. Virginian
Ry., 361 U.S. 354, 358 (1960) ("For the reasons set forth in his opinion in Rogers v. Missouri
Pacific R. Co ... Mr. Justice Frankfurter is of the view that the writ of certiorari was improvi-
dently granted."); Shaw v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 353 U.S. 920 (1957) ("Mr. Justice Frank-
furter is of the opinion that the writ should not be granted. See his dissent in Rogers v. Missouri
Pac. R. Co ... ").
29. Davis v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., 379 U.S. 671, 672 (1965) (Harlan, J. and Stewart, J.,
concurring); Mercer v. Theriot, 377 U.S. 152, 156 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Dennis v. Denver
& R.G.W. R.R., 375 U.S. 208, 212 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Harrison v. Missouri Pac. R.R.,
372 U.S. 248, 250 (1963) (Harlan, J. and Stewart, J., concurring).
30. See, e.g., International Terminal Operating Co. v. Nederl, 393 U.S. 74 (1968) (unani-
mous opinion); Shenker v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., 374 U.S. 1, 11 (1963) (Harlan, J. and Stewart, J.
joined opinion by Goldberg, J., dissenting on the merits).
1989:237 Judges Against Juries 243
cuit decision overturning such a jury verdict.3" In its brief opinion the
Court announced that "[u]nder the Seventh Amendment, th[e disputed
factual] issue should have been left to the jury's determination." 3 2 No
member of the Court dissented from this per curiam opinion, or even
suggested that the case should have been set down for full briefing and
argument.
For most of its history the Supreme Court was equally aggressive
in protecting the prerogative of a jury to determine the extent of the
injuries suffered by an aggrieved plaintiff. The Court repeatedly refused
to authorize the federal appellate courts even to consider objections
that particular jury verdicts were excessive. At common law the proce-
dure for raising such an objection was a motion for a new trial, and the
Supreme Court consistently insisted that the appellate courts could not
review a trial judge's disposition of such motions. The Court expressly
held in eleven cases decided between 1879 and 1933 that it lacked the
authority even to consider objections to the size of a jury verdict.33
Despite this series of decisions, the federal courts of appeals commenc-
ing around 1950 began to overturn jury verdicts which they regarded as
excessive.3a Responding to that trend, the Supreme Court in 1955
31. International Terminal, 393 U.S. 74.
32. Id. at 75.
33. Fairmont Glass Works v. Cub Fork Coal Co., 287 U.S. 474, 481-82 (1933):
The rule that this Court will not review the action of a federal trial court in ... denying a
motion for a new trial for error of fact... has been frequently applied where the ground
of the motion was that the damages awarded by the jury were excessive or were inade-
quate. The rule precludes likewise a review of such action by a circuit court of ap-
peals .... Sometimes the rule has been rested on ... the Seventh Amendment.
See also Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Hill, 237 U.S. 208, 215 (1915); Southern Ry. v. Bennett, 233 U.S. 80,
87 (1914); Phoenix Ry. v. Landis, 231 U.S. 578, 587 (1913); Herencia v. Guzman, 219 U.S. 44, 45
(1910); City of Lincoln v. Power, 151 U.S. 436, 437-38 (1894); New York, L.E. & W. R.R. v.
Winter, 143 U.S. 60, 75 (1892); Wilson v. Everett, 139 U.S. 616, 621 (1891); Arkansas Valley Land
& Cattle Co. v. Mann, 130 U.S. 69, 75 (1889); Railroad Co. v. Fraloff, 100 U.S. 24, 31 (1879).
In Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474 (1935), the Supreme Court concluded that the seventh
amendment precluded the federal courts from utilizing the state practice of additur; Dimick held
that while the lower courts could grant new trials on the ground that the damages awarded were
inadequate, those courts could not permit the defendant to avoid that retrial by agreeing to an
additional award of damages in an amount determined by the judge. The Supreme Court ex-
pressed doubts about the constitutionality of even remittitur and upheld that practice primarily
because "the doctrine has been accepted as the law for more than a hundred years and uniformly
applied in the federal courts during that time." Id. at 484-85. "[W]hile for more than a century the
federal courts have followed the approved practice of conditioning the allowance of a new trial on
the consent of plaintiff to remit excessive damages, no federal court, so far as we can discover, has
ever undertaken similarly to increase the damages ..... Id. at 487. Prior to Dimick there appears to
have been only a single instance in which a federal appellate court actually overturned a verdict on
grounds of excessiveness. Cobb v. Lepisto, 6 F.2d 128 (9th Cir. 1925).
34. Prior to 1950 only two circuits had asserted the authority to grant a new trial, or a
remittitur, on grounds of excessiveness. Cobb v. Lepisto, 6 F.2d 128 (9th Cir. 1925); Virginian Ry.
v. Armentrout, 166 F.2d 400 (4th Cir. 1948). The prevailing view was to the contrary. See 9 C.
WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2820 (1982). In 1950, in a case in
which the defendant had not claimed the damages awarded were excessive, the Supreme Court
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granted certiorari in Neese v. Southern Railway Co. to consider the con-
stitutionality of a Fourth Circuit decision holding excessive the dam-
ages awarded in a FELA case and directing a new trial.3 5 The Supreme
Court did not decide, however, whether the court of appeals had the
authority to review the trial court's denial of a new trial; instead, invok-
ing its traditional practice of refusing to issue unnecessary decisions on
constitutional questions, the Court in Neese held that the trial judge's
action sustaining the jury verdict had sufficient "support in the
record." 6 Ten years later in Grunenthal v. Long Island Railroad37 the
Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the same constitutional
issue, this time raised by a Second Circuit decision ordering a new trial
unless the plaintiff would agree to remit approximately one third of the
jury award. Again, however, the Court held that the trial court had not
erred in sustaining the original jury verdict, and thus did not decide
whether an appellate court could constitutionally overturn a jury ver-
dict as excessive.38
commented, "We agree with the Court of Appeals that the amount of damages awarded by the
District Court's judgment is not monstrous in the circumstances of this case." Affolder v. New
York, C. & St. L. R.R., 339 U.S. 96, 101 (1950). A number of circuits read Affolder to implicitly
authorize appellate review of the size ofjury verdicts, a reading that has been severely criticized. 9
C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra, § 2820; DeParcq & Wright, Damages Under the Federal Employ-
ers' Liability Act., 17 OHIo ST. L.J., 430,471-72 (1956). By 1968 all I I courts of appeals agreed that
such appellate review was permissible. Grunenthal v. Long Island R.R., 393 U.S. 156, 157 & n.3
(1968).
35. Neese v. Southern Ry., 350 U.S. 77 (1955). The petitioner urged that the seventh
amendment precluded the federal appellate courts from granting a new trial on grounds of exces-
siveness. Brief on Merits for Petitioner at 10, 11, 15, 23, No. 28. The parties disagreed about the
meaning of Affolder. Brief on Merits for Petitioner at 15-16 (Affolder does not permit appellate
review of the size ofjury verdicts); Brief on Merits for Respondent at 31-32 (Affolder does permit
appellate review of the size of jury verdicts).
36. Neese, 350 U.S. at 77. Two weeks after Neese the Supreme Court, by a vote of 5 to 4,
reversed summarily and without opinion a Fourth Circuit decision that had overturned as exces-
sive an award of damages by a district judge sitting without a jury. Snyder v. United States, 350
U.S. 906 (1955).
37. 393 U.S. 156 (1968). The first question presented by the petition in Grunenthal was,
"[w]hether a Court of Appeals may constitutionally review the exercise of discretion by a District
Judge in refusing to set aside a verdict for excessiveness." Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 2, No.
35. The parties expressly disagreed about the meaning ofAffolder. Briefon Merits for Petitioner at
7; Brief on Merits for Respondent at 18. The respondent in Grunenthal acknowledged that there
might well be a serious constitutional problem "if the courts of appeals applied the same test that is
used by trial judges in ordering remittiturs. For trial judges can set aside jury awards on grounds of
excessiveness when in their view ... the verdict is excessive as a matter of fact." Brief on Merits for
Respondent at 13. The respondent expressly acknowledged that, where a district court had upheld
a verdict, the appellate courts "must give the benefit of every doubt to the judgment of the trial
judge" and could hold a verdict excessive as a matter of law only if "there was no rational view of
the evidence that could sustain it." Id. at 14.
38. Grunenthal, 393 U.S. at 160-62. The majority opinion noted that the Second Circuit
standard, which it purported to apply, required appellate courts to defer to the judgment of the
trial judge and permitted overturning the verdict as excessive only if the amount of the verdict was
not "in any rational manner consistent with the evidence." Id. at 160. Justice Stewart, in a dissent-
ing opinion, endorsed the same standard. Id. at 164-65. At the oral argument in Grunenthal several
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The Supreme Court decision in International Terminal Operating
Co. v. Nederl, reinstating the jury's finding of liability, was issued on
October 21, 1968. The Court's decision reinstating the original jury ver-
dict in Grunenthal was handed down on November 18, 1968. Neither
decision intimated any reservations regarding the Court's century-old
practice of closely scrutinizing the actions of appellate court judges who
had overturned or reduced jury verdicts in civil cases. Nevertheless, for
reasons which have never been explained, that practice came to an ab-
rupt end in the fall of 1968. Not once since October of 1968 has the
Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether a trial judge or
appellate panel violated the seventh amendment by overturning a jury
verdict or by directing a new trial or remittitur on the ground that a
jury's verdict was excessive. The Court has never undertaken to resolve
the constitutional question avoided in Neese and Grunenthal, or to ex-
plain the circumstances, if any, under which an appellate court could
overturn an excessive jury verdict.
Although twenty years have passed since the Supreme Court aban-
doned its traditional role in enforcing the seventh amendment, com-
mentators and lower courts alike have assumed that the Supreme
Court's obviously deliberate inaction has had no impact on the prac-
tices of lower court judges. Professor Wright and his colleagues assume
that requests for judgment n.o.v. will only "sparingly" be granted.39
Professor Moore asserts that "only in the rare instance" would an ap-
pellate court overturn a trial court's decision denying a new trial on
grounds of excessiveness.'" The federal courts of appeals have repeat-
edly professed that they would not award judgment n.o.v., or direct a
comments from the Court reflected a similar inclination to give weight to the views of the trial
court. Transcript of Oral Argument at 24, No. 35 ("Presumably trial judges see a lot of these cases
and have some sense of what sort of a going rate is for pain and suffering .. "), 28 ("1 gather only
one of this [appellate] panel had any trial experience.").
The majority opinion in Grunenthal noted with apparent concern the indefiniteness of the
standard utilized by the appellate courts in reviewing the amount of jury verdicts. Grunenthal, 393
U.S. at 159 & n.4 ("the standard has been variously phrased: 'Common phrases are such as:
"grossly excessive," "inordinate," "shocking to the judicial conscience," "outrageously exces-
sive," "so large as to shock the conscience of the court," "monstrous," and many others.' ").
Petitioner argued that there was no objective and universally accepted appellate standard for ana-
lyzing claims of excessiveness. Brief for Petitioner at 18. Respondent apparently advocated a "no
evidence" standard similar to that applied in deciding on a request for judgment n.o.v., and ob-
jected to petitioner's suggestion that a verdict could be overturned only if "monstrous." Brief for
Respondent at 13-15 & n.7. At oral argument an unidentified member of the Court expressed
doubts as to the feasibility of appellate review of jury verdicts for pain and suffering. Transcript of
Oral Argument at 21-22 ("1 do not know ... how you would go about saying that this man's
suffering is figured at $5.00 a second or something like that, and would have been entitled to so
much and no more. I do not know how you do it.").
39. 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 34, at § 2524.
40. 6A MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 59-168 (1986).
1989:237
WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW
remittitur, except in a very small number of extreme cases.4" These pro-
fessions of judicial self-restraint, however, are belied by actual practice.
II. THE PATTERNS OF RECENT APPELLATE REVIEW
A. Reversal Rates
The controlling Supreme Court decisions, and the early circuit
court decisions authorizing appellate review of jury factfinding, ex-
pressly contemplated that the appellate courts would overturn such
jury verdicts only in rare and extreme cases. In order to assess what has
actually occurred in the courts of appeals as a result of the Supreme
Court's recent refusal to scrutinize appellate review of jury factfinding,
a review was conducted of all published federal appellate decisions for a
one-year period from October 1984 through October 1985.42 The sub-
stantial number of opinions studied provide a reasonably representa-
tive picture of the manner in which the appellate courts are resolving
appeals in which a party attacks the sufficiency of the evidence to sup-
port a jury verdict.4" For the reasons explained below, the rate at which
appellate courts are today reversing such verdicts probably exceeds the
reversal rate for 1984-1985. 4"
During the year in question there were a total of 208 published
opinions in which a federal appellate court resolved one or more chal-
lenges to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a jury verdict.4 5 In a
substantial number of instances there were several distinct attacks on
the jury verdict, most frequently arguments both that the liability deci-
sion was unsupported by the evidence and that the amount of the ver-
dict was unreasonably excessive.46 As a result, the 208 cases actually
41. See, e.g., Dabney v. Montgomery Ward, 761 F.2d 494, 501 (8th Cir. 1985) (appellate
courts to overturn jury verdicts for excessiveness only in "rare situations"); Haley v. Pan Am.
World Airways, 746 F.2d 311 (5th Cir. 1984) (appellate courts to overturn jury verdicts for exces-
siveness only in "rare" cases); Ratner v. Sioux Natural Gas Corp., 770 F.2d 512, 518 (5th Cir.
1985) ("Cases that justify disregarding the jury's determinations seldom arrive in this Court.").
42. The summary encompasses all opinions in volumes 743 through 774 of the Federal
Reporter Second. Volume 774 was the most recent reporter in print at the time when research for
this article began.
43. During 1985, among appeals decided after either briefing or oral argument, written
opinions were issued in 89% of all the cases. DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE
UNITED STATES COURTS ANNUAL REPORTS at 124 (1985).
44. Since the reversal rate is higher for appellate panels which include a judge appointed
by President Reagan, the additional Reagan appointments since October 1985 have doubtless
increased the overall reversal rate.
45. A list of these cases is on file at the Wisconsin Law Review.
46. E.g., Arceneaux v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 767 F.2d 1498 (1 1th
Cir. 1985). There are also a number of instances in which both parties appealed from the jury's
verdict, each arguing that some aspect of that opinion unfavorable to it was not supported by the
evidence. E.g., Abeshouse v. Ultragraphics, Inc., 754 F.2d 467 (2d Cir. 1985) (plaintiff appealed
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involved 254 separate challenges to the substance of the original ver-
dicts. The 208 appeals occurred in a wide variety of types of cases. One
third of these appeals arose out of commercial litigation, particularly
securities and antitrust cases.47 Another third involved personal injury
claims, primarily negligence and product liability actions.48 One fifth of
the appeals challenged jury verdicts in cases in which the plaintiffs had
alleged that their constitutional rights had been violated.49 Most of the
remaining cases involved discrimination claims, primarily claims under
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.5" Twelve cases, including
four libel actions, did not fit into these four general categories.
Among the 208 cases decided in this period, the appellate courts
held in 102 cases that there was insufficient evidence to support the
jury's verdict. These reversals included cases in which the appellate
courts sustained only part of an appellant's challenge to a verdict, hold-
ing, for example, that there was sufficient evidence to uphold the finding
of liability, but insufficient evidence to sustain the amount of the ver-
dict. The overall reversal rate is 49.0%," a level impossible to reconcile
with either the seventh amendment or the controlling Supreme Court
decisions. It is, of course, likely that appellants' attorneys are somewhat
selective in choosing the cases in which to challenge the evidentiary ba-
sis of jury verdicts, but this extraordinary reversal rate cannot be ex-
plained as the result of brilliant case selection by attorneys for appel-
lants. As is noted below, the reversal rate is far higher for some types of
cases than for others, and appeals by defendants succeed more than
jury verdict in favor of two of the named defendants; other defendants appealed size ofjury verdict
against them).
47. E.g., Air Et Chaleur, S.A. v. Janeway, 757 F.2d 489 (2d Cir. 1985) (breach of con-
tract); Aldrich v. Thomson McKinnon Securities, Inc., 756 F.2d 243 (2d Cir. 1985) (securities);
Bonjorno v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp., 752 F.2d 802 (3d Cir. 1984); Conan Properties,
Inc. v. Conans Pizza, Inc., 752 F.2d 145 (5th Cir. 1985) (trademark infringement).
48. E.g., In re Air Crash Disaster Near New Orleans, La., 767 F.2d 1151 (5th Cir. 1985)
(air crash); Armstrong v. Kansas City S. Ry., 752 F.2d 1110 (5th Cir. 1985) (FELA); Bright v.
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 756 F.2d 19 (6th Cir. 1984) (defective tire); Cole v. Bertsch Vending
Co., 766 F.2d 327 (7th Cir. 1985) (automobile accident); Dabney v. Montgomery Ward, 761 F.2d
494 (8th Cir. 1985) (defective furnace); Deakle v. John Graham & Sons, 756 F.2d 821 (11 th Cir.
1985) (Jones Act).
49. E.g., Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205 (7th Cir. 1984) (police brutality);
Bodzin v. City of Dallas, 768 F.2d 722 (5th Cir. 1985) (arrest without probable cause); Chalmers v.
City of Los Angeles, 762 F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1985) (due process); Davis v. West Community Hosp.,
755 F.2d 455 (5th Cir. 1985) (free speech, due process).
50. E.g., Abasiekong v. City of Shelby, 744 F.2d 1055 (4th Cir. 1984) (race); Bristow v.
Daily Press, Inc., 770 F.2d 1251 (4th Cir. 1985) (age); Christensen v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y,
767 F.2d 340 (7th Cir. 1985) (age and race). Cases involving claims of unconstitutional discrimina-
tion are included among the discrimination cases.
51. An analysis of all Fourth Circuit cases from 1985 to the end of 1988 found that that
circuit had reversed 35 of the 74 civil jury verdicts in which an appellant challenged the sufficiency
of the evidence to support the verdict, a reversal rate of 47%. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, 12-19,
Cobb v. Nizami, 851 F.2d 730 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1177 (1989).
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twice as often as appeals by plaintiffs. It is simply not to be believed that
defense attorneys are twice as good as plaintiffs' attorneys in deciding
which verdicts to appeal, or that defense counsel in constitutional law-
suits are consistently more skilled in case selection than are defense
counsel in commercial cases. Nor is it possible that the substantial dif-
ferences in reversal rates among the circuits could be due to regional
variations in the abilities of attorneys to ascertain whether a jury verdict
was supported by the evidence. The most conclusive evidence that case
selection is not the cause of this overall reversal rate is that the likeli-
hood that a jury verdict will be overturned on appeal depends to a sub-
stantial degree on the background of the judges who compose the par-
ticular appellate panel that decides each case.
An appellant may challenge the sufficiency of the evidence sup-
porting a jury verdict on any one of three grounds. First, an appellant
can assert that he or she is entitled to a new trial on the merits of the
action.52 Second, an appellant can argue that he or she was entitled to
judgment n.o.v. on the merits of the claim. Third, a defendant can urge
that the size of the verdict is excessive, and ask the appellate court to
order a new trial unless the plaintiff agrees to an appropriate remittitur,
The frequency with which such challenges succeeded on appeal varied
substantially. When appellants sought a new trial on the merits, the
courts of appeals set aside the jury verdict and ordered such a trial in
only 18.5% of all appeals.53 When an appellant asked the appellate
court to grant the more drastic remedy of entering a judgment n.o.v.,
however, the rate of success was far higher-appellate courts reversed
the jury verdict in over thirty-eight percent of such appeals.54 When an
appellant challenged the amount of a jury's verdict, the appellate courts
in fifty percent of all appeals overturned that verdict and, in most in-
stances, ordered a remittitur. 55
The rate at which the appellate courts overturn jury verdicts varies
with the subject matter of the litigation. Much criticism of the jury sys-
tem has focused on the alleged difficulty ofjurors in evaluating evidence
in complex commercial cases, but the appellate reversal rate in commer-
cial cases is in actual practice lower than in other types of cases:
52. A small portion of the 208 cases involved appeals from a district court decision
granting a new trial or judgment n.o.v. For the purposes of simplicity the text refers to the far more
common situation in which the district court upheld the jury's verdict.
53. The appellate courts ordered new trials in only five of 27 such cases; in four of these
five cases the appellate courts were merely upholding a district court order for a new trial. Among
the 23 appeals from district court orders denying new trials, there is only a single case in which an
appellate court ordered a new trial.
54. The appellate courts directed entry of judgment n.o.v. in 67 of 175 such cases.
55. The courts of appeals overturned jury verdicts in 34 of the 68 cases in which those
verdicts were challenged. In three instances the appellate courts directed the district court to deter-
mine the appropriate amount of the remittitur. See infra note 444 and accompanying text.
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Appeals Where Verdict Was Reversed or Reduced
by Subject Matter of Appeal
Subject Matter
Commercial
Personal Injury
Constitutional
Discrimination
Reversal-Reduction
41.0% (28 of 70)
41.2% (28 of 68)
56.1% (23 of 41)
58.8% (10 of 17)
There is, however, almost no difference in the frequency with which jury
verdicts are overturned as excessive:
Verdict Reduction Rate
by Subject Matter of Appeal
Subiect Matter
Commercial
Personal Injury
Constitutional
Discrimination
Reduction Rate
50.0% (12 of 24)
43.5% (10 of 23)
46.7% (7 of 15)
50.0% (1 of 2)
When challenges to jury verdicts on the merits of the case are analyzed
separately, on the other hand, the disparities are more pronounced:
Rate of Reversal on Merits
by Subject Matter of Appeal
Subiect Matter
Commercial
Personal Injury
Constitutional
Discrimination
Reversal Rate
27.4% (17 of 62)
30.6% (19 of 62)
44.1% (15 of 34)
52.9% (9 of 17)
The particularly high rate of reversal in discrimination cases is all the
more extraordinary because these cases, as a group, turn on factual is-
sues far less complex than the other categories of cases. Most of the
seventeen discrimination cases were individual actions under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act in which the plaintiff sought to
prove that he or she had been fired or demoted because of his or her age.
The jury's determination of liability in each case rested on a finding that
the relevant officials of the defendant employer had been motivated by
an impermissible desire to discriminate on the basis of age, rather than
by some legitimate purpose. Members of civil juries, drawing on practi-
cal experiences far more diverse than those of federal judges, are partic-
ularly well suited to determine the motives of such parties. As a general
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matter the witnesses heard by the juries in these cases included the very
supervisors whose motives were in dispute. Thus the resolution of these
cases turned to a substantial degree on whether the juries found credible
the testimony of the officials who insisted they had no intent to discrimi-
nate on the basis of age. Given the nature of the factual issues and evi-
dence involved, one would expect that reversals of jury verdicts in dis-
crimination cases would be particularly rare.
The frequency with which the appellate courts overturn jury ver-
dicts is also directly related to whether the jury had accepted the factual
contentions of the plaintiff or those of the defendant. In the 179 in-
stances in which the jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, the
courts of appeals reversed for lack of evidence ninety-four times, or
52.5% of the time. But among the thirty-five cases in which a plaintiff
appealed a verdict for the defendant, the appellate courts overturned
the jury's verdict in only eight of the cases, a twenty-three percent rever-
sal rate. This substantial difference in reversal rates, however, is not
present in all categories of cases:
Combined Reversal-Reduction Rate
by Prevailing Party and Subject Matter
Reversal-Reduction Rate
Verdict for Verdict for
Subject Matter Plaintiff Defendant
Commercial 40.0% .38.5%
Personal Injury 46.6% 7.7%
Constitutional 58.8% 22.2%
Discrimination 58.8% -
Thus in commercial litigation the appellate courts show no inclination
to favor either side. But where a corporate or government defendant is
sued by an injured individual, the courts of appeals generally uphold
verdicts for the defendants, but reverse verdicts in favor of the
plaintiffs.
The rate at which jury verdicts are overturned for excessiveness
does not vary with the subject matter of the appeal. The frequency with
which remittiturs were ordered, however, did vary with the size of the
original jury verdict. In the thirty-six appeals in which a defendant chal-
lenged a verdict of under $500,000, the appellate courts held the verdict
excessive in eighteen cases, or fifty percent. The reversal rate was ap-
proximately the same for verdicts under $1 00,000-the appellate courts
ordered remittiturs in seven of those fifteen cases. Among the twenty-
five challenges to verdicts of more than $500,000, however, the verdicts
were deemed excessive by the circuit courts in eighteen instances, or
Judges Against Juries
seventy-two percent of the time.56 There was no significant difference in
the remittitur rates within this latter group between verdicts under $1
million and verdicts over $1 million.
The rate at which jury verdicts are overturned on appeal also var-
ies substantially from circuit to circuit. Although in some circuits the
reversal rate lacks statistical significance because of the small number of
decisions, the overall variation in reversal rates seems too great to be
the result of chance:
Reversal-Reduction Rate by Circuit
Circuit
Ninth
First
Sixth
Eleventh
Tenth
Fifth
Third
Eighth
Seventh
Fourth
District of Columbia
Second
Federal
Reversal-Reduction Rate
11.1% (1 of 9)
22.2% (2 of 9)
26.3% (5 of 19)
37.5% (6 of 16)
45.5% (5 of 11)
45.5% (17 of 37)
50.0% (6 of 12)
53.1% (17 of 32)
56.7% (17 of 30)
63.6% (7 of 11)
66.7% (4 of 6)
70.0% (7 of 10)
100.0% (4 of 4)
This difference in reversal rates cannot be explained by differences in
the subject matter of the appeals. Discrimination and constitutional
cases were three of the nine First Circuit appeals, 57 and two of the ten
Second Circuit appeals,5" but the First Circuit affirmed the finding of
liability in all three of its cases, while the Second Circuit reversed the
liability finding in both of its cases. As is noted below, a number of
differences in the legal standards being applied by the various circuits in
determining whether the evidence in a particular case is sufficient to
support a jury verdict might explain these varying rates.
In some instances, but not others, the willingness of an appellate
court to overturn a jury verdict turned on whether the trial judge had
found insufficiencies in the evidence. Among the twenty-seven cases in-
volving a challenge to a trial judge's decision to grant or deny a new
56. There are a number of appeals in which the appellate court upheld the jury verdict
without disclosing the size of the challenged verdict.
57. Cazzola v. Codman & Shurtleff, 751 F.2d 53 (1st Cir. 1984); Fishman v. Clancy, 763
F.2d 485 (1st Cir. 1985); Wildman v. Lerner Stores Corp., 771 F.2d 605 (1st Cir. 1985).
58. Martin v. Citibank, N.A., 762 F.2d 212 (2d Cir. 1985); Vippolis v. Village of Haver-
straw, 768 F.2d 40 (2d Cir. 1985).
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trial on the issue of liability, the appellate courts upheld the trial court's
decision in eighty-five percent of the appeals. But where an appellant
challenged a trial court's decision to grant or deny a judgment notwith-
standing the verdict,59 or denying a remittitur, 60 the circuit courts over-
turned the trial judge's decision fifty percent of the time. And where a
defendant sought a new trial on the amount of damages, subject to
agreement by the plaintiff of an appropriate remittitur, the circuit
courts in half of the appeals held that the trial judge had erred in deny-
ing a new trial. Thus although the views of the trial court clearly carry
considerable weight with regard to the propriety of granting or denying
a new trial on liability, the appellate courts evidently attach no signifi-
cance to the views of the trial judge as to whether a new trial was war-
ranted regarding the amount of damages.
The likelihood that a jury verdict would be overturned was sub-
stantially higher if one or more members of the appellate panel had
been selected by the Reagan Administration. Panels with no Reagan
judges reversed 40.9% of all appeals (thirty-six of eighty-eight), but
panels with one or two Reagan judges reversed 55.0% of all the cases
they heard (sixty-six of 120).6" Panels with Reagan judges were more
likely to overturn jury verdicts regardless of which party had prevailed
and regardless of the subject matter of the appeal.
Reversal-Reduction Rate
by Reagan Judges on Panel62
No Reagan 1 or 2
Subiect of Appeal Judges Reagan Judges
Verdict on liability for plaintiff 28.8% 50.6%
Verdict on liability for defendant 12.5% 30.4%
Challenge to size of verdict 33.7% 66.7%
There was, however, no consistent difference between panels with a sin-
gle Reagan judge and panels with two Reagan judges.
There was a similar difference in the dispositions of appeals de-
pending on whether or not the author of the appellate opinion was a
Reagan appointee. Opinions written by non-Reagan judges reversed
jury verdicts in forty-four percent of all appeals, compared to a reversal
rate of 77.3% in opinions written by Reagan judges. The disparity was
59. Judgment n.o.v. was ordered in 69 of the 140 cases in which the district judge had
sustained the disputed jury verdict.
60. In all of the 68 cases in which an appellant challenged the size of the jury verdict, the
district judge had upheld the disputed award.
61. There were no panels with three Reagan appointees.
62. This analysis does not include eight cases in which the Reagan judge disagreed with
the decision of the panel majority.
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even greater when an appellant challenged a jury verdict in favor of the
plaintiff.
Reversal-Reduction Rate
by Author of Opinion
Non-Reagan Reagan
Subject of Appeal Judges Judge
Verdict on liability for plaintiff 33.3% 61.1%
Verdict on liability for defendant 20.0% 33.3%
Verdict challenged as excessive 56.0% 80.0%
Separate dissenting opinions by Reagan judges were also somewhat
more likely to favor the defendant.63
B. The Demise of the Seventh Amendment
A student who sought to understand the federal judicial system by
studying what the circuit courts actually do would probably conclude
that federal appellate judges are under no obligation to accept, or even
give significant weight to, jury verdicts in civil cases. The overall rever-
sal rate is sufficiently close to fifty percent that an external observer
might assume that appellate courts simply decide factual issues de
novo. Looking at the areas of greatest judicial activity in these cases,
one would have to conclude that the two primary purposes of appellate
review of civil jury verdicts were to protect the government from the
cross section of the citizenry found on juries, and to protect defendants
generally from jury biases in favor of plaintiffs who are members of
discrete and insular minorities.64
An observer unfamiliar with the United States Constitution would
be unlikely to learn by perusing Federal Reporter Second that the sev-
enth amendment even existed. On the face of that amendment, every
request that an appellate court "re-examine" an issue of "fact tried by a
jury" raises a serious constitutional issue. Among the 208 appellate de-
cisions passing on such requests, however, only one majority opinion
and one dissent even refer to the existence of the seventh amendment.6 5
Those opinions themselves testify to the moribund state of the amend-
ment. In resolving the cross appeals in Abeshouse v. Ultragraphics, Inc.,
63. Of the l0 dissents written by Reagan judges, seven favored the defendants. Of the 10
dissents written by non-Reagan judges, four favored the defendants.
64. One appellate opinion expressly holds that motions for judgment n.o.v. are to be
granted more readily if made by defendants. Martin v. Joseph Harris Co., Inc., 767 F.2d 296, 302
(6th Cir. 1985).
65. One further case refers to the institution of "trial by jury, enshrined at the Founding
in the Bill of Rights." Stacey v. Allied Stores Corp., 768 F.2d 402, 406 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
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for example, the Second Circuit refused to overturn a verdict in favor of
several defendants, explaining that "to do so would undermine the
jury's fact-finding role and trample on the defendant's seventh amend-
ment right to a jury trial." The same opinion, however, contains no
reference to the seventh amendment in another section reversing most
of the jury's verdict against a remaining defendant; in that section the
appellate court explained simply that it believed that "it is clear the
evidence would not support" the jury verdict.6 6 Judge Tate, dissenting
in In re Air Crash Disaster Near New Orleans, asserted that the decision
of the majority reducing the size of the verdict in that case violated the
seventh amendment, but he chose not to rely on or refer to the amend-
ment in another portion of his dissent objecting to the decision of the
majority to overturn one of the jury's liability findings.6 7 The remain-
ing 206 opinions are entirely devoid of any citation to the seventh
amendment; not one of the 102 decisions overturning jury factual deter-
minations even attempts to reconcile that action with the terms of the
amendment itself. The average cop on the beat, largely untutored in the
law, evidently pays greater heed, or at least lip service, to the constitu-
tional constraints under which he or she acts than do federal appellate
judges. Respect for civil jury verdicts, where it exists, seems little more
than a local rule of practice; thus one Seventh Circuit decision uphold-
ing such a verdict explained that that result was supported by the "great
deference ... accorded to the jury's judgment in this circuit."68
The absence of virtually any discussion of the seventh amendment
might be understandable if the appellate courts were relying instead on
relevant Supreme Court decisions interpreting the amendment. After
all, many appellate decisions applying Miranda v. Arizona6 9 do not dis-
cuss by name the fifth or sixth amendments. But despite the existence of
several hundred Supreme Court opinions which discuss the constitu-
tional restrictions on appellate review of jury liability findings, only
four of the 208 circuit court cases surveyed contain any reference to that
body of decisions.7" The systematic disregard of the entire corpus of
Supreme Court seventh amendment jurisprudence is particularly signif-
66. Abeshouse v. Ultragraphics, Inc., 754 F.2d 467, 472-73 (2d Cir. 1985).
67. In re Air Crash Disaster Near New Orleans, La., 767 F.2d 1151, 1164 (5th Cir. 1985)
(dissenting opinion).
68. U.C. Castings v. Knight, 754 F.2d 1363, 1369 (7th Cir. 1985) (quoting Spesco v.
General Elec. Co., 719 F.2d 233 (7th Cir. 1983)) (emphasis added).
69. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
70. Tice v. Lampert Yards, Inc., 761 F.2d 1210, 1213 (7th Cir. 1985) (citing Gunning v.
Cooley, 281 U.S. 90 (1930)); Armstrong v. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co., 752 F.2d 1110, 1113
(5th Cir. 1985) (citing Lavender v. Kurn, 327 U.S. 645 (1946) and other decisions); J. Yanan &
Associates, Inc. v. Integrity Ins. Co., 771 F.2d 1025, 1034 (7th Cir. 1985) (distinguishing Basham v.
Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 372 U.S. 699 (1963), on the ground that it was "in apparent conflict" with
Indiana court decisions); Springborn v. American Commercial Barge Lines, Inc., 767 F.2d 89, 98
(5th Cir. 1985) (citing Lavender v. Kurn, 327 U.S. 645 (1946)).
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icant because the Court's decisions spell out in considerable detail the
constitutional restrictions applicable to the appellate courts. In the ab-
sence of any discussion of the relevant Supreme Court decisions, it
would not be surprising if the actions of appellate panels deviated sub-
stantially from the standards mandated by the Court; that, as we shall
see, is precisely what has Occurred.
The particularly high rate of reversal in constitutional cases strikes
at the very heart of the purpose of the seventh amendment. As Chief
Justice Rehnquist has noted, the amendment was adopted primarily be-
cause the framers feared that judges often could not be relied on to
protect the public against abuse and oppression by government
officials:
The founders of our Nation considered the right of trial by
jury in civil cases an important bulwark against tyranny... a
safeguard too precious to be left to the whim of... the judici-
ary .... Trial by a jury of laymen rather than by the sover-
eign's judges was important to the founders because juries
represent the layman's common sense, . . . and thus keep the
administration of law in accord with the wishes of the com-
munity. . . .Those who favored juries believed that a jury
would reach a result that a judge either could not or would not
reach.7
Appellate reversals of jury verdicts are occurring in precisely the kinds
of cases in which differences might well exist between the willingness of
judges and ofjuries to protect vigilantly constitutional rights. Appellate
panels have repeatedly overturned jury verdicts because the appellate
judges were less willing than the jurors who had heard those cases to
believe that officials would retaliate against private citizens for criticiz-
ing the government,72 or that police or prison officials would use or
tolerate violence,73 and were less willing than juries to impose liability
71. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 343-44 (1979) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
72. Davis v. West Community Hosp., 755 F.2d 455 (5th Cir. 1985); Jurgenson v. Fairfax
County, Va., 745 F.2d 868 (4th Cir. 1984); McSureley v. McClellan, 753 F.2d 88, 102-05 (D.C. Cir.
1985); see also Neubauer v. City of McAllen, Texas, 766 F.2d 1567 (5th Cir. 1985) (dismissal for
union activity); Hollins v. Powell, 773 F.2d 191 (8th Cir. 1985) (mayor directed arrest of city
commissioners for holding a disputed meeting; verdict reduced); Knapp v. Whitaker, 757 F.2d
827, 846-47 (7th Cir. 1985) (verdict reduced).
73. Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205 (7th Cir. 1984); Thomas v. Booker, 762
F.2d 654 (8th Cir. 1985). See also Madison County Jail Inmates v. Thompson, 773 F.2d 834 (7th
Cir. 1985) (damages for cruel and unusual conditions of confinement reduced to $1.00); LeSavage
v. White, 755 F.2d 814, 818-20 (1 th Cir. 1985) (false arrest); Taliferro v. Augle, 757 F.2d 157 (7th
Cir. 1985) (false arrest, beating, destruction of property; verdict reduced); Estate of Davis v. John-
son, 745 F.2d 1066 (7th Cir. 1984) (victim killed in jail by fellow inmate; verdict reduced); Joan W.
v. City of Chicago, 771 F.2d 1020 (7th Cir. 1985) (strip search; verdict reduced).
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on cities or high ranking officials rather than just on low level employ-
ees.74 It is, of course, easy to understand how such differences could
exist. Federal judges personally have less reason than virtually anyone
else in American society to worry about retaliatory firings, police mis-
conduct, or prison conditions, since they cannot be fired and are un-
likely ever to be arrested. Holding one of the most exalted government
positions in the United States, and preoccupied with theoretical ab-
stractions, such as federalism, comity, and separation of powers, of lit-
tle concern to the public, federal judges may naturally be more sympa-
thetic to the "plight" of government defendants than are the jurors
whose lives are affected by the misconduct of such defendants. But
these are precisely the types of differences which led the framers of the
Bill of Rights to provide that juries, not judges, should resolve disputed
issues of fact in civil cases.
The overall level of appellate reversals has been substantially in-
creased by the addition to the federal bench of circuit judges nominated
by the Reagan Administration. This result is not necessarily what one
would have expected. The Reagan Justice Department professed that
its legal views, and judicial selections, were concerned with judicial re-
straint and a return to the original intent of the framers of the Constitu-
tion.75 But appellate judges particularly sensitive to such matters would
have drastically reduced the frequency with which jury verdicts are
overturned, whereas precisely the opposite has occurred. That develop-
ment may well reflect the adherence of the Reagan Administration and
its judicial nominees to social and political views far to the right of the
common beliefs of the American public; some of these judges have evi-
dently found it impossible to stand idly by while juries vigorously en-
force civil and constitutional rights long criticized by conservatives. The
overall record of Reagan appellate judges, however, cannot be ex-
plained simply as an attempt to impose such conservative views on
more centrist juries, for panels with Reagan nominees are also more
likely to overturn verdicts in favor of defendants. Reagan judges can-
not, of course, be simultaneously both more pro-plaintiff and more pro-
defendant than prior appointees. Rather, the Reagan nominees as a
group tend to act as if they had a commission to operate as super-ju-
rors, deciding all cases de novo; the particularly high reversal rates in
certain types of cases undoubtedly reflect the differences between jurors
74. Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205, 1266-68 (7th Cir. 1984) (reversing verdict
against police chief); Preston v. Smith, 750 F.2d 530, 531 (6th Cir. 1984) (reversing punitive dam-
ages against director of department of corrections); Thomas v. Booker, 762 F.2d 654, 659-60 (8th
Cir. 1985) (reversing verdict against jail supervisors); Vippolis v. Village of Haverstraw, 768 F.2d
40 (2d Cir. 1985) (reversing verdict against city).
75. See H. SCHWARTZ, PACKING THE COURTS: THE CONSERVATIVE CAMPAIGN TO RE-
WRITE THE CONSTITUTION 5 (1988).
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selected at random from a cross section of the community and judge-
jurors carefully screened for ideological purity by the Reagan Justice
Department.
But the impact of the Reagan appointees has merely aggravated a
pre-existing situation. Even among appellate panels with no Reagan
judges, jury factual determinations are being overturned at a rate which
would have astounded the framers of the seventh amendment. The
magnitude of this growing problem has often been obscured by the ap-
parent reasonableness of individual decisions. That plausibility stems at
least in part from the fact that the only available description of the
evidence in a given case is that provided by the very panel which has
resolved to overturn the jury's verdict; the Supreme Court has repeat-
edly noted that such opinions at times "overlook" 76 critical evidence.
The omission of a balanced description of the evidence is apparent in
the handful of cases in which a panel member dissented from an opin-
ion overturning a jury verdict. In Laney v. Coleman Co., Inc.,7 7 for ex-
ample, the majority opinion reversed an award of punitive damages
because it found "no evidence, either direct or circumstantial, that
Coleman actually knew of a defect" in the design of the fuel can at issue
in that case;7" Judge Haney, in a dissenting opinion, described evidence
demonstrating that the danger of the design involved had been com-
mon knowledge for one hundred years and that the defendant itself had
for decades known how to design cans to prevent precisely the sort of
explosion that had injured the plaintiff.79 Laney makes clear that the
descriptions in other appellate opinions of the evidence in the record
must be read with considerable skepticism.
Review of a year's worth of these appellate opinions reveals a
problem which transcends the statistics described earlier. One could
readily mistake many of these decisions for the findings of fact and con-
clusions of law written by a district judge pursuant to Federal Rule of
76. Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685, 701 (1967); Continental Ore
Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690,.700 (1962); see infra note 376. Blackstone
warned: "[ln settling and adjusting a question of fact, when entrusted to any single magistrate,
partiality and injustice have an ample field to range in ... by... artfully suppressing some circum-
stances, stretching and warping others, and distinguishing away the remainder." 3 W. BLACK-
STONE, COMMENTARIES 380 (1803).
77. 758 F.2d 1299 (8th Cir. 1985).
78. Id. at 1305.
79. Id. at 1307. In Yopp v. Siegel Trading Co., 770 F.2d 1461 (9th Cir. 1985) (case with-
drawn from publication), the court of appeals overturned a jury finding that the defendant broker
had "churned" the plaintiffs' securities account, emphasizing that the plaintiff had demonstrated
his independence by rejecting some of the broker's recommendations. Id. at 1466. Judge Fletcher,
in a dissenting opinion, noted there was evidence that the plaintiff had rejected those suggestions
"because he had no ready cash to consummate the transactions." Id. at 1468.
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Civil Procedure 52.80 Often the fact that the case was even heard by a
jury is mentioned only in the introductory paragraph and is never again
referred to in the discussion of the merits of the appeal. The opinions
read like the earnest efforts of judges attempting to decide what the
facts really are, not like limited appellate review of a fact finding process
consigned to the jury. This tendency has become so routine that appel-
late opinions today frequently include express factual findings by the
circuit court. In Bristow v. Daily Press, Inc.,"1 for example, the jury
concluded that the defendant employer had constructively discharged
the plaintiff employee by requiring him to work under intolerable con-
ditions. In reversing the verdict, the Fourth Circuit explained:
It is obvious that Bristow's resignation arose from a particu-
lar financial dispute with his supervisors, and that at no time
did anyone impose intolerable working conditions with the
intent to compel him to retire. We cannot.., conclude that he
resigned due to any thing other than universal workaday
frustrations.8 2
In Craft v. Metromedia, Inc.8 3 the jury found that the defendants had
made fraudulently inaccurate statements to the plaintiff; the Eighth
Circuit concluded, after reviewing the evidence, "we are not satisfied
that it demonstrates that ... [the] statements were false." 8 4 Although
not all appellate decisions are this blatant, many of these opinions are
cast in terms of what "happened," rather than in terms of a summary of
testimony and documentary evidence.8 5
80. Rule 52 requires a trial judge to "find the facts specially" in cases tried without a
jury. FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a).
81. 770 F.2d 1251 (4th Cir. 1985).
82. Id. at 1256 (emphasis added).
83. 766 F.2d 1205 (8th Cir. 1985).
84. Id. at 1219 (emphasis added); see also id. at 1220 ("we believe that in her audition
interviews with KMBC Craft was concerned essentially with her hair and makeup and not with
clothing") (emphasis added); id. at 1220 n.17 ("we do not believe mere suggestions constitute a
'makeover' ") (emphasis added).
'85. Conan Properties Inc. v. Conans Pizza, Inc., 752 F.2d 145, 151 (5th Cir. 1985) ("we
hold that CPI has not carried its burden of proving that Conans subjectively and knowingly in-
tended to use its mark for the purpose of deriving benefit from CPI's good will") (emphasis
added); Estate of Davis v. Johnson, 745 F.2d 1066, 1071 (7th Cir. 1984) ("we find it difficult to see
how appellant knew that Davis was subject to the 'strong likelihood' of violence .. ") (emphasis
added); Gonzalez v. Volvo of America Corp., 752 F.2d 295, 300 (7th Cir. 1985) ("In our opinion
... the station wagon which defendant furnished to plaintiffs was not dangerous beyond the expec-
tations of ordinary consumers.") (emphasis added); Gumz v. Morrissette, 772 F.2d 1395, 1400
(7th Cir. 1985) (verdict overturned because the excessive force utilized was not "so egregious or
intolerable as to shock the conscience of the court") (emphasis added); Holley v. Sanyo Mfg. Inc.,
771 F.2d 1161, 1168 (8th Cir. 1985) (" We believe that Holley's evidence at trial was insufficient to
create a prima facie case.") (emphasis added); Malcak v. Westchester Park Dist., 754 F.2d 239, 244
(7th Cir. 1985) (" We hold that the Manual provision was a contract for at will employment.... We
hold that the automatic inclusion of the plaintiff's salary in the annual budget did not create a
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A plurality of appellate panels profess an unwillingness to over-
turn a jury verdict on evidentiary grounds unless the jury at issue ar-
rived at a result which no "reasonable" or "rational" ' s6 jury could have
reached. If the language of these opinions is to be taken seriously, a
large number of sitting federal appellate judges believe that a substan-
tial portion of the American public simply is not competent to resolve
the often mundane factual issues presented to civil juries. A federal
judge who thinks he has learned from experience that juries frequently
return "unreasonable" or "irrational" verdicts might well conclude
that he should adopt a general practice of deciding de novo any factual
issue that had earlier been resolved by a jury. But the insistence by fed-
eral judges that many juries are unreasonable or irrational, like the in-
sistence of Soviet apparatchiks that anyone who does not support the
Communist Party must be crazy, reveals more about the attitudes of the
officials involved than about the judgment or sanity of whose whom
they denounce.
The problem involves more than this common, although not uni-
versal, disdain for the division of factfinding responsibility established
by the seventh amendment. In the decades prior to 1968 the Supreme
Court had given specific substance to the admonition of the amendment
itself. The Court varied to some extent in its enthusiasm for limiting
appellate review of civil jury verdicts, and some doctrines were more
fully developed than others. But the Court's decisions on the whole es-
tablished a framework of legal principles which, if respected, would as-
sure that jury factual determinations would only rarely be overturned
on appeal. In the two decades since the Supreme Court abandoned its
traditional role in enforcing the seventh amendment, however, the cir-
cuit courts have differed widely in their willingness to adhere to those
once well-established principles.
III. APPELLATE REVIEW OF JURY LIABILITY DETERMINATIONS
When the seventh amendment was originally adopted, the modern
practices of ordering directed verdicts and granting judgments n.o.v.
did not yet exist. The most analogous practice, a demurrer to evi-
contract for year-to-year employment.") (emphasis added); id at 245 (" We hold that the individual
assurances by the commissioners did not create a contract for continued employment.") (emphasis
added); Tice v. Lampert Yards, Inc., 761 F.2d 1210, 1217 (7th Cir. 1985) ("We agree with the
finding of the district court that the plaintiff failed to carry his burden of persuasion establishing
that he was terminated because of his age.") (emphasis added); Yopp v. Seigel Trading Co., Inc.,
770 F.2d 1461, 1466 (9th Cir. 1985) (" We conclude, based on all the evidence before us, that Yopp
possessed sufficient intelligence and understanding to evaluate his brokers' recommenda-
tions .. ") (emphasis added).
86. See infra notes 166-67.
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dence,87 was utilized primarily to attack the legal theory of the non-
moving party, rather than to question the sufficiency of the evidence
offered by that party to establish some controverted fact. 9 The demur-
ring party was required to admit not only the truthfulness of all evi-
dence offered by the non-moving party, but also the existence of any
and all facts which that evidence "conduced" or "tended," even "indi-
rectly," to prove.9"
87. Commonly the moving party would submit a statement of the admitted facts; the
case would be resolved on the basis of the demurrer if the other party concurred in the statement,
or if the court concluded that the statement was as favorable to the non-moving party as was
warranted. Once the court accepted such a statement, the jury was discharged, for there were no
longer any factual issues for it to resolve. The court would proceed to decide, on the basis of the
facts admitted, which party was entitled as a matter of law to prevail. Demurrers to evidence under
English law are discussed in Cocksedge v. Fanshaw, 99 Eng. Rep. 80 (K.B. 1779); Gibson v.
Hunter, 126 Eng. Rep. 499 (1793); Wright v. Pindar, 82 Eng. Rep. 892 (1681). For a discussion of
demurrers to evidence in the United States, see Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 393-94
(majority opinion), 399-400 (Black, J., dissenting) (1943); Slocum v. New York Life Insurance Co.,
228 U.S. 364, 388-92 (majority opinion), 409-17 (Hughes, J., dissenting) (1913). For early exam-
ples of such demurrers in the federal courts, see Suydam v. Williamson, 61 U.S. 427 (1857); Fowle
v. Common Council of Alexandria, 24 U.S. 320 (1826); Bank of the United States v. Smith, 24
U.S. 171 (1826); Young v. Black, I I U.S. 565 (1813); Pawling v. United States, 8 U.S. 219 (1808);
Pickel v. Isgrigg, 6 F. 676 (C.C.D. Ind. 1881); Johnson v. United States, 13 F. Cas. 868 (C.C.D.
Me. 1830); Miller v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., 17 F. Cas. 304 (S.D. Ohio 1876); Patty v. Edelin, 18 F.
Cas. 1344 (C.C.D.C. 1802). See generally Schofield, New Trials and the Seventh Amendment, 8 ILL.
L. REV. 287, 381, 465 (1913); J. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON
LAW 234-39 (1898); S.M. PHILLIPS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 216-17 (3d ed. Albany
1850); BULLER, TRIALS AT NISI PRIUS 313 (1791).
88. "A demurrer to evidence is ... regarded in general as analogous to a demurrer upon
the facts alleged in pleading." Suydam v. Williamson, 61 U.S. 427, 436 (1857); see also Slocum v.
New York Life Ins. Co., 228 U.S. 364, 409 (1913) (Hughes, J., dissenting).
89. The Supreme Court commented in Fowle v. Common Council of Alexandria.
[Tlhe nature of the proceedings upon a demurrer to evidence, seems to have been totally
misunderstood in the present case. It is no part of the object of such proceedings, to bring
before the Court an investigation of the facts in dispute, or to weigh the force of testi-
mony or the presumptions arising from the evidence. That is the proper province of the
jury. The true and proper object of such a demurrer is to refer to the Court the law arising
from facts. It supposes, therefore, the facts to be already admitted and ascertained, and
that nothing remains but for the Court to apply the law to those facts.
Fowle, 24 U.S. at 322. Since under Fowle a non-moving party could be compelled to join a demur-
rer which admitted all facts that a jury could infer from the evidence, it is theoretically possible that
litigation over a demurrer might turn on a dispute as to what those facts were. But Fowle made
clear the Supreme Court's unwillingness to become embroiled in such disputes.
90. The common law required a court at times to examine the evidence to ascertain
whether the moving party had admitted in his demurrer every fact he was required to concede,
since a non-moving party could only be required to join in a demurrer which included all such
facts. Gibson v. Hunter, 126 Eng. Rep. 499 (1793), decided by the House of Lords, made clear that
a demurrer was sufficient only if it included every fact supported in any way by the evidence:
Parol evidence is ... often loose and indeterminate, often circumstantial. The reason for
obliging the party offering evidence.., to join in demurrer.... does not apply to parol
evidence which is loose and indeterminate, which may be urged with more or less effect to
a Jury, and least of all will it apply to evidence of circumstances, which evidence is meant
to operate beyond the proof of the existence of those circumstances, and to conduce to
the proof of the existence of other facts. And yet if... the party who demures, will admit
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the evidence of the fact, the evidence of which fact is loose or indeterminate, or in the case
of circumstantial evidence, if he will admit the existence of the fact, which the circum-
stances offered in evidence conduce to prove, .... the reasons for compelling the party
who offers the evidence to join in demurrer, will ... apply.
Id. at 509. Where evidence existed which conduced to prove a fact, the moving party could not ask
the court to assess the weight of that evidence. "[l1f the matter of fact be uncertainly alleged, or...
it be doubtful whether it be true or no, because offered to be proved by presumptions or probabili-
ties," the demurrer was not good unless it "confess the matter of fact to be true," and the demur-
ring party could not "refer that to the judgment of the court." Id. at 510 (quoting Wright v. Pindar,
82 Eng. Rep. 892 (1681)).
The federal courts faithfully followed the common law standard in the nineteenth century.
In Fowle v. Common Council of Alexandria, Justice Story expressly relied on Gibson in holding that
a party demurring to evidence must "distinctly admi[t] upon the record, every fact, and every
conclusion, which the evidence given for his adversary conduced to prove." Fowle, 24 U.S. at 322
(emphasis in original). The existence of any evidence which tended to prove a disputed fact re-
quired such an admission, since the courts could not undertake "to weigh the force of testimony or
the presumptions arising from the evidence." Id. Columbian Insurance Co. v. Catlett, 25 U.S. 383
(1827), decided the next year, reiterated that a demurring party was bound to admit "every fact
which the evidence ... conduced to prove;" in evaluating the scope of the required admission
"[tihe evidence is taken most strongly against the party demurring," and the admission must en-
compass any fact which that evidence conduces to prove even "indirectly." Id. at 389.
Other demurrer cases applied a similar standard. Chinoweth v. Lessee of Haskell, 28 U.S.
92, 96 (1830) (demurrer sustainable only if moving party entitled to judgment on "any fair con-
struction of the evidence"); Bank of the United States v. Smith, 24 U.S. 172, 179 (1826) (courts to
be "very liberal" in deciding what inferences could be drawn from evidence); Young v. Black, I I
U.S. 565, 568 (1813) (moving party must admit "all the facts which the evidence legally may con-
duce to prove"); Pawling v. United States, 8 U.S. 219, 222 (1808) (moving party admits "those
conclusions of fact which a jury may fairly draw from th[e] testimony. Forced and violent infer-
ences he does not admit; but the testimony is to be taken most strongly against him .. "); Johnson
v. United States, 13 F. Cas. 868, 872 (C.C.D. Me. 1830) (Story, J.) ("the party demurring is bound
to admit not merely all the facts which the evidence directly establishes, but all which it conduces
to prove"). See also Slocum v. New York Life Ins. Co., 228 U.S. 364, 388 (1913) (demurring party
must admit "every fact which the evidence of his adversary conduces to prove .. ").
Some authorities suggested that the moving party was obligated to admit all the facts which
the other side "attempts to prove," Young v. Black, 11 U.S. 565, 568 (1813), or "the truth of every
fact that has been alleged." 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTAMES 372 (1803). Fowle suggests that the
non-moving party could be required to join in a demurrer if there was not "any matter of fact in
controversy between the parties." Fowle, 24 U.S. at 321. See also Slocum, 228 U.S. at 409, 417-18
(Hughes, J., dissenting).
91. The Supreme Court first approved the trial court practice of directing verdicts in
Parks v. Ross, 52 U.S. 362 (1850). The Court sanctioned the use of a directed verdict because it
understood such a motion to be simply a more convenient procedure for raising and resolving the
same question framed by a demurrer to evidence; "[it answers the same purpose, and should be
tested by the same rules." Id. at 373. For several decades, in assessing requests for directed ver-
dicts, the Court adhered strictly to the substantive standards for demurrers to evidence.
Beginning in the 1830s the Supreme Court began to face the same issue in a new procedural
posture, ruling on arguments that a trial judge had erred in issuing an instruction which referred to
or withheld from a jury a particular factual issue. For forty years the Court consistently applied in
these cases the same standard utilized in evaluating a demurrer to evidence. In Greenleaf v. Birth,
34 U.S. 292 (1835), the plaintiff had sought an instruction that evidence offered by the defendant
"was not sufficient" to establish an affirmative defense. Id. at 299. The Supreme Court explained
that a federal judge had no authority to give any such instruction:
It is the province of the jury to weigh and decide on the sufficiency of the evidence; and
from the words of the instruction it would seem to be conceded, that there was some
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n.o.v. 9 2 were devised as more workable versions of the common law
demurrer to evidence,93 but, as Justice Hughes emphasized, the consti-
evidence ... , as the court were asked to instruct the jury that the evidence was not
sufficient to prove the fact. Where there is no evidence tending to prove a particular fact,
the court are [sic] bound so to instruct the jury, when requested; but they cannot legally
give any instruction which shall take from the jury the right of weighing the evidence and
determining what effect it shall have.
Id. In seven other cases, the last decided in 1870, the Court reiterated that ajudge could not direct a
jury to decide a disputed factual issue in a particular way unless there was literally no evidence
which "tended" or "conduced" to support the position of the opposing party. Barney v.
Schmeider, 76 U.S. 248, 251 (1869) (directed verdict appropriate if plaintiff "failed to offer any
evidence"); Hickman v. Jones, 76 U.S. 197, 201 (1869) (instruction proper only if there is "no
evidence" to support the plaintiff's claim, but not if there is "some"); Drakely v. Gregg, 75 U.S.
242, 268 (1868) (issue must be referred to jury if "there was evidence that tended to prove the
position" of the plaintiff) (emphasis in original); Weightman v. Washington, 66 U.S. 39, 49 (1861)
(instruction permissible only if "there is no evidence to sustain the action, or one of its essential
elements"); Bank of Metropolis v. Guttschlick, 39 U.S. 19, 31 (1840); United States v. Laub, 37
U.S. I, 5 (1838) (instruction proper only if there was "no evidence, tending to prove the matter in
dispute"); Lessee of Ewing v. Burnet, 36 U.S. 41, 50 (1837) (issue must go to jury "if there was any
evidence which conduced to prove" the disputed fact). These decisions were based in part on the
unwillingness of the Court, like the refusal of the House of Lords in Gibson, to attempt to evaluate
the weight or force of relevant evidence. Weightman, 66 U.S. at 49; Bank of Metropolis, 39 U.S. at
31; Laub, 37 U.S. at 5; Lessee of Ewing, 36 U.S. at 50. See also Sioux City & Pacific R.R. v. Stout,
84 U.S. 657, 663-64 (1873) ("Upon the facts proven .... it is a matter ofjudgment and discretion,
of sound inference, what is the deduction to be drawn.... It is this class of cases.., that the law
commits to the decision of a jury."); Lessee of Ewing, 36 U.S. at 50-51:
[lhf there was any evidence which conduced to prove any fact.., the court must assume
such fact to have been proved; for it is the exclusive province of the jury to decide what
facts are proved by competent evidence. It was also [the jury's] province to judge the
credibility of the witnesses, and the weight of their testimony, as tending, in a greater or
less degree, to prove the facts relied on; ... these were matters with which the court could
not interfere....
92. At common law, if a trial judge was convinced that a verdict lacked an evidentiary
basis, he or she could only order a new trial. In 1913 the Supreme Court held that, where a trial
judge had mistakenly rejected a motion for a directed verdict, an appellate court which recognized
that error could itself only remand the case for a new trial. Slocum v. New York Life Ins. Co., 228
U.S. 364 (1913). In 1935, however, the Supreme Court held in Baltimore & Carolina Line, Inc. v.
Redman, 295 U.S. 654 (1935), that a trial judge could defer acting on a motion for a directed
verdict until the jury itself had returned its verdict, and could then order entry of a judgment
contrary to that of the jury if the judge believed the earlier motion should have been granted.
Where resolution of the motion for a directed verdict had thus been reserved, the Court reasoned,
an appellate court too could order entry of a judgment inconsistent with the intervening jury
verdict. Id. at 659-61. The procedure that had been utilized in Redman was made universal in 1937
by the adoption of Rule 50 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provided that whenever
a motion for a directed verdict was denied or not granted the court was "deemed to have submitted
the action to the jury subject to a later determination of the legal questions raised by the motion."
5A MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 50.97 (2d. ed. 1985). The effect of Rule 50 was to authorize both
trial judges and appellate courts to direct entry ofjudgment n.o.v. in any case in which motions for
a directed verdict and for judgment n.o.v. had been filed by the party which lost at trial.
93. See Galloway, 319 U.S. at 393 n.28; Slocum, 228 U.S. at 418, 428 (Hughes, J., dis-
senting). In 1826 Justice Wheaton described demurrers to evidence as "an unusual and antiquated
practice, which this Court, and other Courts, have recently endeavored to discourage, as inconve-
nient, and calculated to suppress the truth and justice of the cause." Bank of the United States, 24
U.S. at 183. The practice also fell into disuse because the courts enjoyed discretion to refuse to
entertain even a well pleaded demurrer to evidence. Young, II U.S. at 568. A demurrer to evidence
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tutionality of these procedures depends on close adherence to the sub-
stantive standard that existed under the common law practice.94
Over the years the Supreme Court has used a variety of formula-
tions to describe the circumstances-be it on a demurrer to evidence, a
motion for a directed verdict, or a request for judgment n.o.v.-in
which a court could hold that there was a fatal lack of evidence to sup-
port a particular claim. The reigning modern formulation dates from
the 1946 decision in Lavender v. Kurn. 9 5
Only when there is a complete absence of probative facts to
support the conclusion reached does a reversible error ap-
pear .... [T]he appellate court's function is exhausted when
[an] evidentiary basis becomes apparent, it being immaterial
that the court might draw a contrary inference or feel that
another conclusion is more reasonable.9 6
This "complete absence of probative facts" standard, which had pre-
vailed in the late nineteenth century, 97 was reiterated by the Court in
1947,98 1957,99 and twice in 1963. 00 When Justice Harlan accused the
Court of requiring only a scintilla of evidence, 10 1 no member of the
majority saw fit to deny that characterization. In time even Justice
Harlan, among recent justices by far the most willing to overturn jury
also waived any objections to earlier rulings admitting disputed evidence. Suydam v. Williamson,
61 U.S. 427 (1857). The problems in the old demurrer to evidence are reflected in Rule 50(a), FED.
R. Civ. P., which expressly provides that a party which moves for a directed verdict does not waive
the right to offer evidence or to a trial by jury if the motion is denied.
94. Slocum, 228,U.S. at 401-09 (1913) (Hughes, J., dissenting); see also Galloway, 319
U.S. at 402 (Black, J., dissenting); Slocum, 228 U.S. at 418,423 (Hughes, J., dissenting); Pleasants
v. Fant, 89 U.S. 116, 121 (1874). In Galloway Justice Black asserted in dissent that the Supreme
Court was unconstitutionally applying a more stringent standard than had been utilized under a
demurrer to evidence. Galloway, 319 U.S. at 401-05. The majority opinion denied any such change
had occurred, but did not dispute Justice Black's premise that the courts could not require more
evidence to support a jury verdict than would have been required in 1793. Id. at 395.
95. 327 U.S. 645 (1946).
96. Id. at 653.
97. Chicago & Northwestern R.R. v. Ohle, 117 U.S. 123, 129 (1886) (verdict must be
upheld because "there was some evidence to support the finding"); Lancaster v. Collins, 115 U.S.
222, 225 (1885) (determination can only be overturned if "there was no evidence to sustain the
verdict rendered"); Sinclair v. Cooper, 108 U.S. 352, 360 (1883) (court cannot set aside verdict
"unless there is no evidence from which the conclusion of fact can be legally inferred") (citing
Parks v. Ross, 52 U.S. 362 (1850)); see Texas & Pacific R.R. v. Cox, 145 U.S. 593, 606 (1892)
(verdict upheld because there was evidence which "tended to establish" plaintiff's claim); Erhardt
v. Steinhardt, 153.U.S. 177, 182 (1894) (verdict upheld because "[tihere was evidence tending to
show" that plaintiffs' contentions were correct).
98. Myers v. Reading Co., 331 U.S. 477, 485 (1947).
99. Herdman v. Pennsylvania R.R., 352 U.S. 518 (1957).
100. Basham v. Pennsylvania R.R., 372 U.S. 699, 700 (1963); Dennis v. Denver & Rio
Grande W. R.R., 375 U.S. 208, 210 (1963).
101. Ferguson v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 352 U.S. 521, 564 (1957) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
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verdicts, cast his own arguments for doing so in terms of a claim that
there was no evidence to support a disputed verdict.' °2
Since Lavender, there have been no instances in which the Supreme
Court took a case from the jury because the Court thought the weight
of the plaintiff's evidence too slight; on the contrary, in every case in
which a plaintiff had adduced at least some evidence to support a dis-
puted claim of fact, the Court held that the jury alone should weigh that
evidence. The rare instances in which the Supreme Court did overturn a
jury verdict, or sustained a directed verdict, fit well within the common
law standards for a demurrer to evidence. In Inman v. Baltimore and
Ohio Railroad Co.' 03 and Herdman v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co. 104 the
parties were in agreement regarding what events had preceded and
caused the injuries to the plaintiffs. The question in Herdman was
whether those facts warranted application of the principle of res ipsa
loquitur, and the question in Inman was whether the agreed upon cir-;
cumstances created a duty on the part of the employer to take addi-
tional safety precautions-both issues which are often treated as essen-
tially legal. In Davis v. Virginian Railway Co.' °5 and New York, New
Haven & Hartford Railroad Co. v. Henagan' °6 the Court insisted the
record contained literally no evidence to support the jury verdicts at
issue. Although such assertions must ordinarily be taken with a grain of
salt, in these cases even Justices Black, Douglas and Murphy joined in
that characterization. Davis appears to be a case in which plaintiff's
counsel simply failed to introduce the evidence of general medical prac-
tice which is required to establish a medical malpractice claim; Henagan
presented facts almost identical to Herdman, 10 7 and as a practical mat-
ter may have been an unsuccessful attempt to invoke res ipsa loquitur.
The language used by the Supreme Court to describe the limita-
tions imposed by the seventh amendment is, perhaps unavoidably,
102. Salem v. United States Lines Co., 370 U.S. 31, 40 (1962) (Harlan, J., dissenting);
Maynard v. Durham & Southern Ry., 365 U.S. 160, 165-66 (Whittaker, J. and Harlan, J., dissent-
ing); Davis v. Virginian Ry., 361 U.S. 354, 359 (1960) (Harlan, J., dissenting) 360 (Whittaker, J.,
dissenting) (record lacks "any evidence"); Harris v. Pennsylvania R.R., 361 U.S. 15, 27 (1959)
(Harlan, J., dissenting). See also Shenker v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., 374 U.S. 1, 12-14 (1963)
(Goldberg, J., dissenting) ("no evidence"); Inman v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., 361 U.S. 138, 142
(1959) (Whittaker, J., concurring) (record lacks even a "scintilla" of evidence); Moore v. Terminal
R.R. Ass'n, 358 U.S. 31, 32 (1958) (Whittaker, J., dissenting) (record "does not contain any evi-
dence of negligence").
103. 361 U.S. 138 (1959).
104. 352 U.S. 518 (1957).
105. 361 U.S. 354 (1960).
106. 364 U.S. 441 (1960).
107. In Henagan the plaintiff was injured when the train on which he was riding stopped
abruptly to avoid hitting a man attempting to commit suicide by standing on the tracks. In Herd-
man the plaintiff was injured when the train on which he was riding stopped abruptly to avoid
hitting a car on the tracks.
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more evocative than specific, but it provides a key barometer of the
Court's determination to preclude or severely limit appellate reconsid-
eration of jury factfinding. Although there have been some shifts in the
general formulations articulating the requirements of the seventh
amendment, the Court has announced and repeatedly adhered to a
number of subsidiary, but decidedly more specific, rules delineating the
constitutional limitations on the authority of federal judges to overturn
jury verdicts. These rules grew out of the Supreme Court's extensive
experience with the enforcement of the seventh amendment, its under-
standing of the types of factual issues which juries are typically called
upon to resolve, and its familiarity with the ways in which overreaching
lower court judges have sought to usurp the factfinding responsibilities
ofjuries. This body of well established subsidiary principles, had it been
respected by the circuit courts in the years since 1968, would have kept
appellate reversals of civil jury verdicts at a relatively low level. An ex-
amination of the substance of the 1984-1985 decisions overturning jury
verdicts reveals that the circuit courts routinely, and often expressly,
disregard the specific constitutional safeguards embodied in the
Supreme Court's pre-1968 opinions.
A. Credibility of Witnesses
For almost a century the Supreme Court has repeatedly insisted
that jurors alone are to evaluate the demeanor and credibility of wit-
nesses. In its 1891 decision in Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Ward, the
Court explained:
The jury were the judges of the credibility of the witnesses...
and in weighing their testimony had the right to determine
how much dependence was to be placed upon it. There are
many things sometimes in the conduct of a witness upon the
stand, and sometimes in the mode in which his answers are
drawn from him through questioning of counsel, by which a
jury are to be guided in determining the weight and credibility
of his testimony. That part of every case ... belongs to the
jury, who are presumed to be fitted for it by their natural intel-
ligence and their practical knowledge of men and the ways of
108
men....
108. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 140 U.S. 76, 88 (1891).
The Supreme Court has applied a similar rule restricting appellate review of credibility de-
terminations made by a trial judge:
When findings are based on determinations regarding the credibility of witnesses, Rule
52(a) demands even greater deference to the trial court's findings; for only the trial judge
can be aware of the variations in demeanor and tone of voice that bear so heavily on the
listener's understanding of and belief in what is said.
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Over the decades that followed, notwithstanding changes in the
Supreme Court's view of such matters as the "no evidence" rule, the
Court consistently reiterated that a jury's evaluation of credibility
could not be reconsidered on appeal." 9
The general principle announced in Aetna Life Insurance has a
number of important ramifications that were subsequently elaborated
upon by Supreme Court or early circuit court opinions. In cases involv-
ing a mix of documentary and testimonial evidence, of course, the jury's
unreviewable responsibility for assessing credibility would not by itself
be dispositive of the factual disputes at issue. There are circumstances
in which the testimony of even the most believable witness could not
support a jury verdict: if a witness testified with utter credibility that X
had been killed in a car accident, but X subsequently appeared in the
courtroom alive and well, no court could sustain a wrongful death ver-
dict on behalf of X's estate.1 10 But there are at least four types of situa-
tions in which a jury's credibility assessment would at least ordinarily
be conclusive of any dispute regarding the sufficiency of the evidence.
First, when two or more witnesses give conflicting testimony con-
cerning a question of fact about which they have personal knowledge,
and no documentary or other objective evidence is dispositive of the
issue, a jury's decision to believe one witness, and disbelieve the others,
must be treatedas conclusive. 11' Such a decision may turn on the jury's
evaluation of the truthfulness of the conflicting statements, or on its
evaluation of the reliability of a witness's observations or memory. Just
as demeanor may convince a jury that one of two witnesses is lying, so
too the witnesses' bearing on the stand may lead a jury to conclude that
one of the witnesses, although sincere, does not fully recall what oc-
curred on the date in question or paid scant attention to the event at
issue when it actually occurred.
Anderson v. City of Bessemer, 470 U.S. 564, 575 (1985).
109. Ellis v. Union Pac. R.R., 329 U.S. 649, 653 (1947); Lavender v. Kurn, 327 U.S. 645,
652-53 (1946); Brady v. Southern Ry., 320 U.S. 476, 479 (1943); Galloway v. United States, 319
U.S. 372, 407 (1943) (Black, J., dissenting); Pence v. United States, 316 U.S. 332, 338 (1942);
Gunning v. Cooley, 281 U.S. 90, 94 (1930); Baltimore & 0. R.R. v. Groeger, 266 U.S. 521, 524
(1925).
110. The Court noted in Anderson v. City of Bessemer, 470 U.S. 564, 575 (1985), in dis-
cussing the limits imposed by Rule 52, FED. R. Civ. P., on appellate review of a trial judge's
credibility determinations, that "[d]ocuments or objective evidence may contradict the witness'
story."
11l. Ellis v. Union Pac. R.R., 329 U.S. 649, 653 (1947) ("The choice of conflicting ver-
sions of the way the accident happened, the decision as to which witness was telling the truth ...
are questions for the jury."); cf Anderson v. City of Bessemer, 470 U.S. 564, 575 (1985) ("[w]hen a
trial judge's finding is based on his decision to credit the testimony of one of two or more witnesses,
each of whom has told a coherent and facially plausible story that is not contradicted by extrinsic
evidence, that finding, if not internally inconsistent, can virtually never be clear error.")
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Second, where only a single witness testifies to a particular fact, a
jury may conclude, based on his or her demeanor, not merely that the
witness is untrustworthy-that he or she may not know the relevant
facts or might not be giving a reliable, accurate report-but that the
witness is lying-that he or she does know the relevant facts and is de-
liberately testifying in a manner that is the opposite of the truth.1 12
Learned Hand observed, for this reason, that the testimony of a witness
that Y occurred could support a jury finding that Y did not in fact
occur. A witness's bearing on the stand may convince a jury
not only that the witness' testimony is not true, but that the
truth is the opposite of his story; for the denial of one, who
has a motive to deny, may be uttered with such hesitation,
discomfort, arrogance or defiance, as to give assurance that he
is fabricating, and that, if he is, there is no alternative but to
assume the truth of what he denies.' 13
What an appellate court may consider "uncontradicted" testimony, a
jury might legitimately have regarded as a deliberate misrepresentation
of the truth. A reading of the cold transcript of such testimony, like a
reading of the text of the automobile advertisements featuring televi-
sion personality Joe Isuzu, might well lead the reader to conclusions
that would seem palpably mistaken to anyone who had actually ob-
served the statements involved.
The Supreme Court faced just this sort of situation in Sonnentheil
v. Christian Moerlein Brewing Co." 4 That case turned on whether sev-
eral creditors, who were relying on a deed of trust, had known at the
time they accepted the deed that it had been executed by the grantor as
part of a scheme to defraud certain third parties. All of the creditors
testified that they were unaware of the fraudulent scheme, and there
was apparently no other evidence bearing on the extent of their knowl-
edge. The creditors unsuccessfully urged the trial judge to instruct the
jury
that... it has not been shown that at the time of such accep-
tance such creditors had knowledge of any fraudulent intent
112. In Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, 466 U.S. 485 (1984), the majority asserted:
"When the testimony of a witness is not believed, the trier of fact may simply disregard it. Nor-
mally the discredited testimony is not considered a sufficient basis for drawing a contrary conclu-
sion." Id. at 512. "Discredited" testimony, testimony which the trier of fact regards as unreliable,
is quite different from testimony which the trier of fact believes deliberately misstated the truth.
The language of Bose differs from some earlier opinions suggesting that a finding of contrary fact
was impermissible even if the trier of fact "disbelieved" the critical testimony, that is, concluded
that it was not truthful. See Moore v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 340 U.S. 573, 576 (1951). See WEB-
STER'S SEVENTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 237 (disbelieve), 238 (discredit) (1967).
113. Dyer v. MacDougall, 201 F.2d 265, 269 (2d Cir. 1952).
114. 172 U.S. 401 (1899).
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in the making of such deed, or had any cause to suspect that
the same was made with fraudulent intent.1 15
The Supreme Court held that the issue had properly been submitted to
the jury, and upheld the jury's finding that the creditors had had such
knowledge.1" 6 The Court reasoned that the jurors, based on the de-
meanor and credibility of the creditor witnesses, could have concluded
that the creditors were lying when they denied having knowledge of the
fraudulent scheme. 11 7
Although a jury is entitled to conclude, on the basis of demeanor
or other factors, that a witness was deliberately stating the opposite of
the truth, it does not follow that a verdict that, for example, a defendant
drove negligently should automatically be upheld whenever there is tes-
timony that the defendant had driven in a non-negligent manner. There
must be something in the record suggesting that the veracity of the rele-
vant witness had been put at issue and that the jury thus might have
based its verdict on a conclusion that the witness was lying. A witness'
truthfulness might be called into question by opposing counsel through
cross examination or closing argument, or, as in Sonnentheil, by the
witness himself because of an apparent interest in the outcome of the
litigation or because of inconsistencies in his or her statements. 1 8 Once
the truthfulness of such a witness has been put in issue, a jury may infer
from his testimony the existence of facts which it believes the witness
tried to hide, and an appellate court should not attempt to evaluate the
testimony in a different manner. 1 9
115. Id. at 406.
116. Id. at 408:
[lI]t was possible for the jury to have found that the accepting creditors had knowledge of
the fraud at the time of their acceptance. They were all apparently interested in sustaining
the deed, and in denying all knowledge of a fraudulent intent, and while the jury has no
right to arbitrarily disregard the positive testimony of unimpeached and uncontradicted
witnesses, the very courts that lay down this rule qualify it by saying the mere fact that
the witness is interested in the result of the suit is deemed sufficient to require the credibil-
ity of his testimony to be submitted to the jury as a question of fact.
(citations omitted).
117. Similarly, the Supreme Court has held in a Title VII case that the testimony of de-
fense witnesses regarding their motives may, although not directly contradicted by another wit-
ness, be discredited by "effective cross-examination" or other circumstances "showing that the
employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence." Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v.
Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255 n.10, 256 (1981).
118. It has been suggested that testimony that a particular traffic light was green would
not by itself support a jury verdict that the light was red. See Dyer v. MacDougall, 201 F.2d 265,
269 (2d Cir. 1952). That is probably correct, for there would be no reason, without more, to.
assume the jury based its verdict on an assessment of the credibility of the critical witness.
119. A related problem may arise in the course of jury selection in a capital case. Under
Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968), as modified by Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412
(1985), a juror opposed to the death penalty may not be excluded for cause unless his views would
"prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his
instructions and his oath." Wainwright, 469 U.S. at 425 (quoting Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45
1989:237 Judges Against Juries
Third, the jury is necessarily the final arbiter of the meaning of
testimony which on a cold record is arguably ambiguous. Twice in re-
cent years this issue has arisen in the context of appellate review of the
decisions of trial judges, whose factual findings are for non-constitu-
tional reasons entitled to significant deference. In Anderson v. City of
Bessemer12 ° the plaintiff, in order to establish her claim of sex discrimi-
nation, alleged that she, unlike male job applicants, had been asked if
her spouse approved of her decision to take a job requiring night work.
Although a female interviewer had discussed spousal reaction with a
male applicant, 1 2 1 the trial court believed that interviewer's statement
was a "facetious" comment made in reaction to the questions asked the
female plaintiff, and concluded that the plaintiff had in fact been treated
differently than men. 122 The court of appeals reversed, insisting that
the female interviewer's remarks were not a facetious statement but a
serious inquiry to the male applicant about his wife's views. 1 2 3 The
Supreme Court reinstated the findings of the trial judge, emphasizing
that it was for the trier of fact to resolve ambiguities in the meaning of
testimony. 124 Similarly, in Wainwright v. Witt' 25 the Court said it was
for the trial judge to decide what a prospective juror meant when she
said her views on capital punishment would "interfere" with her sitting
on a capital case. 126
(1980)). In reviewing the exclusion of a disputed juror the Court will defer to the decision of the
trial judge, rather than make its own de novo determination, because of the possibility that a trial
judge might infer that a juror was misrepresenting his or her willingness to obey the instructions or
oath. Some "veniremen... may wish to hide their true feelings ... " Id. at 425. "[T]he manner of
the juror while testifying is often times more indicative of the real character of his opinion than his
words." Id. at 428 n.9 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 156-57 (1879)).
120. 470 U.S. 564 (1985).
121. The female interviewer testified as follows:
Q. Did you tell Phyllis Anderson that Donnie Kincaid was not asked about night work?
A. You asked if there was any question asked about-I think Donnie was just married,
and I think I made the comment to him personally-and your bride won't mind.
Q. So, you asked him yourself about his own wife's reaction?
A. No, no.
Q. That is what you just said.
Anderson v. City of Bessemer, 470 U.S. at 578 n.3.
122. Anderson v. City of Bessemer, 557 F. Supp. 412, 414 (W.D.N.C. 1983).
123. Anderson v. City of Bessemer, 717 F.2d 149, 155 (4th Cir. 1983).
124. Anderson, 470 U.S. at 578-79:
[The female interviewer's] testimony on these matters is not inconsistent with the theory
that her remark was not a serious inquiry into whether [the male applicant's] wife ap-
proved of his applying for the position. Whether the judge's interpretation is actually
correct is impossible to tell from the paper record, but it is easy to imagine that the tone
of voice in which the witness related her comment.., might have conclusively established
that the remark was a facetious one.
125. 469 U.S. 412 (1985).
126. Id. at 434:
Face to face with living witnesses the original trier of the facts holds a position of advan-
tage from which appellate judges are excluded. In doubtful cases the exercise of his power
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Fourth, a jury's assessment of credibility will often be decisive of
any issue regarding the mental state, knowledge, or intent of a witness.
Frequently the only person who understands with certainty what a par-
ticular individual knew or intended at a given point in time will be the
individual himself. In a civil action for tortious interference with a con-
tractual relation, for example, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant
knew of the relevant contract and intended to interfere with it. 1 27
Where the defendant's actual knowledge or motive is in dispute, and
the defendant himself takes the stand and testifies about the issue, the
jury's resolution of that question-whether the jury believes or disbe-
lieves that critical testimony-will often be conclusive. 128 The decision
in Anderson regarding whether the female interviewer intended her
words to the male applicant as a serious question, and in Wainwright v.
Witt regarding what the disputed juror actually believed about the
death penalty, involved just such disputes about mental states.
Although the subject matter of the jury verdicts overturned on ap-
peal in 1984-1985 is extraordinarily diverse, one issue pervades a large
portion of these cases. In the appeals in which a circuit court over-
turned a civil jury verdict, the most common question about which a
jury and appellate panel disagreed concerned the mental state of the
defendant or the defendant's employees. The largest number of these
cases concerned the motive of the defendant-thus the appellate courts
have overturned verdicts that defendants acted for the purpose of dis-
criminating on the basis of race 129 or age, 130 or with an intent to
deceive, to defraud,' 3 1 or to retaliate for constitutionally protected
of observation often proves the most accurate method of ascertaining the truth.... How
can we say the judge is wrong? We never saw the witnesses.... To the sophistication and
sagacity of the trial judge the law confides the duty of appraisal .... Thus, whatever
ambiguity respondent may find in this record, we think that the trial court, aided as it
undoubtedly was by its assessment of [the juror's] demeanor, was entitled to resolve it in
favor of the State....
127. PROSSER ON TORTS § 129 (5th ed. 1984).
128. There may, of course, be circumstances in which material evidence is dispositive of
the issue, regardless of the testimony. If the plaintiff produces a copy of the contract at issue,
discovered in the plaintiffs own files and covered with the plaintiff's fingerprints and hand written
notes, a simple claim of ignorance by the plaintiff would not be sufficient to sustain a jury finding
on that issue in favor of the plaintiff.
129. Christensen v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y, 767 F.2d 340, 343-44 (7th Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1102 (1986); Martin v. Citibank, N.A., 762 F.2d 212, 217-20 (2d Cir. 1985);
Smith v. Monsanto Chem. Co., 770 F.2d 719, 721-24 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1050
(1986).
130. Bristow v. Daily Press, Inc., 770 F.2d 1251, 1252 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475
U.S. 1082 (1986); Christensen v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y, 767 F.2d 340, 343-44 (7th Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1102 (1986); Holley v. Sanyo Mfg., Inc., 771 F.2d 1161, 1164-68 (8th Cir.
1985); Tice v. Lampert Yards, Inc., 761 F.2d 1210, 1213-18 (7th Cir. 1985).
131. Clarkson v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 761 F.2d 189, 191 (4th Cir. 1985); Craft v'
Metromedia Inc., 766 F.2d 1205, 1219-21 (8th Cir. 1985), cerl. denied, 475 U.S. 1058 (1986);
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speech. 132 The courts of appeals have reversed jury verdicts regarding
malice and willfulness 133 or a lack of good faith. 134 The circuit courts
have repeatedly thrown out jury verdicts because the appellate judges
disagreed with the jury's findings that the defendants knew certain criti-
cal facts, such as that products produced by the defendants were dan-
gerous, 135 that the stock options the defendants urged the plaintiff to
purchase were a risky investment, 136 that a prison inmate was in danger
of physical abuse,' 37 that particular employees were black or white,"13
or that their actions were illegal or unconstitutional.1
39
Usually the individual whose knowledge or intent was critical to
the case testified in these cases, and the circuit court opinion overturn-
ing the jury verdict rested largely on the decision of the appellate judges
to credit that pivotal defense testimony. 140 None of these appellate de-
cisions acknowledge, however, that these cases present any issue of
credibility; the appellate panels merely recite the evidence supporting
the defendants' claims of good faith or ignorance, frequently relying on
Mackey v. Burke, 751 F.2d 322, 327-29 (10th Cir. 1984); Yopp v. Siegel Trading Co., 770 F.2d
1461, 1464-65 (9th Cir. 1985).
132. McSurely v. McClellan, 753 F.2d 88, 102-03 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
1005 (1985); Neubauer v. City of McAllen, Texas, 766 F.2d 1567, 1573-78 (5th Cir. 1985). See also
Redic v. Gary H. Watts Realty Co., 762 F.2d 1181, 1187 (4th Cir. 1985) (intent to create a
contract).
133. Davis v. West Community Hosp., 755 F.2d 455, 466-67 (5th Cir. 1985); Gilkerson v.
Toastmaster, Inc., 770 F.2d 133, 137 (8th Cir. 1985); Lerman v. Flynt Distrib. Co., 745 F.2d 123,
140-41 (2d Cir. 1984); Mr. Chow v. Ste. Jour Azur, S.A., 759 F.2d 219, 230 (2d Cir. 1985); Rorex v.
Traynor, 771 F.2d 383, 388 (8th Cir. 1985); Lavicky v. Burnett, 758 F.2d 468,477 (10th Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1101 (1986). See also Abeshouse v. Ultragraphics, 754 F.2d 467, 472 (2d Cir.
1985) ("innocent" infringement of copyright); J. Yanan Associates v. Integrity Ins. Co., 771 F.2d
1025, 1034-35 (7th Cir. 1985).
134. Delta Rice Mill, Inc. v. General Foods Corp., 763 F.2d 1001, 1003-05 (8th Cir.
1985); Park v. El Paso Board of Realtors, 764 F.2d 1053, 1062 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474
U.S. 1102 (1986); cf. Conan Properties v. Conans Pizza, 752 F.2d 145, 150-51 (5th Cir. 1985);
LeSavage v. White, 755 F.2d 814, 821-22 (11 th Cir. 1985); United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Royal Ins.
Co., 759 F.2d 306, 309-12 (3d Cir. 1985).
135. Gideon v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 761 F.2d 1129, 1145 (5th Cir. 1985); Laney v.
Coleman Co., 758 F.2d 1299, 1305 (8th Cir. 1985).
136. Yopp v. Siegel Trading Co., 770 F.2d 1461, 1464 (9th Cir. 1985).
137. Thomas v. Booker, 762 F.2d 654, 659 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1117
(1986).
138. Martin v. Citibank, N.A., 762 F.2d 212, 217-18 (2d Cir. 1985).
139. Lavicky v. Burnett, 758 F.2d 468, 477 (10th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1101
(1986); Gilkerson v. Toastmaster, Inc., 770 F.2d 133, 137 (8th Cir. 1985). See also Neubauer v.
City of McAllen, Texas, 766 F.2d 1567, 1574-75 (5th Cir. 1985) (knowledge that plaintiff had
engaged in constitutionally protected union activity); Smith v. Monsanto Chem. Co., 770 F.2d
719, 724 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1050 (1986) (knowledge that white workers had
engaged in the same practice for which black plaintiff had been dismissed); LeSavage v. White, 755
F.2d 814, 819 (11 th Cir. 1985) (knowledge that complaints to police were groundless).
140. See, e.g., Craft v. Metromedia Inc., 766 F.2d 1205, 1219-20 (8th Cir. 1985); Christen-
sen v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y, 767 F.2d 340, 343-44 (7th Cir. 1985); Holley v. Sanyo Mfg.,
Inc., 771 F.2d 1161, 1164-68 (8th Cir. 1985); Tice v. Lampert Yards, Inc., 761 F.2d 1210, 1214-15
(7th Cir. 1985).
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testimony by the defendant or its employees or agents, and then pro-
nounce that evidence too conclusive to permit a verdict for plaintiff.
The appeals courts simply never discuss or consider the possibility that
the jury might have thought that those key defense witnesses were lying,
or at the least untrustworthy.
All of these decision seem flatly inconsistent with the Supreme
Court's opinion in Sonnentheil. The central issue in dispute in this
group of cases concerns the past mental state of a witness; the veracity
of that witness is obviously in dispute, since the plaintiffs claim rests on
an allegation regarding that mental state, and the witness, ordinarily
either a defendant or an employee of the defendant, has an obvious
motive for misrepresenting the facts. In ordinary life, if a juror wanted
to find out what an individual knew, or why that individual had taken a
particular action, the first thing the juror would do would be to ques-
tion the individual directly, and try to make a personal judgment as to
whether the individual had responded truthfully. Credibility evalua-
tions are probably the most common way in which we evaluate the in-
tentions and knowledge of others. If a supervisor testifies that he fired a
plaintiff for reasons other than race, and the plaintiff claims that he was
fired because of his race, the central issue in the case is whether the
supervisor was telling the truth when he was on the stand; it is almost
inconceivable that the jury's verdict in such a case, like the verdict in
Sonnentheil, would not rest, at least in part, on its assessment of the
credibility and demeanor of the witness.
The Supreme Court decisions in Aetna Life Insurance, Sonnentheil,
and their progeny would, if fairly read, largely preclude any appellate
reconsideration of the mental state of a party witness. The contrary
manner in which many appellate panels are actually dealing with issues
of this type today is illustrated by the Seventh Circuit decision in Chris-
tensen v. Equitable Life Assurance Society."'4 The plaintiff in that case
was a long-time management employee whose work had generally been
rated as satisfactory; at the age of 52 he was removed from his position
and replaced by a younger man. The plaintiff alleged, and the jury
found, that the plaintiff had lost his job as a result of intentional dis-
crimination on the basis of age. 14 2 The court of appeals acknowledged
that the evidence adduced by the plaintiff was sufficient to make out a
prima facie case of discrimination, but held:
[t]he record establishes . . . that Equitable rebutted this pre-
sumption by articulating legitimate, nondiscriminatory rea-
sons for the action.. 43 ... Evidence submitted by Equitable,
141. 767 F.2d 340 (7th Cir. 1985).
142. Id. at 342-43.
143. Id. at 343.
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consisting of testimony by Christensen's immediate supervi-
sor and another company executive, showed that the company
had been concerned about Christensen's job performance for
sometime. 14 4 ... Equitable showed that it considered Chris-
tensen only marginally qualified for the very important posi-
tion he held, and that it wished to replace him with someone it
regarded as far better qualified .... Christensen utterly failed
to meet the burden which shifted to him, once Equitable
showed a nonpretextual reason for its action, of "demon-
strat[ing] that the proffered reason was not the true reason for
the employment decision. 14
5
It seems never to have occurred to the Seventh Circuit that the jury
might have ruled for Christensen because it simply did not believe the
pivotal testimony of the company executives who had demoted the
plaintiff, and because it regarded the demeanor of those key defense
witnesses as demonstrating that their explanations were pretextual.1 46
Although there are a large number of appellate decisions like
Christensen overturning jury verdicts regarding the mental state of a
witness, other appellate panels have recognized that a jury is entitled to
reject as not credible the testimony of a key witness, especially where
that witness has a stake in the outcome of the litigation. In Knapp v.
Whitaker,14 7 for example, the plaintiff alleged that school board offi-
cials had taken various adverse personnel actions in order to punish
him for certain activities protected by the first amendment. The defen-
dants insisted that they had taken the disputed actions for legitimate
non-retaliatory purposes, but the court of appeals noted that the
jury was not obligated to believe that testimony: "The credibility of the
witnesses and the weight of the evidence are matters within the purview
144. Id. at 342 (emphasis added).
145. Id. at 343 (emphasis added).
146. The Eighth Circuit overturned in a similar fashion a jury finding of age discrimina-
tion in Holley v. Sanyo Mfg., Inc., 771 F.2d 1161 (8th Cir. 1985). The court summarized at length
the testimony of the employer's witnesses and relied on it to conclude that the plaintiff had not
been discharged because of his race:
[Elven if we were to assume that Holley's evidence established a prima-facie case of dis-
crimination, Sanyo articulated nondiscriminatory reasons for the discharge. The evi-
dence demonstrated a careful plan to spread the impact of the layoffs over all groupings
of employees based on race, sex, and age. Holley's discharge, which followed from the
consolidation of his position with another pursuant to the carefully planned reduction-
in-force, was based on a reasonable factor other than age and was for good cause....
Holley's evidence .. makes no showing that Sanyo's articulated reasons for discharge
were pretextual.
Id. at 1168. This opinion, which dispenses with any deference to the jury and overtly decides the
factual dispute at issue, simply accepts as truthful the testimony of the critical defense witnesses.
147. 757 F.2d 827 (7th Cir. 1985).
148. Id. at 844.
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of the jury, especially in a case such as this which turns, in large mea-
sure, upon the defendants' motive in making certain decisions. '"149
In Fishman v. Clancy, 50 another first amendment retaliation case,
the First Circuit observed that "where state of mind is crucial to the
outcome of a case, jury judgments about credibility are typically
thought to be of special importance." 15  In upholding a jury verdict of
age discrimination in Stacey v. Allied Stores Corp.,' 52 the District of
Columbia Circuit held that "the jury could have refused to credit the
defense ... that Mr. Stacey's performance was not up to par.... [I]t is,
of course, elementary that credibility determinations are reserved exclu-
sively to the jury."'1 5 3 In Stacey the appellate court thought it possible
that the jury had chosen to disbelieve the proffered testimony because it
was contradicted, in part, by another witness who, "quite unlike" the
key defense witness, "had no direct stake in this litigation."' 5 4 In Hale
v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.,' 5 the court of appeals believed a credi-
bility issue had been raised by the existence of prior inconsistent state-
ments. In Cole v. Bertsch Vending Co., Inc.,156 the appellate panel held
that an arguable lack of candor in statements made by a witness prior
to the commencement of the litigation raised such an issue.
Although many appellate opinions simply accept without explana-
tion the veracity of critical testimony inconsistent with the jury's ver-
dict, some cases go further and establish legal rules that expressly re-
quire juries to treat certain testimony as truthful, regardless of whether
the demeanor of the witness may have convinced everyone in the court-
room that he was lying through his teeth. In La Montagne v. American
Convenience Products, Inc.,' 57 the Seventh Circuit held that, in the ab-
sence of some substantial evidence to the contrary, "a reasonable jury
could not reject [the defendant's] plausible account" of why it had dis-
missed the plaintiff. In Marino v. Ballestas,'5 8 the Third Circuit held
that a jury was required to accept certain "uncontradicted" evidence
offered by the plaintiff, rejecting the argument of a dissenting opinion
149. Id. at 843.
150. 763 F.2d 485 (1st Cir. 1985).
151. Id. at 488 (quoting Stephanischen v. Merchants Despatch Transp. Corp., 722 F.2d
922, 928 (1st Cir. 1983)). The court of appeals noted that the district court, in denying a defense
motion for judgment n.o.v., had described the critical defendants as neither "particularly good
[nior as particularly forthcoming witnesses." Id. at 489.
152. 768 F.2d 402 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
153. Id. at 407-08.
154. Id. at 408.
155. 756 F.2d 1322, 1337 (8th Cir. 1985) (question of whether the company knew of tire
rim defect turned on jury evaluation of the "credibility" and "truthfulness" of a company engineer
who testified that he was unaware of the defect).
156. 766 F.2d 327, 332 (7th Cir. 1985).
157. 750 F.2d 1405, 1411 (7th Cir. 1984) (emphasis added).
158. 749 F.2d 162, 168, 171 (3d Cir. 1984).
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that the jury could reject the testimony if "it did not find that testimony
credible." In Seidenstein v. National Medical Enterprises, Inc.,1 59 the
Fifth Circuit held that when a defendant insisted he had acted in good
faith, a jury could infer from his demeanor that the witness was unrelia-
ble, and thus disregard his testimony, but that the jury could not con-
clude that the witness was lying, and thus hold that he had not acted in
good faith. These restrictions on juries are not, however, uniformly ac-
cepted; other appellate decisions hold that a jury is free to conclude that
a witness is not merely untrustworthy, but a liar.16 °
In most of the appellate decisions involving problems of credibil-
ity, the courts of appeals have insisted on crediting testimony which the
jury may have considered unbelievable. Conversely, appellate panels in
several instances have held that the juries erred in accepting testimony
which the appellate judges themselves thought was not credible. In Eyre
v McDonough Power Equipment, Inc.,16 1 the Fifth Circuit dismissed as
"implausible to a degree approaching the incredible" the testimony of
the plaintiff in a product liability case. In Estate of Davis v. Johnson,162
the Seventh Circuit rejected as unreliable testimony that a jail supervi-
sor could have heard the sounds of the beating suffered by the plaintiff
inmate:
[O]ne prisoner in the female holding area said that he heard
the sounds of a beating, and one officer stated that such
sounds would have to be loud if they were audible to that pris-
oner. The testimony of the prisoner in the female area, how-
ever, is strikingly wanting in detail. In particular, the prisoner
was unable to establish accurately the time at which he heard
the sounds of a beating .... Accordingly, we believe that the
... prisoner['s] testimony was of such inferior quality that it
cannot support the jury's verdict on the Section 1983
counts.
16 3
159. 769 F.2d 1100, 1105 (5th Cir. 1985).
160. See, e.g.. Molex, Inc. v. Nolen, 759 F.2d 474, 479 (5th Cir. 1985) (although defen-
dant testified he did not know certain information was confidential, "the jury was not required to
believe him and did not"); Goldstein v. Manhattan Industries, Inc., 758 F.2d 1435, 1445 (11 th Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1005 (1985) ("The employer offered explanations for all of these
actions, which were not directly rebutted. The jury was not required to accept these explanations
but was entitled to draw its own conclusions .....
161. 755 F.2d 416, 418 (5th Cir. 1985).
162. 745 F.2d 1066 (7th Cir. 1984).
163. id. at 1072 (emphasis added). See also Taliferro v. Augle, 757 F.2d 157, 159 (7th Cir.
1985):
Taliferro's testimony lacked credibility.... His unsubstantiated testimony that he had
seen Augle at a Nazi rally, wearing a Nazi-style uniform and Hitler mustache, was bi-
zarre .... Taliferro's testimony that he was seriously beaten is hard to square with the
fact that he waited several days after his release from jail before going to a doctor. ...
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Although these decisions are clearly inconsistent with Aetna Life Insur-
ance, other recent appellate decisions have expressly refused to enter-
tain challenges to the credibility of testimony accepted by a jury. 164
Appellate decisions which reject testimony credited by the jury are
particularly egregious violations of the seventh amendment, but they
are relatively rare. Considerably more important and common are ap-
pellate dispositions of jury verdicts-particularly regarding the mental
state of a party witness-which insist on crediting testimony which the
jury may have found unbelievable. The rate at which appellate courts
are currently reversing civil jury verdicts would be substantially reduced
if the courts were to recognize that when a party witness testifies about
his or her mental state, the jury's disposition of the case will ordinarily,
and properly, turn on its assessment of the credibility of the witness. It
makes no sense to suggest, as some courts have, that such testimony is
"undisputed"; the very nature of the claims of the opposing party puts
the correctness of that testimony in dispute. It makes even less sense to
require in employment discrimination cases, where the plaintiff has es-
tablished a prima facie case of discrimination and the defendant has
offered testimony of benign purposes, that the plaintiff produce addi-
tional evidence that the purported purpose was a "pretext." Since the
prima facie case supports a verdict different than that supported by the
defense testimony, such a case necessarily presents a straightforward
conflict in the evidence,, a conflict which the jury may well resolve in
large measure based on its evaluation of the credibility of the defense
testimony. 165
The rate of appellate reversals would also be reduced if the courts
were to recognize that jurors will at times draw factual conclusions
from the mendacious testimony of a witness with personal knowledge
of the disputed facts. To forbid juries to do so would be to establish an
164. Air et Chaleur, S.A. v. Janeway, 757 F.2d 489, 493 (2d Cir. 1985); Armstrong v.
Kansas City S. Ry., 752 F.2d 1110, 1113-14 (5th Cir. 1985); Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d
1205, 1279 (7th Cir. 1984); Cazzola v. Codman & Shurtleff, Inc., 751 F.2d 53, 54 (lst Cir. 1984);
Dobbs v. Gulf Oil Co., 759 F.2d 1213, 1218 (5th Cir. 1985); Eisenberg v. Gagnon, 766 F.2d 770,
779 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 946 (1985); Fishman v. Clancy, 763 F.2d 485, 489 (1st Cir.
1985); Grogan v. General Maintenance Service Co., 763 F.2d 444, 447 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Herold v.
Burlington Northern, Inc., 761 F.2d 1241, 1248 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 888 (1985); Hibma
v. Odegaard, 769 F.2d 1147, 1153 (7th Cir. 1985); LaMontagne v..American Convenience Prod-
ucts, Inc., 750 F.2d 1405, 1410 (7th Cir. 1984); Leonard v. Uniroyal, Inc., 765 F.2d 560, 566 (6th
Cir. 1985); Molex, Inc. v. Nolen, 759 F.2d 474, 479 (5th Cir. 1985); O'Donnell v. Georgia Osteo-
pathic Hosp., Inc., 748 F.2d 1543, 1550 n.8 (1 th Cir. 1984); Phillips v. Hardware Wholesalers,
Inc., 762 F.2d 46, 48 (6th Cir. 1985); Spanish Action Comm. of Chicago v. City of Chicago, 766
F.2d 315, 319-20 (7th Cir. 1985); Stacey v. Allied Stores Corp., 768 F.2d 402, 407-08 (D.C. Cir.
1985); Tavoulareas v. Piro, 759 F.2d 90, 105 & n.14 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Thomas v. Booker, 762 F.2d
654, 659 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1117 (1985); Toth v. YoderCo., 749 F.2d 1190, 1197 (6th
Cir. 1984); Wildman v. Lerner Stores Corp., 771 F.2d 605, 609 (1st Cir. 1985).
165. See Brown v. Sierra Nevada Memorial Miners Hosp., 849 F.2d 1186, 1192 (9th Cir.
1988); Grigsby v. Reynolds Metals Co., 821 F.2d 590, 595-96 (11 th Cir. 1987).
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absolute bar to recovery in those cases in which the only witness with
direct knowledge of a critical fact, such as the circumstances of an acci-
dent, chooses to lie. Such a witness is especially likely to misrepresent
the facts, since he or she testifies with the knowledge that no witness
could be found to contradict whatever is said. At least where such a
witness has a reason to lie-because, for example, the witness or his or
her employer is a party to the case-evidence of such a possible motive,
in combination with testimony the jury found unbelievable, would
fairly support a jury verdict that the facts are the opposite of the ac-
count testified to by the disputed witness.
B. Inference Drawing and the Sufficiency of Evidence
The Supreme Court in Lavendar v. Kurn directed that a jury verdict
be upheld unless there was "a complete absence of probative facts to
support the conclusion reached." 166 Although this formulation was at
least as symbolic as it was substantive, most federal appellate courts
today neither heed the symbol nor adhere to the substance. The largest
group of appellate opinions hold that there must be sufficient evidence
that a "reasonable" jury might arrive at the verdict in question. 16 7 A
second major group of opinions requires that there be "substantial"
evidence supporting a disputed verdict. 168 The third principal category
of decisions overturns jury verdicts only where there is "no evidence" to
support them. 169 Other standards crop up only occasionally. Thus var-
ious panels have required that the evidence be sufficient that a "fair,"
"impartial," 170 or "rational" 1 71 jury could reach the same conclusion
as the jury below, or that the verdict not be against the "great weight"
166. Lavendar v. Kurn, 327 U.S. 645, 653 (1946).
167. See, e.g., U.C. Castings Co. v. Knight, 754 F.2d 1363, 1369 (7th Cir. 1985); Conan
Properties, Inc. v. Conans Pizza, Inc., 752 F.2d 145, 149 (5th Cir. 1985); DeFranco v. Valley Forge
Ins. Co., 754 F.2d 293, 295 (8th Cir. 1985); Haney v. Mizell Memorial Hosp., 744 F.2d 1467, 1478-
79 (11th Cir. 1984); Klein v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 773 F.2d 1421, 1424 (4th Cir. 1985); Marino v.
Ballestas, 749 F.2d 162, 167 (3d Cir. 1984); Plante v. Hobart Corp., 771 F.2d 617, 618 (Ist Cir.
1985); Rhea v. Massey-Ferguson Inc., 767 F.2d 266, 269 (6th Cir. 1985); Romero v. National Rifle
Assoc. of Am., 749 F.2d 77, 79-81 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
168. Arceneaux v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 767 F.2d 1498, 1501-02
(I Ith Cir. 1985); Erebia v. Chrysler Plastic Products Corp., 772 F.2d 1250, 1256 (6th Cir. 1985);
Eyre v. McDonough Power Equipment, Inc., 755 F.2d 416,420 (5th Cir. 1985); Handgards, Inc. v.
Ethicon, Inc., 743 F.2d 1282, 1288 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1190 (1985); Laney v.
Coleman Co., 758 F.2d 1299, 1303 (8th Cir. 1985).
169. Armstrong v. Kansas City S. Ry., 752 F.2d 1110, 1112-14 (5th Cir. 1985); Delevaux
v. Ford Motor Co., 764 F.2d 469, 473 (7th Cir. 1985); Jamesbury Corp. v. Litton Industrial Prod-
ucts, Inc., 756 F.2d 1556, 1558 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Mr. Chow of New York v. Ste. Jour Azur, S.A.,
759 F.2d 219, 230-31 (2d Cir. 1985).
170. Estate of Davis v. Johnson, 745 F.2d 1066, 1070 (7th Cir. 1984).
171. Electro-Miniatures Corp. v. Wendon Co., Inc., 771 F.2d 23, 26-27 (2d Cir. 1985);
McKinnon v. City of Berwyn, 750 F.2d 1383, 1391 (7th Cir. 1984).
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of the evidence. 172 More than a dozen appellate opinions in 1984-1985
utilize standards that combined several of these criteria. The most com-
mon combinations were the "reasonable jury" and "substantial evi-
dence" rules 17 3 and the "reasonable" and "fair" jury standards. 174
These decisions generally read as though the appellate court believed
that the criteria were really alternative formulations of the same legal
standard.
There are occasional suggestions that these varying formulas do in
fact reflect quite distinct legal rules. For example, a few opinions apply-
ing the "reasonable jury" and "substantial evidence" rules expressly
disapprove of the "no evidence" standard.17 Two decisions assert that
the constitutional standard for appellate review of jury verdicts is the
same as the standard of review under Rule 52 for district judge opin-
ions. 1 16 One court applying the "substantial evidence" rule insisted
that "merely suggestive" evidence will not suffice 1 77-a view that cer-
tainly seems on its face quite different than the "no evidence" or even
"reasonable jury" standards. Yet on the whole these widely varying for-
mulations appear to have little substantive content. Evaluated in the
abstract, it would be difficult to explain or understand just what a court
meant, for example, by the "reasonable jury" or "substantial evidence"
172. In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation, 756 F.2d 411, 418 (5th Cir. 1985);
Perry v. Stewart Title Co., 756 F.2d 1197, 1205-06 (5th Cir. 1985).
173. Dixon v. International Harvester Co., 754 F.2d 573, 587 (5th Cir. 1985); Gideon v.
Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 761 F.2d 1129, 1143 (5th Cir. 1985); Herold v. Burlington Northern,
Inc., 761 F.2d 1241, 1245 (8th Cir. 1985); J.E.K. Industries, Inc. v. Shoemaker, 763 F.2d 348, 352-
53 (8th Cir. 1985); Keiser v. Coliseum Properties, Inc., 764 F.2d 783, 785 (11 th Cir. 1985); Trans-
World Manufacturing Corp. v. Al Nyman & Sons, Inc., 750 F.2d 1552, 1560-61 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
174. Grogan v. General Maintenance Service Co., 763 F.2d 444, 447 (D.C. Cir. 1985);
Gutierrez v. Exxon Corp., 764 F.2d 399, 402 (5th Cir. 1985); O'Donnell v. Georgia Osteopathic
Hosp., Inc., 748 F.2d 1543, 1549 (1 1th Cir. 1984). See also Transgo, Inc. v. AJAC Transmission
Parts Corp., 768 F.2d 1001, 1014 (9th Cir. 1985) (substantial evidence, reasonable, clear error);
Dartez v. Fibreboard Corp., 765 F.2d 456, 469, 471 (5th Cir. 1985) ("any evidence" and "any
substantial evidence"); Douglass v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 769 F.2d 1128, 1137, 1139 (7th Cir.
1985) (rational, reasonable); Okeson v. Tolley School Dist. No. 25, 760 F.2d 864, 868 (8th Cir.
1985) (reasonable, rational, substantial evidence); Park v. El Paso Board of Realtors, 764 F.2d
1053, 1059 (5th Cir. 1985) (substantial evidence, reasonable, fair); Smith v. Monsanto Chemical
Co., 770 F.2d 719, 722 (8th Cir. 1985) (reasonable, rational evidence, "all one way"); Smith v.
Updegraff, 744 F.2d 1354, 1366 (8th Cir. 1984) (reasonable, rational evidence, "all one way").
175. J.E.K. Industries v. Shoemaker, 763 F.2d 348, 353 (8th Cir. 1985); Ramsey v. Ameri-
can Air Filter Co., Inc., 772 F.2d 1303, 1307 (7th Cir. 1985); Tice v. Lampert Yards, Inc., 761 F.2d
1210, 1213 (7th Cir. 1985); La Montagne v. American Convenience Products, Inc., 750 F.2d 1405
(7th Cir. 1984).
176. Transgo, Inc. v. AJAC Transmission Parts Corp., 768 F.2d 1001, 1014 (9th Cir.
1985); Tullos v. Resource Drilling, Inc., 750 F.2d 380, 385 (5th Cir. 1985).
177. La Montagne v. American Convenience Products, Inc., 750 F.2d 1405, 1413 (7th
Cir. 1984). This decision stands in stark contrast to the common law rule that, "[i]f there be cir-
cumstantial evidence only slightly tending to prove a fact, the demurring party is required to admit
that fact to be absolutely true before the opposite party will be required to join in the demurrer."
Pickel v. Isgrigg, 6 F. 676, 678 (C.C.D. Ind. 1881).
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standard, or when, if at all, the different formulations might in practice
yield different results. The appellate decisions provide no substance to
any of these vague formulations. None of the opinions applying the
"reasonable jury" standard explain how much evidence a reasonable
jury would require; the relevant opinions are every bit as uninformative
regarding how much evidence is "substantial evidence." Equally signifi-
cant, there is no perceptible correlation between the standard which a
panel applies and the result which it reaches. Indeed, a review of the
appellate decisions strongly suggests that these formulations do not
function as legal standards at all, but are merely rhetorical flourishes
which open or close each opinion. In decisions concluding that there is
"no evidence" to support a jury verdict, that formulation often seems
intended to emphasize the weakness of the jury-winner's position,
rather than to establish a broad range of situations in which jury ver-
dicts would be upheld. 7 ' It is common, and perhaps understandable,
for appellate opinions in the same circuit to use different formulations.
One can, of course, readily hypothesize cases in which the differ-
ences among these standards might well mean something, or construct
standards which would have clear, predictable, and distinct meanings.
Suppose, for example, that the evidence in a case showed that the dece-
dent in an automobile accident had been run off the road by a negli-
gently driven blue car, and officials at a nearby police roadblock could
identify all the blue cars on the road at the time. If the defendant were
driving one of two such cars, there would be a one in two chance that he
had committed the tort; if there were three such cars, the odds would be
one in three, and so on. Odds of one in one hundred might satisfy the no
evidence standard, but not the substantial evidence rule; it would be
possible, at least in theory, to impart a different specific probability re-
quirement to each of the various alternative formulations. In hypotheti-
cal situations of this sort, where it might be feasible to calculate the
probability that a jury's verdict was correct, the "no evidence" rule
seems particularly unappealing; something would surely be wrong with
a rule that required that a motion for a directed verdict be denied so
long as there was any probability above zero, even if only one in a mil-
lion, that a particular defendant was the individual who had negligently
injured a plaintiff.
But the actual problems that arise in appellate decisions are noth-
ing like this hypothetical. In the case discussed above, any mathemati-
cian could mechanically calculate the probability that the defendant
was the tortfeasor; the mathematician would not need to understand
anything about automobile accidents, or even know what a car is or
what the word "blue" means. In real life, however, the problem faced
178. See cases cited supra note 169.
1989:237
WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW
by juries and the appellate courts is not the making of such mathemati-
cal calculations, but the assessment of evidence in the context of their
pre-existing knowledge of and assumptions about the world. In an ac-
tual accident case there would be no police roadblock to limit the group
of possible tortfeasors; a jury would have to compare the description of
the vehicle, for example, "dark, recent model, and sporty" with the
defendant's car, say, a brown 1987 Porsche, bearing in mind, for exam-
ple, what ordinary people mean by the words "sporty" and "recent
model," and whether many cars meeting that description existed in the
locale involved. Depending on the assumptions and experience of the
jury or appellate court, either might conclude that the defendant almost
certainly was, or very probably was not, the cause of the accident.
Most factual questions that come before juries involve neither
probability calculations nor conflicting testimony from eyewitnesses to
the disputed event. The task of the jury, rather, is to decide what oc-
curred by drawing inferences about the disputed events from non-con-
clusive evidence. Here, too, the circuit courts today clearly depart from
the standards previously established by the Supreme Court. The
Supreme Court repeatedly emphasized in the past that the process of
inference drawing is ordinarily consigned to the jury. 179 More impor-
tant, the Court has offered a detailed practical explanation of why the
seventh amendment confers the responsibility for inference drawing on
juries rather than judges. In an 1874 decision in Sioux City & Pacific
Railroad Co. v. Stout the Court observed:
[I]t is a matter of judgment and discretion, of sound inference,
what is the deduction to be drawn from the undisputed
facts.... It is this class of cases and those akin to it that the
law commits to the decision of a jury. Twelve men of the aver-
age of the community, comprising men of education and men
of little education, men of learning and men whose learning
consists only in what they have themselves seen and heard, the
merchant, the mechanic, the farmer, the laborer; these sit to-
gether, consult, apply their separate experience of the affairs
of life to the facts proven, and draw a unanimous conclusion.
This average judgment thus given it is the great effort of the
179. Tennant v. Peoria & Pekin Union Ry., 321 U.S. 29, 34-35 (1944) ("It is the jury, not
the court, which ... weighs the contradictory evidence and inferences ... and draws the ultimate
conclusion as to the facts. The very essence of its function is to select from among conflicting
inferences and conclusions that which it considers most reasonable."); Standard Oil Co. v. Brown,
218 U.S. 78, 86 (1910) ("[wNhat the facts were ... and what conclusions were to be drawn from
them were for the jury and cannot be reviewed here."); Hyde v. Booraem & Co., 41 U.S. (16 Pet.)
232, 236 (1842) ("we have no authority, as an appellate court, upon a writ of error, to revise the
evidence in the court below, in order to ascertain whether the judge rightly interpreted the evidence
or drew right conclusions from it. That is the proper province of the jury ... ").
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law to obtain. It is assumed that twelve men know more of the
more common affairs of life than does one man, that they can
draw wiser and safer conclusions from admitted facts thus oc-
curring than can a single judge.' 8
What the Court said a century ago about the differing knowledge and
experiences ofjudges and juries is even more true in our own time. With
the possible exception of certain monastic orders, there are few groups
in America today which have had a narrower personal acquaintance
with the common affairs of life than do federal judges. The typical fed-
eral judge went directly from college to law school and then to private
practice or academia before being elevated to the bench. Few if any
federal judges at any point during their adult lives have ever applied for
or held a non-legal job, been out of work, had an unpleasant encounter
with the police, handed out leaflets, lived on a meager budget or wel-
fare, or seen the inside of a factory, a mine, a social security office, or a
prison. The overwhelming majority of federal judges are white men
who are necessarily ignorant of many of the day-to-day experiences of
minorities and women, and who may be blissfully unaware of the ways
in which those experiences are often dramatically different than their
own.
The experiences which most federal judges lack are ordinarily vital
to the process of drawing inferences from evidence. The significance of
testimony or other forms of proof depends largely on the nature of the
society within which it arose. Evidence that a defendant was driving on
the left side of a two-way street would support an inference of negli-
gence in New York or Florida, but not in England or Australia. The
understanding and experiences which a trier of fact brings to a case is
often of decisive significance in the selection of inferences to be drawn
from the evidence. The importance of that background is critical to the
constitutional requirement that fact finding be left in the hands of a
jury. So long as the background information relevant to evaluating evi-
dence falls within the probable understanding of the men and women
likely to comprise a jury, federal judges should be especially reluctant to
differ with the inferences which the jury chose to draw. The reason for
that desirable reluctance is more than simply constitutional-as a prac-
tical matter judges will often be less competent than jurors to evaluate
the evidence.
Considered in light of the Supreme Court's comments in Stout, it is
readily apparent how and why the appellate courts -have gone astray in
recent years. In a large number of the instances in which circuit courts
have overturned jury verdicts, the appellate panel disagreed with the
180. 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 657, 663-64 (1874).
1989:237
WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW
inferences which the jury had drawn from the evidence, and in many of
these cases the evaluation of the evidence at issue turned largely on a
knowledge of "the common affairs of life," knowledge which federal
judges were likely to lack.
The largest group of these cases involve problems connected with
the workplace and employment. In Jasperson v. Purolator Courier
Corp., s1 the plaintiff alleged that she had difficulty obtaining a job be-
cause her previous employer had refused, in violation of state law, to
provide a letter explaining why she had lost a previous position as a
courier guard. The Eighth Circuit held that a jury could not infer that
the plaintiff had been injured unless there was express evidence that a
particular employer had refused to hire the plaintiff because she had no
such letter of recommendation. 182 Members of the jury, who unlike the
appellate panel doubtless had considerable actual experience applying
for jobs, might well have drawn an inference of injury because they
knew from their own lives that employers generally or uniformly look
askance at applicants who lack such recommendation letters. Federal
judges, on the other hand, are unlikely to have the foggiest idea whether
such letters are important when an unemployed worker is looking for a
new job.
In Plante v. Hobart Corp.1 8 3 and Powell v. J.I. Posey Co. s18 1 the
appellate courts held that a jury could not reasonably infer that a fac-
tory worker and a nurse, respectively, would have taken greater precau-
tions had the defendants provided them with effective warnings about
the dangers of their products. The work experience of ordinary jurors,
unlike the jobs held by lawyers and judges, was likely to entail exposure
to potentially hazardous equipment, and thus to provide jurors with a
direct understanding of how workers respond to warnings about such
dangers. In Bristow v. Daily Press, Inc.' the Fourth Circuit disagreed
with and reversed a jury verdict that working conditions on a particular
job were so bad that "no reasonable person" would have stayed. A
federal judge, whose every job was in all probability safe, comfortable,
and handsomely paid, would have no better idea what working condi-
tions would be intolerable to an ordinary man or woman than might
the Sultan of Brunei. In Smith v. Monsanto Chemical Co. 186 the plain-
tiff alleged that he was fired because of his race, and attacked as pretex-
tual the employer's argument that he had been dismissed for taking a
company towel into the firm's parking lot to wipe off his car. Although
181. 765 F.2d 736 (8th Cir. 1985).
182. Id. at 742.
183. 771 F.2d 617 (Ist Cir. 1985).
184. 766 F.2d 131 (3d Cir. 1985).
185. 770 F.2d 1251, 1255 (4th Cir. 1985).
186. 770 F.2d 719 (8th Cir. 1985).
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the plaintiff proved that white employees regularly took towels out of
the plant for the same or similar purposes, the appellate panel insisted
that the jury could not infer racial motivation absent additional evi-
dence that the employer knew of this practice. 117 Jurors with personal
experience in industrial plants might well have based such an inference
on their own knowledge that management officials, as a practical mat-
ter, would ordinarily be well aware of the existence of any such em-
ployee practice."'
Employment discrimination cases combine two types of circum-
stances which, although unfamiliar to judges, are well within the exper-
iences which jurors ordinarily bring to their deliberations. First, of
course, these cases usually arise in plants or offices whose personnel
practices are quite unlike anything a lawyer or judge might personally
have experienced. Most members of the bar probably have never in
their adult lives filled out a job application or sat in the personnel office
of a commercial employer, and most have no personal understanding of
the typical relationships that exist, for example, between supervisors
and workers on a plant floor. Equally important, an appellate panel
composed only of white males-as the vast majority of court of appeals
panels are-will have no personal experience with discrimination on the
basis of race or sex. Jurors who have had such experiences are more
likely to be familiar with the telltale comments or attitudes that signal
an invidious motive, or with the types of excuses used to explain away
such discrimination. A trier of fact must also bring to the evaluation of
the evidence some understanding of whether the type of discrimination
alleged is widespread or virtually unheard of. A black or female juror
who has been on the job market for twenty years can better make that
type of judgment than a white male who has spent the same period of
time on the bench.
A number of these problems are well illustrated by the issues in
Craft v. Metromedia, Inc.,' 8 9 the celebrated case involving a female
television anchor removed from that position allegedly because the sta-
tion management believed she was too unattractive and insufficiently
deferential to men. The action was tried on a civil fraud theory, the
plaintiff claiming that the defendants, in order to recruit her from an-
other station, had falsely represented that they had no intention of in-
sisting on a "makeover" of her appearance. The plaintiff had made
clear during her interview for the position that she would not take the
187. Id. at 724.
188. See also Vippolis v. Village of Haverstraw, 768 F.2d 40 (2d Cir. 1985) (overruling
jury inference that police officer would not have utilized unconstitutionally excessive force and
engaged in false arrest if the officer had been sent to a police academy, as required by state law,
rather than been provided casual on-the-job training).
189. 766 F.2d 1205 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1058 (1986).
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proffered job if a "makeover" were contemplated, having been sub-
jected in an earlier job to such treatment, which she regarded as unpro-
fessional for a journalist. Craft began work in January 1981; by May
1981, Metromedia officials ordered precisely the types of changes she
had feared, ultimately issuing a "clothing calendar" specifying what she
would wear on a day by day basis. In August 1981, Craft left the station
in Kansas City and returned to her old position in California.190 The
case was tried twice before federal juries in St. Louis; both juries con-
tained a significant number of women,' 9 and both returned verdicts
for the plaintiff.192 An all-male panel of the Eighth Circuit reversed.
The central claim in Craft concerned a deceptive recruiting prac-
tice that might well be familiar to jurors but not judges-luring a de-
sired employee into changing jobs, and in Craft's case into moving sev-
eral thousand miles, with promises the employer intends to disregard
once the employee has given up his or her former job and would be in
no position to complain. Craft also involved a number of issues which
the male appellate judges were uniquely ill-equipped to evaluate. The
appeal turned in part on whether the changes in appearance sought by
the station constituted a "makeover," the term used in the representa-
tions made to recruit Craft. The appellate judges suggested, based on
their own reading of the record, that many if not all the changes subse-
quently demanded by the station fell outside of what the parties would
have regarded as a "makeover." The male judges seem to have had no
idea, as most men would not, that "makeover" has for several decades
been a term in common parlance among women and has a fairly well
understood meaning that refers to changes large and small in a wo-
man's clothes, jewelry, hair, and cosmetics that are designed to bring
about a substantial "improvement" in the woman's physical appear-
ance. Judges Donald Lay, Theodore McMilligan, and John Gibson
were certain that changes in clothing were not encompassed within the
meaning of the term "makeover";193 any reader of Glamour, Cosmo-
politan or Vogue would have known otherwise. 194 The term "make-
over" also has among women a connotation at least as important as the
types of changes encompassed. The fundamental idea implicit in the
concept of a makeover, a concept actively encouraged if not invented
by fashion magazines and cosmetic manufacturers, is that the overall
physical appearance of a woman can be substantially. improved by the
types of changes encompassed in a "makeover," and that such changes
190. Id. at 1208-09.
191. There were four women on the first 12-member jury, and six women on the second
12-member jury. Interview with Dennis Egan, counsel for plaintiff (Oct. 23, 1987).
192. Craft, 766 F.2d at 1210.
193. Id. at 1220.
194. See, e.g., Holiday Makeovers to Make you Shine, GLAMOUR, Dec. 1987, at 194.
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in physical appearance ought to be of central importance to the made-
over woman. A woman would probably understand that when a pro-
spective female employee expressed objections to any "makeover" by
her employers, that employee was not stating that she was committed to
her particular hairstyle, makeup, and wardrobe, and would tolerate
only modest changes, but that she did not want to work for a station
that attached substantial importance to, and would contemplate con-
trolling, whether a television journalist wore designer fashions, a partic-
ular number of ruffles and bows, or one rather than two strings of
pearls. 9 If that were the meaning of the "no makeover" agreement, as
a jury might well have concluded, then even on the Eighth Circuit's
view of the remaining facts the jury verdicts in Craft would have been
proper.
A jury may also be in a better position to draw inferences from the
evidence because jurors bring to their deliberations an understanding of
relevant local circumstances. In Pietroniro v. Borough of Oceanport'
9 6
the plaintiff claimed that municipal officials in a New Jersey city, alleg-
edly acting to further their own financial interests, had denied the plain-
tiff certain assistance required by federal law in relocating a store that
had been closed as a result of urban renewal. The only commercially
viable alternative site was apparantly a tract that required a zoning va-
riance before the plaintiff could operate a store there. Although the in-
dividual defendants included both the mayor and a member of the city
council, the Third Circuit panel-composed of three judges from Penn-
sylvania-believed that individual defendants and the city itself were
powerless to do more for the plaintiff because a legally separate entity-
the Oceanport Board of Adjustment-had the authority to grant the
needed variance. Neither the mayor nor members of the council served
on the Board. A New Jersey jury with an understanding of local politi-
cal realities, on the other hand, might well have believed that in the real
world a mayor and city council could have had significant influence, or
even absolute control, over the actions of a local zoning board had
those officials sought, as the law required, to assist in the relocation.' 97
In other cases, although the jury might have had no greater under-
standing of the subject matter than the appellate courts, jurors were at
least as competent as judges to draw the critical inferences. In Gonzalez
195. See, e.g., Craft, 766 F.2d at 1209 n.2, 1214.
196. 764 F.2d 976 (3d Cir. 1985).
197. See also Neubauer v. City of McAllen, Texas, 766 F.2d 1567 (5th Cir. 1985) (litiga-
tion arising out of attempt to organize police union and related referendum); Park v. El Paso
Board of Realtors, 764 F.2d 1053 (5th Cir. 1985) (independence of local board of realtors from
realtors themselves); cf White v. Register, 412 U.S. 755, 769-70 (1973) (district judge's decision
upheld because it turned on "an intensely local appraisal" of the evidence).
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v. Volvo of America Corp.1 9 8 the plaintiff alleged that he was injured
because a car manufacturer had failed to provide a warning that its
station wagon was unsafe when pulling certain types of trailers. The
court of appeals held that the Volvo at issue "was not dangerous be-
yond the expectations of ordinary consumers," since in deciding
whether it was safe to drive the vehicle pulling the trailer, "[i]t is the
advice of [trailer lessors], and not the warnings of automobile manufac-
turers upon which ordinary consumers. . . rely." 99 A panel of jurors
would surely have had at least as good an understanding as a panel of
judges about how "ordinary consumers" act in such circumstances. 200
In Estate of Davis v. Johnson2"' one of the plaintiffs sought damages for
loss of society and companionship following the wrongful death of his
father. The father had been institutionalized most of his adult life, and
the son had seen him on average once a month during visits to the
mental institutions where the father lived. The visits had continued
throughout the father's life, despite the fact that the father was so se-
verely disabled that he only rarely recognized his son. The jury con-
cluded that the relationship between father and son was sufficiently sub-
stantive that the son was entitled to damages, while the appellate judges
insisted that the son had "suffered no loss of society or companionship
when his father died.",212 It may be difficult for most people to fully
understand and appreciate the relationship that might exist between an
individual and a severely disabled, even mute, parent, but the personal
experiences of judges do not make them any better able than jurors to
understand such a painful and difficult situation.
In a number of instances appellate courts and juries differed over
whether the actions of defendants were merely negligent, as the judges
believed, or were grossly negligent, willful, or deliberate, as the juries
concluded. 20 3 Because of the considerable difficulty in ascertaining the
precise mental state of a defendant at a point in the past, one cannot
readily imagine circumstances in which, despite clear proof of negli-
gence, a court could say that no reasonable jury could infer gross negli-
gence, willfulness, or even malice. To make such distinctions, a trier of
198. 752 F.2d 295 (7th Cir. 1985).
199. Id. at 300. See also Conti v. Ford Motor Co., 743 F.2d 195, 198 (3d Cir. 1984) (effect
on consumer of additional or more explicit warnings).
200. Since federal judges are considerably wealthier than the average juror, it is quite
possible that jurors would be more likely to have had experience renting U-Haul trailers.
201. 745 F.2d 1066 (7th Cir. 1984).
202. Id. at 1074.
203. Clarkson v. Orkin Exterminating Co., Inc., 761 F.2d 189, 191 (4th Cir. 1985) (revers-
ing jury finding that misrepresentation was deliberate rather than merely negligent); Gilkerson v.
Toastmaster, Inc., 770 F.2d 133, 137 (8th Cir. 1985) (reversing jury finding of willfulness); Lavicky
v. Burnett, 758 F.2d 468, 475, 477 (10th Cir. 1985) (affirming jury finding that the defendants did
not act in good faith but reversing jury finding of malice); Rorex v. Traynor, 771 F.2d 383, 388 (8th
Cir. 1985) (affirming verdict of negligence, but reversing verdict of gross negligence).
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fact must evaluate the degree of apparent danger and of unreasonable-
ness involved, and consider whether the levels of both were sufficiently
high that the defendant must have foreseen and intended the conse-
quences of his or her actions.2 °4 Almost by definition, reasonable men
and women could disagree over these issues.
In most instances appellate decisions rejecting the inferences
drawn by a jury consist largely of a summary of the evidence and an
assertion that it fails to meet whatever vague legal standard the panel
has announced it will apply. In a few cases, despite repeated Supreme
Court admonitions that appellate judges may not attempt to assess the
weight of the evidence before the jury,2 °5 the courts of appeals ac-
knowledge that they have done precisely that.20 6 In other instances, to
avoid the appearance of having merely reweighed the evidence, the ap-
pellate courts have resorted to several analytic, or perhaps merely se-
mantic, devices to justify their actions.
The first of these devices is to assert that the jury's verdict is "spec-
ulative, ' ' 2°' a perjorative term which suggests that the jury could have
had no real idea what the facts were, and must therefore have reached
its conclusion by guesswork. An argument that the relevant evidence is
weak-an argument on its face insufficient to overcome the restrictions
of the seventh amendment-is recast to sound like a far more serious
204. SeeW. PROSSER&W. KEETON, LAwoFTORTS§8, at36(5thed. 1984)("[T]hedistinc-
tion between intent and negligence obviously is a matter of degree.").
205. See Gunning v. Cooley, 281 U.S. 90, 94 (1930) ("Issues that depend on the... weight
of evidence are to be decided by the jury."); Baltimore & 0. R.R. v. Groeger, 266 U.S. 521, 524
(1925) ("The... weight and probative value of evidence are to be determined by the jury and not
by the judge."); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 140 U.S. 76, 91 (1891) ("We have no concern with
questions of ... the weight to be given to the evidence."); Lancaster v. Collins, 115 U.S. 222, 225
(1885) ("this court cannot review the weight of the evidence..."); Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Doster, 106
U.S. 30, 32 (1882) ("Where a cause fairly depends upon the effect or weight of testimony, it is one
for the consideration and determination of the jury .... ).
206. La Montagne v. American Convenience Products, Inc., 750 F.2d 1405, 1410-13 (7th
Cir. 1984):
We do ... weigh the evidence to the extent of determining whether the evidence to sup-
port the verdict is substantial .... We have concluded that none of the three items of
evidence adduced by La Montagne is sufficient by itself to support [the] verdict of age
discrimination. In addition, we think that their combined weight is still insufficient....
[Mlerely suggestive evidence is not substantial evidence.
(emphasis in original). See also Keiser v. Coliseum Properties, Inc., 764 F.2d 783, 785 (11 th Cir.
1985) (appellate decision turns on the "quality and weight" of evidence supporting the disputed
verdict); Gutierrez v. Exxon Corp., 764 F.2d 399, 402 (5th Cir. 1985).
207. Conti v. Ford Motor Co., 743 F.2d 195, 198 (3d Cir. 1984) ("the evidence must be
such as to support a reasonable inference, rather than a guess .... [The jury's conclusion was
based on ... mere speculation"); Romero v. National Rifle Ass'n of Am., Inc., 749 F.2d 77, 81
(D.C. Cir. 1984) ("sheer conjecture"). A number of decisions affirming jury verdicts apply this
same standard. Stacey v. Allied Stores Corp., 768 F.2d 400, 409 (D.C. Cir. 1985); J.E.K. Indus-
tries, Inc. v. Shoemaker, 763 F.2d 348, 353 (8th Cir. 1985); Air et Chaleur, S.A. v. Janeway, 757
F.2d 489, 493 (2d Cir. 1985); Cazzola v. Codman & Shurtleff, Inc., 751 F.2d 53, 55 (1st Cir. 1984);
Delvaux v. Ford Motor Co., 764 F.2d.469, 473 (7th Cir. 1985).
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assertion, that the jury, finding the evidence of no value, essentially
flipped a coin. Such jury conduct would of course provide a ground for
reversal, but no appellate court in the year studied ever seriously sug-
gested that any extrinsic basis existed for believing that the jury literally
arrived at its decision in such an arbitrary manner. This approach by
appellate courts marks the revival of a doctrine that has been expressly
and repeatedly repudiated by the Supreme Court. In Lavender v.
Kurn2 °8 the decedent's body was found beside the tracks where he had
worked as a switch operator. The administrator of the decedent's estate
argued that the death had been caused by a hook extending from a
passing train; the railroad contended the decedent had been murdered
during a robbery. Since no eyewitness to the death could be found, a
state appellate court overturned the jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff,
insisting it was a matter of "mere speculation and conjecture" whether
the fatal blow had been struck by a train or an assailant.2 °9 The
Supreme Court reversed, explaining
It is no answer to say that the jury's verdict involved specula-
tion and conjecture. Whenever facts are in dispute or the evi-
dence is such that fair-minded men may draw different infer-
ences, a measure of speculation and conjecture is required on
the part of those whose duty it is to settle the dispute by
choosing what seems to them to be the most reasonable
inference.2 1 0
Other Supreme Court decisions have made clear that, where there was
some evidence to support the conclusion that an injury was caused by
the acts of the defendant, the Court would not entertain any argument
that the evidence of causation, although present, was so modest that the
actual cause of the injury was a matter of "speculation." '211
The second -recent appellate approach to overruling jury verdicts
has been to single out, from among the issues which theoretically might
have borne on the disputed inference, one particular subsidiary factual
question, to declare that question of controlling legal significance, and
then to reverse because the jury winner had failed to adduce evidence
specifically addressed to the issue selected. In this manner an appellate
court's disagreement with the inferences drawn by the jury is recast to
resemble a finding that the prevailing party failed to adduce any evi-
208. 327 U.S. 645 (1946).
209. Id. at 651.
210. Id. at 653.
211. Tennant v. Peoria & Pekin Union Ry., 321 U.S. 29, 34-35 (1944); Webb v. Illinois
Central R.R., 352 U.S. 512, 515-17 (1957); Gallick v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., 372 U.S. 108, 112-14
(1963). Justice Harlan attempted without success in 1957 to revive the old speculation doctrine.
Rogers v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 500, 564 (1957) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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dence on a critical and distinct element of his claim. In Vippolis v. Vil-
lage of Haverstraw,212 for example, city officials chose to disregard a
state law requiring police officers to be trained at a police academy; new
recruits were simply given a gun and assigned to work for several
months with an experienced officer. One such new officer, who was
never issued even a police manual, allegedly attacked Vippolis over a
minor traffic violation. A jury found the attack unconstitutional and
concluded that the city could be held liable because the attack was due
to inadequate training. The Second Circuit reversed, insisting that no
jury could "rationally" find for the plaintiff absent specific evidence re-
garding what was taught in the police academy and what the officer had
learned through his on-the-job experiences. There was, of course, some
evidence that the beating was due to city policy; the jury knew not only
that the city had policy X rather than the state mandated policy Y, but
also that X consisted. of on-the-job experience, while Y was a formal
training program. The Second Circuit's requirement of more specific
information about the details of the program 213 was in effect a holding
that no rational jury could infer that an untrained police officer would
act less professionally than a graduate of a state police academy. That is
a conclusion which a visitor from Mars might well draw from viewing
the slapstick Police Academy movies, but most natives of this planet
know otherwise. Because judges cast opinions of this sort in terms of
the prevailing party's failure to adduce certain "essential" information,
the language of the decision not only obscures the fact that the appel-
late court is reversing a jury inference, but also avoids any need for the
court to explain why, under the particular circumstances of the case, the
evidence that was available could not have supported the jury's
211conclusion.2 a
212. 768 F.2d 40 (2d Cir. 1985).
213. Id. at 44-45: "For a victim of police brutality to establish the requisite causal connec-
tion between his injuries and a municipal policy of inadequate training, he must make some show-
ing that specific deficiencies in the training given police officers led the misbehaving officer to en-
gage in the alleged misconduct."
214. In Bristow v. Daily Press, Inc., 770 F.2d 1251 (4th Cir. 1985), the jury found that,
because of the plaintiff's age, his employer had subjected him to a variety of practices that
amounted to a constructive discharge. One of the plaintiff's complaints was that he was required to
pay the employer approximately $250 to cover part of his customer's uncollectible debts. The
court of appeals, in overturning the verdict, dismissed as irrelevant the incident involving the $250
because there was "no evidence" that the employer had not treated other workers in the same
manner. Id. at 1256. Having thus announced and found a violation of that special additional
evidence rule, the appellate panel neither characterized its decision as a rejection of the jury's
inferences nor explained how an inference of unfair treatment could not have been based on the
other evidence.
The other difficulty with such per se evidence rules is that if the missing evidence had the
decisive exculpatory effect theorized by the appellate court, the losing party would surely have
introduced it. In Bristow, for example, there was no suggestion in the Fourth Circuit opinion that
any defense witness had asserted that other employees had ever been required to pay out of their
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The third recent approach is to assess the inferential value of the
evidence wholly outside of the trial court context in which the jury itself
evaluated that evidence. During the one-year period studied, there is
not a single instance in which an appellate panel referred to the content
of the arguments made by trial counsel either to the jury or to the dis-
trict judge. The treatment of jury instructions varies considerably. A
small number of appellate decisions do rely on the instructions to delin-
eate the factual question at issue;2"' most decisions, however, contain
no reference to those instructions, even in circumstances in which the
terms of those instructions seem critical to evaluating the sufficiency of
the evidence.2 16 A third group of opinions takes an even more extreme
position, holding that judgment n.o.v. is proper even if the evidence was
sufficient under jury instructions that were not challenged at trial, as
long as the evidence would have been insufficient under a legal standard
which the losing party never advanced in the district court at all.2 1 7
The Supreme Court has indicated in the past that disputes about
the sufficiency of the evidence must be resolved in light of both the jury
instructions and the contentions advanced by the parties at trial. In At-
lantic & Gulf Stevedores, Inc. v. Ellerman Lines, Ltd.2 1 a jury, after
finding that the injuries of a plaintiff longshoreman were the result of
negligence, rejected the claim of the defendant boat owner, Ellerman,
for indemnification by the stevedoring company which employed the
longshoreman. The court of appeals, assuming that the longshoreman's
injuries were the result of unsafe working conditions in the hold of the
own pockets the debts of their customers. In Vippolis the city unsuccessfully tried to introduce
evidence about the details of the training program. Vippolis, 768 F.2d at 42. Rather than remand-
ing for a new trial to consider what the evidence might show, the appellate court precluded any
jury from considering that evidence by holding that the plaintiff had an absolute obligation to
introduce it. So far as appears from the opinion in Vippolis, no prior Second Circuit decision had
ever framed any such requirement.
215. Hatrock v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 750 F.2d 767, 771 (9th Cir. 1984); Lavicky v.
Burnett, 758 F.2d 468, 477 (10th Cir. 1985); Rock v. McCoy, 763 F.2d 394, 397 n.3 (10th Cir.
1985).
216. In Gonzalez v. Volvo of Am. Corp., 752 F.2d 295 (7th Cir. 1985), the court of ap-
peals analyzed the evidence in light of legal standards found in the Restatement (Second) of Torts
and Indiana case law. Id. at 299-301. Nothing in the opinion indicates, however, whether those
standards were embodied in the jury instructions. See also Gray v. Manitowoc Co., 771 F.2d 866,
868-70 (5th Cir. 1985) (applying legal standards in Restatement (Second) of Torts and Mississippi
case law); Llaguno v. Mingey, 763 F.2d 1560, 1567 (7th Cir. 1985) (applying legal standards an-
nounced in Supreme Court fourth amendment decisions); Manguia v. Chevron Co., U.S.A., 768
F.2d 649, 652-54 (5th Cir. 1985) (applying legal standards derived from Fifth Circuit decisions
interpreting the Jones Act); Plante v. Hobart Corp., 771 F.2d 617, 620 (1st Cir. 1985) (applying
legal standard derived from Restatement (Second) of Torts); Spence v. Mariehams R/S, 766 F.2d
1504, 1506-07 (11 th Cir. 1985) (applying legal standards based on appellate decisions construing
Longshoremen and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act).
217. Ebker v. Tan Jay Int'l, Ltd., 739 F.2d 812, 825-26 n.17 (2d Cir. 1984); Hanson v.
Ford Motor Co., 278 F.2d 586, 592-93 (8th Cir. 1960).
218. 369 U.S. 355 (1962).
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boat, reasoned that the evidence compelled a finding of liability against
the stevedoring company for permitting its longshoremen to work in an
unsafe place, as well as against the ship owner who had created those
unsafe conditions.219 In reinstating the jury verdict, the Supreme Court
expressly evaluated the dispute in light of the jury instructions, which
were quoted at length in the Court's opinion. The Court concluded that
the jury had been charged that it could also impose liability on an alter-
native ground of unseaworthiness of the bands holding the bales, a
claim on which only the shipowner could have been held liable. The
Court emphasized that the ship owner had not objected to this critical
instruction, and that the disputes about the safety of the bands had
been an issue during the trial.22 ° If the issue on appeal is whether there
was an adequate basis for the jury's resolution of the issues actually
presented to it, the terms of the jury instructions are clearly of central
importance in defining what factual issue the jury was directed to re-
solve.221 If a jury was charged, for example, that liability could be
based on mere negligence, it would ordinarily be of no importance
whether or not the evidence was sufficient to support an inference of
willfulness or malice. The difference between the issues as framed on
appeal and as presented to the jury may not be that stark, but where
any differences exist, it is the jury instruction which must control. A
litigant, of course, is free to challenge a jury instruction on appeal, pro-
vided that that issue was presented and preserved below, and to argue,
for example, that the instructions incorrectly describe the factual ques-
tion which the jury should have been asked to decide. But only if such a
challenge were sustained on appeal would there be reason to consider
whether the evidence would have been sufficient to support a verdict
under instructions which might have been but were not given at trial.222
It will often be helpful to examine challenges to jury verdicts, as
was done in Atlantic & Gulf, in light of the specific factual contentions
advanced by the parties at trial. The closing arguments of counsel, in
particular, can provide an appellate court with an invaluable perspec-
tive from which to evaluate appeals concerning the sufficiency of the
219. Beard v. Ellerman Lines, Ltd., 289 F.2d 201, 207 (3d Cir. 1961).
220. Atlantic & Gulf, 369 U.S. at 363-64:
The question of the manner in which the New York cargo had been stored was promi-
nent in the case; and the trial judge left it to the jury on the question of [the ship owner's]
negligence. On the issue of the [stevedore's] liability his charge was no more precise than
has been indicated. Yet [the ship owner] did not ask for more on this phase of the contro-
versy. In their requested charge they were no more specific. ...
22 1. See Pleasants v. Fant, 89 U.S. (22 Wall.) 116, 121-22 (1875) ("It is the duty of a court
in its relation to the jury to ... mak[e] plain to them the issues they are to try . . . [and] instruc[t]
them in the rules of law by which th[e] evidence is to be examined and applied .... ").
222. For the reasons set out below, this is an issue which ought ordinarily be considered in
the first instance by the trial judge.
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evidence. It is frequently difficult on the basis of the testimony and ex-
hibits alone to understand clearly the nature of the factual disputes
which arose at trial. In some cases there will be matters of fact about
which the parties agreed, and which thus were simply ignored by both
during the presentation of the evidence. Similarly, as the Supreme
Court noted in Wainwright v. Witt, the evidence actually introduced
may suggest to an appellate court the existence of an issue which was
not seriously presented or pursued at trial because the attorneys were
aware of circumstances which made that line of inquiry clearly unfruit-
ful.2 2 3 By using the closing arguments as a point of departure, an appel-
late court can minimize the danger that it might resolve the case on the
basis of some issue extraneous to the actual factual disputes at trial.
In addition, due deference to the preeminent factfinding role which
a jury plays under the seventh amendment dictates that a party be re-
quired to present its factual arguments to the jury itself. As a general
rule a litigant may not advance on appeal factual or legal contentions
not raised and preserved below. A party appealing the denial by a dis-
trict court of a motion for a directed verdict or judgment n.o.v. must
ordinarily confine its brief on appeal to arguments that were first made
to the trial judge who heard the motion. Rule 50 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure requires that a motion for a directed verdict "shall state
the specific grounds therefor." '2 24 The manifest purpose of this rule-to
permit the trial judge to consider in the first instance the contentions of
the moving party-would clearly be frustrated if the movant could offer
in the appellate courts grounds for reversal which had never been in-
cluded in its Rule 50 motion.
It is no less important that such factual contentions also be
squarely presented to the jury itself. The jury trial will be merely a "try-
out on the road," rather than "the main event," '2 2 5 if litigants are per-
mitted to defer framing their factual contentions until the case is on
appeal. It seems unlikely that the framers of Rule 50 contemplated that
a trial judge presented with a motion for judgment n.o.v. could enter-
tain with regard to the sufficiency of the evidence arguments that had
never been presented to the jury itself. In virtually any case it will be
223. Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1985), suggests that the lack of an argument or
objection by counsel at trial might well reflect a general agreement as to what the facts were. Both
the majority, and Justice Stevens in a concurring opinion, indicated that the trial court arguments
of counsel were of substantial importance. in assessing whether the trial judge erred in his factual
finding regarding the mental state of a prospective juror: "[Respondent's counsel chose not to
question Colby himself, or to object to the trial court's excusing her for cause .... [Flrom what
appears on the record it seems that at the time Colby was excused no one in the courtroom ques-
tioned the fact that her beliefs prevented her from sitting." Id. at 434-35. See also id. at 436 n.3
(Stevens, J., concurring).
,
224. FED. R. Civ.'P. 50(a).
225. Cf. Anderson v. City of Bessemer, 470 U.S. 564, 575 (1985).
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possible for an attorney with a modicum of ingenuity to frame some
hypothetical question not addressed by the evidence, or to imagine
some possible inference never argued for at the trial itself. The central
issue on an appeal from the denial of a motion for a directed verdict or
for judgment n.o.v., however, should be the sufficiency of the evidence
bearing on the factual disputes actually presented to the jury, not the
ability of appellate counsel to conjure up new factual issues, however
intriguing, which the jury itself was never asked to decide.
C. Conflicting Evidence
Although the standard for evaluating the probative vaiae of evi-
dence supporting a jury's verdict raises some fine theoretical issues and
has been framed in varying ways by the Supreme Court, the Court has
found no difficulty in deciding how to treat evidence that tended to sup-
port the verdict rejected by the jury. The Supreme Court has repeatedly
insisted that an appellate court should simply disregard whatever evi-
dence militated against the verdict actually reached by the jury.226 If in
a given case there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict,
any evidence offered by the losing party would merely have created a
conflict in the evidence; such conflicts, the Court has reiterated, are al-
ways to be resolved by the jury.227 In Corinne Mill, Canal & Stock Co.
v. Toponce228 the jury sustained various claims by the plaintiff em-
ployee against his former employer. In upholding the verdict the
Supreme Court commented:
226. Dennis v. Denver & R.G. W. R.R., 375 U.S. 208, 210 (1963) ("[tlhe jury is free to
discard or disbelieve whatever facts are inconsistent with its conclusion"); Basham v. Pennsylvania
R.R., 372 U.S. 699, 701 (1963) ("[tlhe jury is free to discard or disbelieve whatever facts are incon-
sistent with its conclusion"); Webb v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 352 U.S. 512, 513-14 (1957) ("[iln pass-
ing upon whether there is sufficient evidence to submit an issue to the jury we need look only to the
evidence and reasonable inferences which tend to support" the verdict) (emphasis added); Wilker-
son v. McCarthy, 336 U.S. 53, 57 (1949) ("[iln passing upon whether there is sufficient evidence to
submit an issue to the jury we need look to the evidence and reasonable inferences which tend to
support" the verdict) (emphasis added); Lavender v. Kurn, 327 U.S. 645, 653 (1946) ("[tlhe jury is
free to discard or disbelieve whatever facts are inconsistent with its conclusion"); Lumbra v.
United States, 290 U.S. 551, 553 (1934) ("[wle assume as established by all the facts that the evi-
dence supporting petitioner's claims reasonably tends to prove") (emphasis added). See Hepburn
v. Dubois, 37 U.S. 743, 745 (1838) ("the finding of the jury... must be taken as negativing all facts,
which the party against whom their verdict is given, has attempted to infer from, or establish by
the evidence").
227. Gunning v. Cooley, 281 U.S. 90, 94 (1930) ("Where uncertainty ... arises from a
conflict in the testimony ... the question is not one of law but of fact to be settled by the jury.");
Richmond & Danville R.R. v. Powers, 149 U.S. 43, 47 (1893) ("It is true that there was testimony
tending to show a different state of facts.... But, of course, all conflict in the testimony was settled
by the jury, and could not be determined by the court . .
228. 152 U.S. 405 (1894).
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It is unnecessary to refer to the testimony which tends to
weaken the scope of these... statements of the plaintiff...,
because such conflict presents but a mere question of fact,
upon which the verdict of the jury is conclusive .... It is un-
necessary to consider the contradictory testimony or to at-
tempt to determine the actual facts in reference to this matter.
It is enough that the jury by their verdict have practically af-
firmed the truth of the plaintiff's story.229
Although there are some instances in which the Court may have failed
in practice to adhere fully to these principles,23 ° the Supreme Court has
never disavowed or questioned the doctrine that where there is suffi-
cient evidence to support a disputed jury verdict, that verdict cannot be
overturned because of contrary evidence offered by the losing party.2 .31
These two closely related rules 232-that conflicts in the evidence
are for the jury and that the evidence of the losing party is to be disre-
garded-have both an historical and a practical basis. In his 1913 opin-
ion proposing that the federal courts regard motions for judgment
n.o.v. as a form of deferred demurrer to the evidence,233 Justice Hughes
acknowledged that for constitutional reasons this new type of motion
would have to "be tested by the same rules" as a common law demur-
rer.2 34 Justice Hughes correctly observed that a common law demurrer
could not rely on "the defendant's evidence ... to rebut what the other
side aimed to establish, and to overthrow the presumptions, arising
therefrom, by counter presumptions. "235 Similarly, Justice Hughes
noted, a demurrer to evidence was improper "when there is contradic-
tory testimony to the same points, or presumptions leading to opposite
conclusions, so that what the facts are remains uncertain, and may be
229. Id. at 408-09.
230. See Brady v. Southern R.R., 320 U.S. 476,480(1943); Bowditch v. Boston, 101 U.S.
16 (1880).
231. This principle has its roots in the common law restrictions on a demurrer to evi-
dence. "[lt is utterly inadmissible to demur to the evidence, when there is contradictory testimony
to the same points, or presumptions leading to opposite conclusions." Johnson v. United States,
13 Fed. Cas. 868, 872 (C.C. Mich. 1830).
232. In most cases in which these rules apply, they are both applicable because the evi-
dence offered by the losing party created a conflict in the evidence. It is, of course, conceivable that
cases could arise in which only one or the other of the rules was applicable. That might occur if the
prevailing party himself offered contradictory testimony, or if only the losing party had offered
evidence on a particular issue, such as the existence of an affirmative defense.
233. Slocum v. New York Life Ins. Co., 228 U.S. 364, 400-428 (1913) (dissenting
opinion).
234. Id. at 418.
235. Id. at 413-14 (quoting Fowle v. Alexandria, II Wheat 370). At common law a defen-
dant could only offer a demurrer to evidence at the close of the plaintiffs case. See supra notes 87-
90.
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urged with more or less effect to a jury." 2 36 In 1793 a judge, acting on a
demurrer to evidence or in any other way, could not have taken a case
from a jury based on evidence offered by a defendant.237
In most instances the same rules follow as well from the more gen-
eral principles regarding credibility and inferences. In the large number
of cases in which the losing party seeks to rely on testimony inconsistent
with the verdict, the jury's prerogative to disbelieve oral testimony
would preclude an appellate court from relying on that evidence. For
appellate courts, which only rarely (if ever) can undertake to evaluate
the weight of the evidence offered by a prevailing party, the assessment
of the comparative weight of contradictory evidence would be virtually
impossible. Such an evaluation would require the appellate courts (1) to
determine the probative value of the evidence supporting the verdict,
(2) to determine the weight of the evidence of the opposing party, (3) to
compare the relative weight of the two bodies of evidence, and (4) to
fashion and apply some standard regarding how great a disparity in
probative weight is sufficient to require reversal of the jury's own ver-
dict. It is, as Justice Black suggested in a related context, inconceivable
that judges could in this manner "weigh conflicting evidence with math-
ematical precision" 23 without intruding upon the constitutional pre-
rogatives of the jury.
Although these two Supreme Court restrictions on appellate re-
view of jury verdicts remain unquestioned in that Court, in the lower
courts the rule forbidding consideration of the evidence of the losing
party is now virtually a dead letter. The general practice of the appellate
courts today is to insist that the correctness of a challenged jury verdict
236. Id. at 415 (quoting Johnson v. United States, 13 Fed. Cas. at 872).
237. It would be possible to hypothesize a situation in which the evidence adduced by a
defendant would render absurd a verdict for plaintiff-such as a wrongful death case in which,
following testimony about an apparently fatal accident, the purported decedent was brought to
the courtroom alive and well. In the real world, however, plaintiffs do not bring or at least juries do
not sustain the claims in cases of that sort. None of the 1984-1985 cases studied, and none of the
Supreme Court jury trial cases, involve circumstances even approaching that extreme hypotheti-
cal. In theory one might permit consideration of defense evidence to deal with such situations, but
practical experience demonstrates that those situations do not in fact arise, and that the circuit
courts which feel free to consider defense evidence consistently abuse that authority. Under these
circumstances it seems far wiser to adhere to the common law rule which precluded consideration
of defense evidence on a demurrer to evidence, bearing in mind that where that evidence seems
overwhelming a new trial can always be ordered.
Throughout the nineteenth century the Supreme Court insisted that the only way a party
challenging the sufficiency of the evidence could obtain relief was by a motion in the trial court for
a new trial. Slocum v. New York Life Ins. Co., 228 U.S. 364, 397-98 (1913); Capital Traction Co.
v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1, 13 (1899); Fowler v. Rathbone, 79 U.S. 102, 119 (1870); Schuchardt v. Allen, 68
U.S. 359, 371 (1863); Barreda v. Silsbee, 62 U.S. 146, 167 (1858); Zeller's Lessee v. Eckhert, 45 U.S.
118, 122 (1845); Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. 443, 448 (1830).
238. Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 405 (1943) (dissenting opinion).
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is to be assessed by considering "all" the evidence. 2" 9 In the Eleventh
Circuit, for example,
On motions... for judgment notwithstanding the verdict the
court shall consider all of the evidence-not just that evidence
which supports the non-mover's case .... If the facts and in-
ferences point so strongly and overwhelmingly in favor of one
party that the court believes that reasonable men could not
arrive at a contrary verdict, granting of the motion is
proper.2
40
In the Sixth Circuit reversal of a jury verdict is required if the "rebuttal
testimony of defendant's experts ... completely negated the probative-
ness of plaintiff's expert's testimony., 24 ' As a consequence of this ap-
proach, appellate panels routinely rely on the evidence of the losing
party in overturning jury verdicts, 242 explaining that in their view the
239. Crawford v. Edmondson, 764 F.2d 479,487 (7th Cir. 1985); Dallis v. Aetna Life Ins.
Co., 768 F.2d 1303, 1305 (1l th Cir. 1985); Dixon v. International Harvester Co., 754 F.2d 573, 587
(5th Cir. 1985); Eyre v. McDonough Power Equip., Inc., 755 F.2d 416, 419 (5th Cir. 1985) ("On
motions for directed verdict and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict the Court should con-
sider all of the evidence-not just the evidence which supports the nonmover's case .. "); Grogan
v. General Maintenance Serv. Co., 764 F.2d 444,447 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Keiser v. Coliseum Proper-
ties, Inc., 763 F.2d 783, 785 (11 th Cir. 1985) ("On motions ... for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict the Court should consider all of the evidence-not just the evidence which supports the
non-mover's case .... ); Quaker City Gear Works v. Skil Corp., 747 F.2d 1446, 1454 (Fed. Cir.
1984) ("Under Quaker City's view we would look only to evidence in its favor to determine
whether 'substantial evidence' supports [the verdict] .... The law is clearly to the contrary....
[Under] the standard governing the granting or denial of a motion JNOV ... a court must (1)
consider all the evidence") (emphasis in original); Rhea v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 767 F.2d 266,
269 (6th Cir. 1985); Walden v. United States Steel Corp., 759 F.2d 834, 837 (11 th Cir. 1985) ("In
reviewing the denial of a motion for judgment n.o.v., this court is obligated to consider all the
evidence, not just the evidence supporting the non-moving party's case...."); Western Plains Serv.
Corp. v. Ponderosa Dev. Corp., 769 F.2d 654, 656 (10th Cir. 1985).
240. Keiser v. Coliseum Properties, Inc., 764 F.2d 783, 785 (11 th Cir. 1985) (quoting Fed-
eral Kemper Life Assur. Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 712 F.2d 459 (11 th Cir. 1983)).
241. Leonard v. Uniroyal, Inc., 765 F.2d 560 (6th Cir. 1985).
242. In Bodzin v. City of Dallas, 768 F.2d 722 (5th Cir. 1985), the plaintiffwas improperly
arrested for criminal trespass on private property when he was in fact on a public right of way; in
finding probable cause for the arrest, the Fifth Circuit expressly relied on the testimony of the
defendants that they had believed in good faith and with justification that plaintiff was on private
property. Id. at 724-26. See also Christensen v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y, 767 F.2d 340, 342
("evidence submitted by Equitable, consisting of testimony by Christensen's immediate supervisor
and another company executive, showed . . ."), 343 ("Equitable showed..."), 344 ("Equitable
demonstrated a nonpretextual reason for its action,"); Craft v. Metromedia, Inc., 766 F.2d 1205,
1219 n.16 (8th Cir. 1985) (key officials of defendant "were convinced that the actions they took"
did not violate the allegedly fraudulent representations they had made to plaintiff); Dartez v.
Fibreboard Corp., 765 F.2d 456, 470 (5th Cir. 1985) (non-dangerousness of defendant's product
established by "the deposition testimony of ... a marketing consultant for Raymark"); Estate of
Davis v. Johnson, 745 F.2d 1066, 1071 (7th Cir. 1984) (defendant official and other police officers
"explicitly testified" they did not hear assault on decedent, and all "described [the assailant] as
placid and 'very docile' "); Gideon v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 761 F.2d 1129, 1144 (5th Cir.
1985) ("longtime ... employee" of defendant testified that any asbestos dust generated by firm's
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evidence adduced by that losing party was "overwhelming," '243 when
"[b]alanced against ' 244 the evidence in support of the verdict. In the-
ory, of course, it might matter whether a circuit was applying a "sub-
stantial evidence" rather than a "reasonable person" test. If a jury must
be upheld if supported by "substantial evidence," there would seem to
be no reason to inquire whether the evidence favoring the opposite con-
clusion was even more substantial. On the other hand, a "reasonable
person" probably would consider all the evidence in deciding whether
only one verdict could sensibly be reached. But none of the appellate
courts have made such distinctions, and there is no indication that a
court's willingness to rely on the evidence of the losing party is con-
trolled or affected by which of these two legal standards has been
utilized.
Paradoxically, the appellate courts which insist on considering the
evidence of both the winning and losing parties, and which reverse ver-
dicts in reliance on the latter, also routinely profess that only juries can
resolve conflicts in the evidence. 24 5 These two lines of decisions co-exist
because the appellate courts seem to regard as presenting "conflicting
evidence" only those cases, such as differing accounts by two witnesses
to the same event, in which the testimony of witnesses is in direct con-
flict, and in which one or the other of the witnesses must thus be lying or
at least mistaken.246 But the Supreme Court's holding with regard to
conflicting evidence, like the limitations on common law demurrers,
was not restricted to this narrow situation, but encompassed the more
common case in which the testimony of the witnesses supported differ-
ent inferences regarding the key disputed factual issue.
product was too little to cause injury; "overwhelming weight of the evidence" is that that firm's
product could not have harmed the plaintiff); cf. Leonard v. Uniroyal, Inc., 765 F.2d 560, 566 (6th
Cir. 1985) (in another case the "rebuttal testimony of defendant's experts ... completely negated
the probativeness of plaintiff's expert's testimony").
243. Gray v. Manitowoc Co., 771 F.2d 866, 870 (5th Cir. 1985); Gideon v. Johns-
Manville Sales Corp., 761 F.2d 1129, 1144 (5th Cir. 1985).
244. Gray, 771 F.2d at 871.
245. Air et Chaleur, S.A. v. Janeway, 757 F.2d 489, 493 (2d Cir. 1985); Gilkerson v.
Toastmaster, Inc., 770 F.2d 133, 136 (8th Cir. 1985); Grogan v. General Maintenance Serv. Co.,
763 F.2d 444,447 (D.C. Cir. 1985); La Montagne v. American Convenience Prods., Inc., 750 F.2d
1405, 1410 (7th Cir. 1984); Rorex v. Traynor, 771 F.2d 383, 387 (8th Cir. 1985).
246. Thomas v. Booker, 762 F.2d 654, 659 (8th Cir. 1985) ("factual conflicts in the evi-
dence"); Tice v. Lampert Yards, Inc., 761 F.2d 1210, 1213 (7th Cir. 1985) ("conflicts in the evi-
dence"); Wildman v. Lerner Stores Corp., 771 F.2d 605, 607 (lst Cir. 1985) ("conflicting testi-
mony"); Arceneaux v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 767 F.2d 1498, 1501 (l Ith Cir.
1985); Haney v. Mizell Memorial Hosp., 744 F.2d 1467, 1479 (11 th Cir. 1984); Estate of Davis v.
Johnson, 745 F.2d 1066, 1072 (7th Cir. 1984) (evidence supporting inference of liability "of such
inferior quality" as to be inadequate when "weighted against" defense testimony supporting con-
trary inference); J.E.K. Industries, Inc. v. Shoemaker, 763 F.2d 348, 353 (8th Cir. 1985) ("direct
factual conflicts"); Rock v. McCoy, 763 F.2d 394, 396 (10th Cir. 1985) ("conflicting evidence").
But see Dobbs v. Gulf Oil Co., 759 F.2d 1213, 1218 (5th Cir. 1985) ("jury ... to weigh conflicting
evidence and inferences").
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Decisions in the First and Seventh Circuits hold, consistent with
the Supreme Court precedents discussed above, that a directed verdict
is never permissible in favor of a defendant in any case in which a rea-
sonable person might conclude that the plaintiff has established a prima
facie case: "A directed verdict in favor of a defendant... is proper only
if reasonable people, viewing the facts most favorable to the plaintiff
and disregarding conflicting unfavorable testimony, could not conclude
that the plaintiff has made out a prima facie case." '24 7 This rule, which
necessarily follows from the Supreme Court decisions regarding de-
fense evidence and evidentiary conflicts, would often be of decisive im-
portance in intentional discrimination cases, where the elements neces-
sary to establish a prima facie case are well understood and frequently
present.248 Another Seventh Circuit decision of the same era, however,
acknowledged that the plaintiff who had prevailed at trial had proffered
evidence which "made out a prima facie case," but nonetheless reversed
the jury verdict on the ground that "the record establishes ... that [the
defendant] rebutted" that prima facie case.24 9
Such inconsistencies, as well as the general tendency to disregard
Supreme Court precedents in this area, are understandable in light of
the willingness of the lower courts, in contravention of other Supreme
Court precedents, to make credibility determinations and assess the in-
ferential weight of evidence. Once the appellate courts were willing to
reconsider the jury's assessment of the probative value of the prevailing
party's evidence and to credit contrary testimony which the jury might
have chosen to disbelieve, it was probably inevitable that those courts
would then attempt to weigh those two types of evidence against one
another. The last century of Supreme Court jurisprudence is founded
on a number of fairly specific premises about differences in the factflnd-
ing abilities and roles of juries and judges; in recent years the inclination
of the appellate courts has been to try to make their own independent
evaluation of which party should have prevailed at trial, and to leave
the decision to the jury only where the evidence proffered by the com-
peting parties seems to present a close case.
D. New Trials, Judgments N.O. V., and
Deference to the Role of Trial Judges
The major change that has occurred over the course of the last
century regarding the role of judges in reviewing evidence is that today,
247. Malcak v. Westchester Park Dist., 754 F.2d 239, 243-44 (7th Cir. 1985) (quoting
Crowder v. Lash, 687 F.2d 996, 1002 (7th Cir. 1982)).
248. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); Texas Dept. of Com-
munity Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
249. Christensen v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y, 767 F.2d 340, 343 (7th Cir. 1985).
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unlike the practice which existed in 1889 or 1789, appellate judges now
undertake to pass on the sufficiency of the evidence to support a dis-
puted verdict. Trial judges, on the other hand, have always had some
power to do this, although the procedures and standards used by trial
judges have evolved over time. In the course of permitting appellate
judges to play a role in this process, the Supreme Court laid down two
rules rooted in the fact that in 1791 only trial judges had the authority
to evaluate the evidence in a jury trial. The Supreme Court required,
first, that appellate judges give substantial deference to the trial judge's
view of the sufficiency of the evidence, and, second, that the trial judge
should often, if not ordinarily, have the preeminent responsibility for
deciding whether a defect in the evidence was so serious as to require a
judgment n.o.v., or warranted only the granting of a new trial. Today
the courts of appeals largely disregard both of these rules.
The Supreme Court had indicated on a number of occasions prior
to 1968 that an appellate court should be particularly reluctant to grant
a judgment n.o.v. if the district judge who tried the case believed that
there was sufficient evidence to support the verdict. In Patton v. Texas &
Pacific Railway Co. the Court admonished:
[I]t is seldom that an appellate court reverses the action of a
trial court in declining to give a peremptory instruction for a
verdict .... [T]he judge is primarily responsible for the just
outcome of the trial .... He has the same opportunity that
jurors have for seeing the witnesses, for noting all those mat-
ters in a trial not capable of record. . . .'[A]n appellate court
will pay large respect to his judgment.25 °
Rule 52251 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires appellate
deference to the factual findings of a district judge in a non-jury case.
The assessment of the sufficiency of the evidence to support a jury ver-
dict, although labeled a "question of law" to retain a patina of constitu-
tionality, is necessarily a fact-bound task. The same policy considera-
tions underlying Rule 52 are applicable when an appellate panel reviews
a trial judge's determination that the evidence was sufficient to support
250. 179 U.S. 658, 660 (1901). See also Dick v. New York Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 437, 447
(1959) ("the district judge, who was intimately concerned with the trial ... believed that the case
should go to the jury"); Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U.S. 53, 74 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting);
cf Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 560 (1931) (deference to
concurrent conclusions of jury, trial judge, and court of appeals).
251. FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a):
In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury ... the court shall find the facts spe-
cially.... Findings of fact whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be
set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the
trial court to judge of the credibility of the witnesses.
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a jury verdict. The rationale for deference to a trial court's own factual
findings, the Supreme Court has explained, includes, but
is not limited to the superiority of the trial judge's position to
make determinations of credibility .... [W]ith experience in
fulfilling that role comes expertise. Duplication of the trial
judge's efforts in the court of appeals would very likely con-
tribute only negligibly to the accuracy of fact determination at
a high cost in diversion of judicial resources.2 52
When a trial judge has concluded that there is sufficient evidence to
support a given verdict, and a jury has found that the evidence requires
that particular verdict, the chance that both judge and jury will have
erred is likely to be small, and substantial deference to their concurrent
conclusions is certainly appropriate.253
There is today widespread disagreement among the circuit courts
regarding whether the views of a trial judge are entitled to any deference
in this regard. During the one-year period studied, appellate panels in
the First, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits held that deference was appro-
priate. The Eighth Circuit reasoned in Herold v. Burlington Northern,
Inc.:
[w]e must give great credence to the findings of ... the trial
judge.... [H]e... heard the testimony and reviewed the evi-
dence first hand; many credibility findings must be made in a
trial such as this. Appellate courts should be extremely reluc-
tant to interfere with a verdict where ... an experienced and
competent trial judge finds no error in the jury's
determination.254
Another Eighth Circuit panel suggested that a trial court's rejection of a
motion for judgment n.o.v. could be reversed only if "clearly errone-
ous." 212  A First Circuit decision indicated that such a decision could
not be overturned unless the lower court had "abused its
discretion." '5 6
252. Anderson v. City of Bessemer, 470 U.S. 564, 574-75 (1985).
253. An appellate court faces a different problem when it is asked to review a trial court
order granting a directed verdict or judgment n.o.v. In such a case the correctness of the trial
court's action raises a constitutional issue under the seventh amendment, a circumstance requiring
independent appellate factfinding. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466
U.S. 485 (1984). Indeed, since it is the district judge who allegedly violated the constitution, it
would be uniquely inappropriate to defer to that judge's views about the constitutionality of his or
her own conduct.
254. 761 F.2d 1241, 1245 (8th Cir. 1985).
255. Cashman v. Allied Products Corp., 761 F.2d 1250, 1256 (8th Cir. 1985).
256. Fishman v. Clancy, 763 F.2d 485, 489 (1st Cir. 1985). See also Ramsey v. American
Air Filter Co., Inc., 772 F.2d 1303 (7th Cir. 1985) ("the court will rarely conclude that a district
court improperly refused to enter judgment notwithstanding the verdict").
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During the same one-year period, on the other hand, nine panels in
five circuits, including both the First and the Seventh, held that the pro-
priety of granting a motion for judgment n.o.v. was to be considered de
novo by the appellate court. In two of the circuits involved, other
panels in the same year had applied a deference rule. The First Circuit
opinion quoted in the previous paragraph was issued on June 10, 1985;
on August 1, 1985, another panel of that circuit-which included one of
the same judges who had participated in the earlier decision-held,
"We employ the same standard in reviewing the judge's decision on the
motion as the trial judge uses in passing on the motion."2 7 A Seventh
Circuit panel explained, "An appellate court is as well situated as a trial
court to make this legal determination and we therefore review the trial
court's decision denying the J.N.O.V. motion de novo." 25 Similar de-
cisions are to be found in the Third, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits.2" 9 All
of the decisions applying a deference standard upheld the action of the
trail judge, while a number of the nondeference opinions reversed the
trial judge's holding; whether the standard affected the outcome, or vice
versa, is unclear.
The Supreme Court has also repeatedly emphasized that a court
faced with a request for judgment n.o.v. has the authority to order a
new trial instead, and should, in any case in which a judgment is set
aside, make a considered judgment in choosing between a new trial and
judgment n.o.v. In 1947 the Court suggested in Cone v. West Virginia
Pulp & Paper Co. that only the trial judge could make the choice be-
tween a new trial and judgment n.o.v.:
[A trial judge] ... can exercise this discretion with a fresh per-
sonal knowledge of the issues involved, the kind of evidence
given, and the impression made by witnesses. His appraisal of
the bona fides of the claims asserted by the litigants is of great
257. Sprague v. Boston & Maine Corp., 769 F.2d 26, 29 (1st Cir. 1985).
258. Spanish Action Comm. of Chicago v. City of Chicago, 766 F.2d 315, 319-20 (7th Cir.
1985). See also Tice v. Lampert Yards, Inc., 761 F.2d 1210, 1213 (7th Cir. 1985) ("we review the
district court's decision applying the same judgment n.o.v. standard used by the district court
judge"); cf. La Montagne v. American Convenience Prods., Inc., 750 F.2d 1405, 1410 (7th Cir.
1984) ("A district court's grant of judgment n.o.v. is subject to de novo review; we apply the same
standard as the district court.").
259. Eisenberg v. Gagnon, 766 F.2d 770, 779 (3d Cir. 1985) ("On appeal, the appellate
court should apply the same standard as the trial court in determining the propriety of judgment
n.o.v.") (quoting Danny Kresky Enterprises v. Magid, 716 F.2d 206, 209 (3rd Cir. 1983)); Lavicky
v. Burnett, 758 F.2d 468, 476 (10th Cir. 1985) ("The appellate court applies the same standard in
reviewing motion for a judgment n.o.v. as the trial court."); Powell v. J.T. Posey, Co., 766 F.2d
131, 134 (3d Cir. 1985) ("On appeal, the appellate court should apply the same standard as the trial
court in determining the propriety of judgment n.o.v.") (quoting Danny Kresky, 716 F.2d at 209);
Tibbs v. Great American Ins. Co., 755 F.2d 1370, 1374 (9th Cir. 1985) ("We review de novo the
district court's instruction to the jury that it could award punitive damages."); West America
Corp. v. Vaughan-Bassett Furniture, 765 F.2d 932, 934 (9th Cir. 1985) ("Review is de novo.").
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value in reaching a conclusion as to whether a new trial
should be granted. Determination of whether a new trial
should be granted or a judgment [n.o.v.] entered under Rule
50(b) calls for the judgment in the first instance of the judge
who saw and heard the witnesses and has the feel of the case
which no appellate printed transcript can impart ....
Exercise of this discretion presents to the trial judge an
opportunity, after all his rulings have been made and all the
evidence has been evaluated, to view the proceedings in a per-
spective peculiarly available to him alone. . . . [A] litigant
should not have his right to a new trial foreclosed without
having had the benefit of the trial court's judgment on the
question.260
Under Cone, if a court of appeals held that the trial judge erred in refus-
ing to set aside a verdict, the appellate court was required to remand the
proceeding to permit the trial judge to exercise his discretion in choos-
ing between judgment n.o.v. and a new trial. In 1967 the Court held in
Neely v. Eby Construction Co., Inc. that an appellate court had the
power to make that choice itself, rejecting the rigid rule of Cone for "a
more discriminating approach.",26' But Neely admonished that there
were situations in which the district court rather than the appellate
court ought to make the choice, "because of the trial judge's first-hand
knowledge of witnesses, testimony, and issues-because of his 'feel' for
the overall case." The Supreme Court admonished the circuit courts to
be "constantly alert" to the possibility that these "very valid concerns"
would dictate that in a particular case the decision between judgment
n.o.v. and a new trial "should more appropriately be addressed to the
trial court."
26 2
The decisions in Cone and Neely agreed that the law requires a
carefully considered judicial choice between judgment n.o.v. and a new
trial. Neely noted that "where the court of appeals set aside the jury['s]
verdict because the evidence was insufficient to send the case to the jury,
it is not so clear that the litigation should be terminated." '263 The need
for such a choice derives in part from the terms of Rule 50(b), which
direct a trial judge to consider three alternatives when presented with a
motion for judgment n.o.v: "the court may allow the judgment to stand
or may reopen the judgment and either order a new trial or direct the
260. 330 U.S. 212, 216-17 (1947).
261. 386 U.S. 317, 326 (1967).
262. Id. at 325-26.
263. Id. at 327.
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entry of judgment as if the requested verdict had been directed." '264 The
Supreme Court explained in Cone:
Rule 50(b) contains no language which absolutely requires a
trial court to enter judgment notwithstanding the verdict even
though that court is persuaded that it erred in failing to direct
a verdict for the losing party. Th[e] . . . "either-or" language
means what it seems to mean, namely, that there are circum-
stances which might lead the trial court to believe that a new
trial rather than a final termination of the trial stage of the
controversy would better serve the ends of justice. In short,
the rule does not compel a trial judge to enter a judgment not-
withstanding the verdict instead of ordering a new trial; it per-
mits him to exercise a discretion between the two
alternatives.265
In its 1952 decision in Johnson v. New York, New Haven & Hartford
Railroad2 6 6 the Supreme Court emphasized that an appellate court
should not automatically direct entry of judgment n.o.v. in every case in
which it thought a directed verdict would have been proper:
[A] holding that a directed verdict should have been given
cannot be the equivalent of a court's entry of judgment for
defendant notwithstanding a jury verdict for plaintiff. For af-
ter setting aside a verdict as authorized by Rule 50(b), a trial
judge may "either" enter a judgment contrary to the verdict
"or" order a new trial. The rule thereby requires the exercise
of an informed judicial discretion as a condition precedent to
a choice between these two alternatives. And this discretion
must be exercised by the court, not by its clerk. The Court was
told during oral argument that it is the practice in the Second
Circuit for the clerk to include in his mandate a direction to
the district court to have a judgment entered in favor of a
party notwithstanding the verdict where the court reverses a
district court's refusal to direct a verdict. A rule or practice of
this kind under which a court clerk's mandate would auto-
matically direct entry of a judgment for defendant after court
reversal of a plaintiffs judgment could not possibly be the re-
sult of the kind of judicial discretion directed by Rule
50(b).26 "
264. FED. R. Civ. P. 50(b).
265. Cone, 330 U.S. at 215.
266. 344 U.S. 48 (1952).
267. Id. at 54-55 n.3. The court described with evident approval the practice in another
circuit: "The Fifth Circuit emphatically pointed out that mere reversal and remand for proceed-
ings consistent with the opinion did not authorize a trial court to enter judgment notwithstanding
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The Supreme Court was "not willing to attribute ... to the Second
Circuit" the improper practice of directing judgment n.o.v. without ei-
ther considering the alternative of a new trial or remanding the case to
the trial court to make that choice. 2 68
The practice that the Supreme Court in 1952 thought an unlikely
aberration is today the general rule throughout the circuit courts. Out
of more than forty cases in nine circuits in which the appellate panel
overturned the district court's denial of a motion for judgment n.o.v.,
there are only two instances in which the appellate panel even purports
to consider the possibility of ordering a new trial rather than judgment
n.o.v. 2 9 Far from being "constantly alert" to the possibility that the
trial judge should be afforded an opportunity to choose between judg-
ment n.o.v. and a new trial, not a single appellate panel gives the district
court authority to make that choice on remand. In cases where the ap-
pellate panel overturns the entire verdict, the decisions uniformly direct
the lower court to enter judgment for the appellee.27 ° Where a verdict is
overturned only in part, the appellate court often issues an equally une-
quivocal direction; 271 in the remaining cases, the appellate opinions-
"affirming" certain aspects of the verdict and "reversing," rather
the verdict; entry of such a judgment was only to be granted as of discretion and after a hearing."
Id.
268. Id.
269. Marino v. Ballestas, 749 F.2d 162, 169-70 (3d Cir. 1984) (citing Neely and ordering a
new trial); Smith v. Monsanto Chemical Co., 770 F.2d 719, 724 (8th Cir. 1985) ("because Smith
has not asserted any grounds entitling him to a new trial, we direct entry of judgment").
270. Bristow v. Daily Press, Inc., 770 F.2d 1251, 1256 (4th Cir. 1985) ("no ADEA suit can
be maintained against defendant. The judgment for plaintiff is reversed."); Christensen v. Equita-
ble Life Assur. Soc'y, 767 F.2d 340, 344 (7th Cir. 1985) ("The judgment of the district court is
reversed and the cause is remanded for the entry of judgment for the defendant."); Craft v. Me-
tromedia, Inc., 766 F.2d 1205, 1221 (8th Cir. 1985) ("We ... reverse the judgment entered on the
jury verdict ... and instruct the district court to enter judgment for Metromedia."); Gonzalez v.
Volvo of America Corp., 752 F.2d 295, 301 (7th Cir. 1985) ("we reverse the judgment ofthe district
court as to Volvo and remand the case with direction to enter judgment for defendant-appellant");
Gray v. Manitowoc Co., 771 F.2d 866, 871 (5th Cir. 1985) ("The district court erred in refusing to
grant defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. We therefore reverse and
render the judgment."); Gumz v. Morrissette, 772 F.2d 1395, 1404 (7th Cir. 1985) ("The judgment
is reversed ... with directions to enter judgment for the defendants.")
271. Gideon v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 761 F.2d 1129, 1146 (5th Cir. 1985) ("We
reverse the judgment as to Raymark and Standard and enter judgment in their favor."); Bacon v.
Patera, 772 F.2d 259, 266 (6th Cir. 1985) ("We remand and instruct the district court to dismiss the
judgment in favor of Private Officer, Inc."); Estate of Davis v. Johnson, 745 F.2d 1066, 1075 (7th
Cir. 1984) ("The Cause accordingly is remanded to the district court with instructions to enter
judgment for defendant on counts 1, 2, and 3."); Gilkerson v. Toastmaster, Inc., 770 F.2d 133, 137
(8th Cir. 1985) ("We hold that ... the district court erred in failing to grant Toastmaster a judg-
ment notwithstanding the verdict on the claim for liquidated damages."); Llaguno v. Mingey, 763
F.2d 1560, 1570 (7th Cir. 1985) (case "remanded with instructions to enter judgment for [verdict
loser] on count VII"); Madison County Jail Inmates v. Thompson, 773 F.2d 834, 845 (7th Cir.
1985) ("The case is remanded to the district court to enter judgment in favor of the second subclass
for nominal damages of $1.00 together with costs."); Rorex v. Traynor, 771 F.2d 383, 388 (8th Cir.
1985) ("the award of punitive damages must be dismissed in its entirety").
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merely than vacating, others-leave no doubt that the claims covered
by the reversal are to be dismissed.272 Among the appeals involving
district court orders granting motions for judgments n.o.v, there is no
indication that the trial court or the circuit court ever considered the
possibility of ordering a new trial instead.
A return to the principles of Cone, Neely, and Johnson would serve
not merely to assure compliance with the procedure contemplated by
Rule 50(b), but also to provide a significant check on the tendency of
the appellate courts to intrude upon the factfinding responsibilities of
juries. The reason most often given by the Supreme Court for ordering
a new trial rather than judgment n.o.v. is to afford the losing party an
opportunity to introduce additional evidence at a second trial. That
practice has an historical and constitutional basis; following the grant-
ing of a common law demurrer to evidence, the unsuccessful plaintiff
272. Air Crash Disaster Near New Orleans (Turgeau) v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc.,
764 F.2d 1084, 1092 (5th Cir. 1983) ("To the extent the judgment of the district court awards
damages for [a particular claim], it is reversed. The judgment of the district court is in all other
respects affirmed."); Clarkson v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 761 F.2d 189, 192 (4th Cir. 1985) ("re-
versed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded"); Erebia v. Chrysler Plastic Products Corp., 772
F.2d 1250, 1260 (6th Cir. 1985) ("The case is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.");
Laney v. Coleman Co., 758 F.2d 1299, 1306 (8th Cir. 1985) ("The judgment below is affirmed with
respect to the award of actual damages and is reversed with respect to the award of punitive
damages."); Minnesota Timber Producers Ass'ns. v. American Mutual Ins. Co., 766 F.2d 1261,
1268 (8th Cir. 1985); Park v. El Paso Board of Realtors, 764 F.2d 1153, 1170 (4th Cir. 1985); J.
Yanan & Associates v. Integrity Ins. Co., 771 F.2d 1025, 1035 (7th Cir. 1985); Air Crash Disaster
Near New Orleans, La. (Giancontieri) v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 767 F.2d 1151, 1159-60
(5th Cir. 1985); Holley v. Sanyo Mfg., Inc., 771 F.2d 1161, 1168 (8th Cir. 1985) ("We reverse the
judgment entered on the verdict for Holley and remand to the district court with instructions that
judgment be entered for Sanyo."); Jasperson v. Purolator Courier Corp., 765 F.2d 736, 742 (8th
Cir. 1985) ("We ... remand with instructions that the district court reduce the award of actual
damages ... to $1.00."); Jurgensen v. Fairfax County, Va., 745 F.2d 868, 890 (4th Cir. 1984) ("the
cause is remanded to the district court with directions for the entry ofjudgment consistent with the
decision herein"); Lerman v. Flynt Distributing Co., 745 F.2d 123, 142 (2d Cir. 1984) (plaintiffs
complaint "is dismissed"); Malcak v. Westchester Park Dist., 754 F.2d 239, 245 (7th Cir. 1985)
("the due process claim is dismissed with prejudice"); Martin v. Citibank, N.A., 762 F.2d 212, 221
(2d Cir. 1985) (case remanded "with instructions to enter a judgment in accordance with this
opinion"); Mr. Chow of New York v. Ste. Jour Azur S.A., 759 F.2d 219, 231 (2d Cir. 1985) (case
remanded "with instructions to dismiss the complaint"); Owens v. Bourns, Inc., 766 F.2d 145, 151
(4th Cir. 1985) ("We ... reverse and direct the entry of judgment for defendant."); Pietroniro v.
Borough of Oceanport, New Jersey, 764 F.2d 976, 983 (3d Cir. 1985) ("the judgment of the district
court will be vacated with directions to enter ajudgment in favor of the appellants"); Powell v. J.T.
Posey Co., 766 F.2d 131, 135 (3d Cir. 1985) (case "remanded to the district court with a direction
to enter an order granting defendant's motion for judgment notwit hstanding the verdict"); Vip-
polis v. Village of Havestraw, 768 F.2d 40, 45 (2d Cir. 1985) (case remanded "with instructions to
dismiss the complaint"). See Spence v. Mariehamns R/S, 766 F.2d 1504, 1508 (11 th Cir. 1985)
("the judgment of the district court denying the defendants' motion for judgment notwithstanding
the verdict is reversed"); cf. Yopp v. Siegel Trading Co., 770 F.2d 1461, 1467 (9th Cir. 1985)
("reversed"); Seidenstein v. National Medical Enterprises, 769 F.2d 1100, 1107 (5th Cir. 1985)
(judgment on slander claim reversed and case remanded "for entry ofjudgment for appellants on
that claim"); Worthen Bank & Trust Co., N.A. v. Utley, 748 F.2d 1269, 1274 (8th Cir. 1984) ("we
reverse with directions to grant the motion of Worthen for judgment n.o.v. on the counterclaim").
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had an absolute right to take a voluntary nonsuit and refile his or her
complaint.27 The existence of that right reflected the fact that the pri-
mary purpose of a nonsuit was to resolve issues of law, not to assess
whether the plaintiff had presented an airtight evidentiary case. The
Supreme Court noted in Neely that appellate courts as well as trial
courts are required to respect that right:
A plaintiff whose jury verdict is set aside by the trial court on
defendant's motion for judgment n.o.v. may ask the trial
judge to grant a voluntary nonsuit to give plaintiff another
chance to fill a gap in his proof.... The plaintiff-appellee
should have this same opportunity when his verdict is set
aside on appeal.2 74
There was a time when the appellate courts expressly framed their opin-
ions to protect that opportunity. 2
75
At first blush this opportunity could seem to reflect undue solici-
tousness for the verdict winner, who, it might be asserted, should have
introduced at the first trial sufficient evidence to fill the "gap" subse-
273. For this reason early Supreme Court decisions stressed that the losing party was
entitled to take a voluntary nonsuit and refile his or her complaint following entry of a directed
verdict or judgment n.o.v. Slocum v. New York Life Ins. Co., 228 U.S. at 380-81 (judgment
n.o.v.), 396-97 (compulsory nonsuit), 398-99 (directed verdict); Pleasants v. Fant, 89 U.S. 116, 122
(1874). The Slocum Court regarded the opportunity to refile such a case as among the substantive
rights protected by the seventh amendment. Slocum, 228 U.S. at 399.
274. Neely, 386 U.S. at 328. See also id. at 343 (Black, J., dissenting) (new trial appropri-
ate because "[t]he record here clearly reveals that there were gaps in petitioner's case which she
might, if given a chance, fill upon a new trial"); Fountain v. Filson, 336 U.S. 681,683 (1949) (party
who won at trial may not "be deprived of any opportunity to remedy the defect which the appel-
late court discovered in his case"); Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 411 (1943) (Black, J.,
dissenting) (denial of opportunity for new trial unjust because "[plerhaps, now that the petitioner
knows he has insufficient evidence to satisfy a judge even though he may have enough to satisfy a
jury, he would be able to fill this ... gap to meet any judge's demand"); Pleasants, 89 U.S. at 122
(where the court has granted a directed verdict "the party can submit to a nonsuit and try his case
again if he can strengthen it"). In Cone the Court emphasized the historical basis of this practice:
Take the case where a trial court is about to direct a verdict because of failure of proof in
a certain aspect of the case. At that time a litigant might know or have reasons to believe
that he could fill the crucial gap in the evidence. Traditionally, a plaintiff in such a di-
lemma has had an unqualified right, upon payment of costs, to take a nonsuit in order to
file a new action after further preparation, unless the defendant would suffer some plain
legal prejudice other than the mere prospect of a second lawsuit.
Cone, 330 U.S. at 217 (citing Pleasants, 89 U.S. at 122; Jones v. S.E.C., 298 U.S. 1, 19, 20 and cases
cited therein).
275. In Theriot v. Mercer, 262 F.2d 754 (5th Cir. 1959), the appellate court, after holding
the evidence insufficient to sustain the verdict, remanded the case to the district court "with direc-
tions to enter a judgment for the defendant unless plaintiff ... makes a satisfactory showing that
on another trial evidence of sufficient probative force to justify submission of the cause to the jury
will be offered, in which event the judgment shall be for a new trial." Id. at 761. See United States
v. Lyman, 125 F.2d 67 (1st Cir. 1942), 138 F.2d 509 (1st Cir. 1943); Home Owners' Loan Corp. v.
Huffman, 134 F.2d 314, 317 (8th Cir. 1943); cf. Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Dismang, 106
F.2d 362, 364 (10th Cir. 1939).
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quently detected by the trial or appellate court. But the existence of that
opportunity is more understandable when one recalls that the jury,
which has the preeminent factfinding role under the seventh amend-
ment, did not itself perceive any such critical defect in the evidence. The
professed constitutional rationale of judgments n.o.v. is that a decision
regarding the insufficiency of the evidence involves only a question of
law, and that such decisions merely create fact-intensive legal rules re-
garding what evidence must be adduced at a particular trial. But ordi-
narily the essential legal components of a cause of action are made
known to a litigant prior to trial; there is more than merely facial un-
fairness in announcing only after, possibly years after, trial what a
party was obligated to prove. The fact that a jury found the evidence
persuasive despite the allegedly fatal omission strongly suggests that the
omitted evidence was not so obviously essential that the need to intro-
duce it could readily have been foreseen.
The pattern of recent appellate opinions makes clear that the right
of a litigant to fill in supposed "gaps" will often provide a significant
check on overreaching by the appellate courts. It will always be possible
for an appellate court to hypothesize some circumstance, however im-
plausible, which, if present, would render the verdict improper, and
then hold that the verdict-waiver had the burden of adducing evidence
showing the absence of that circumstance. In Smith v. Monsanto Chemi-
cal Co., 2 7 6 for example, the central issue was whether, as the jury be-
lieved, the black plaintiff had been fired because of his race, or, as his
employer maintained, for taking a company towel out to the parking
lot to clean his car. In an effort to discredit the company's explanation,
the plaintiff adduced evidence that white workers had never been dis-
missed for engaging in the same practice. The Eight Circuit found this
evidence legally insufficient, hypothesizing that management might
have been unaware of the practice of white employees and faulting the
plaintiff for failing to introduce evidence of such knowledge by com-
pany officials. 277 The court of appeals might with equal ease have hy-
pothesized any number of other nondiscriminatory explanations for the
same apparent disparity-that there was a change in policy before or
after the plaintiffs dismissal, that the whites were given special treat-
ment for some non-racial reasons, such as their youth or record of pro-
ductivity, that the supervisors who knew of the other towel incidents
were intimidated by the union, and so on-and held the evidence defec-
tive since the plaintiff had not demonstrated the absence of one or more
276. 770 F.2d 719 (8th Cir. 1985).
277. Id. at 722-24.
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of these benign explanations. 278 Because problems and appellate
abuses of this sort are so case-specific, it is impossible either for the
Supreme Court to lay down rules delineating who must prove precisely
what, or for a litigant to foresee what an appellate court may subse-
quently require. Affording a litigant an opportunity to fill in such gaps
provides a reasonably workable check on the danger that a court's hy-
pothesized problems will bear no relationship to reality. If a court has
correctly identified a factual issue on which the verdict winner can ad-
duce no additional evidence, that may tend to confirm the wisdom of
the court's action.279 On the other hand, if the court's hypothesized
benign explanation is largely a figment of the judicial imagination, a
litigant will often be able to demonstrate on remand that the court's
concern was unwarranted.
Restoration of the principles of Cone, Neely, and Johnson is war-
ranted for a second, somewhat related reason. Federal procedure pro-
vides for two devices to correct a jury verdict based on questionable
evidence. Where the verdict is not supported by a certain minimum
quantum of evidence, judgment n.o.v. is authorized; where the verdict
is merely "against the weight of the evidence" a new trial may be or-
dered. But while it is possible to verbalize different formulas for the type
of defect warranting judgments n.o.v. and new trials, the practical dif-
ference between those formulations is neither clear nor predictable. In
Smith v. Monsanto Chemical, for example, it is far from obvious why
the verdict should have been held to be unsupported by the evidence,
rather than merely against the weight of the evidence. Indeed, it is diffi-
cult to imagine how one would explain the differences between these
standards, or argue in a situation like Smith that the case fit into one
category or the other.
The notion that a motion for judgment n.o.v. raises a question of
law, and is to be evaluated by a standard quite distinct from that ap-
plied to a motion for a new trial, is not merely fiction, it is twentieth-
century fiction. In the nineteenth century, when the practice of entering
judgments n.o.v. first emerged, the Supreme Court did not maintain
there was a sharp difference in the substantive standards for granting a
new trial and a judgment n.o.v. Judgment n.o.v., the Court repeatedly
suggested, was appropriate when a court concluded that it would be
required to grant a new trial if any future jury reached the same verdict.
Roughly speaking, judgment n.o.v. was proper whenever it was clear
that the verdict-winner could not remedy the evidentiary defect which
278. The practice of requiring a plaintiff to disprove every conceivable benign explanation
of a defendant's actions was expressly disapproved by the Supreme Court in Bazemore v. Friday,
478 U.S. 385, 400-01 (1986).
279. Of course, the verdict winner may be unable to adduce such evidence because no
evidence exists on either side of the hypothesized issue.
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required the granting of a new trial after the first verdict. 28 ° In that era
the Supreme Court expressly recognized that a trial court's disposition
of a motion for j.n.o.v., like its action on a motion for a new trial, re-
quired the exercise of a degree of discretion.281
The practical difficulty in distinguishing between a verdict unsup-
ported by substantial evidence and a verdict against the weight of the
evidence often makes the choice between a judgment n.o.v. and a new
trial a difficult one. A decision to deny a motion for judgment n.o.v. is,
as was noted above,28 2 entitled to substantial weight on appeal. The
decision of a district court to grant or deny a new trial is accorded such
deference that it is virtually unreviewable in the appellate courts.28 3 A
fortiori the trial judge is likely to be better able to determine whether a
verdict is merely against the weight of the evidence or is without any
evidentiary basis, and ought ordinarily be permitted to make that deter-
mination in the first instance. Recent experience has made clear that
language of Neely apparently giving appellate courts significant latitude
in determining whether to make themselves the choice between a judg-
ment n.o.v. and a new trial, or to remand that decision to the trial court,
280. McGuire v. Blount, 199 U.S. 142, 148 (1905) ("Where the court would be bound to
set aside a verdict for want of testimony to support it, it may direct a finding in the first instance,
and not await the enforcement of its view by granting a new trial."); Griggs v. Houston, 104 U.S.
553, 554 (1882) ("If upon the evidence the jury had brought in a verdictagainst the defendants it
would have been the duty of the court to set it aside and grant a new trial. . . . It was right,
therefore, to direct a verdict for the defendants."); Bowditch v. Boston, 101 U.S. 16, 18 (1880)
("Whenever, in the trial of a civil case, it is clear that the state of the evidence is such as not to
warrant a verdict for a party, and that if such a verdict were rendered the other party would be
entitled to a new trial, it is the right and duty of the judge to direct the jury to find according to the
views of the court."); Pleasants v. Fant, 89 U.S. 116, 122 (1875) (If the evidence is not "sufficient to
justify a verdict.., then it is the duty of the court after a verdict to set it aside and grant a new trial.
Must the court go through the idle ceremony in such a case of submitting to the jury the testimony
on which plaintiff relies, when it is clear to the judicial mind that if the jury should find a verdict in
favor of plaintiff that verdict would be set aside and a new trial had? Such a proposition is absurd,
and accordingly we hold the true principle to be, that if the court is satisfied that.., the evidence is
insufficient to warrant a verdict for-the plaintiff, the court should say so to the jury.").
A long line of decisions, the last of them Patton v. Texas & Pac. Ry., 179 U.S. 658 (1901),
utilized the following formulation: "[A] court may withdraw a case from [the jury], and direct a
verdict ... where the evidence ... is of such conclusive character that the court, in the exercise of
sound juridical discretion, would be compelled to set aside a verdict returned in opposition to it."
Id. at 659-60 (citations omitted). It seems clear that the words "set aside a verdict" refer to the
ordering of a new trial, since Patton and the cases which it cites were decided prior to the emer-
gence of the practice of ordering judgment n.o.v.
281. Empire State Cattle Co. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 210 U.S. 1, 10 (1908)
(district court order granting directed verdict is to be upheld if "the state of the proof was such as
to have authorized the court, in the exercise of a sound discretion, to decline to submit the cause to
the jury"); Herbert v. Butler, 97 U.S. 319, 320 (1877) (if the evidence "is insufficient to sustain a
verdict . . . the court is not bound to submit the case to the jury, but may direct them what verdict
to render"). See also Patton, and cases cited supra note 280.
282. See supra text accompanying notes 250-53.
283. See, e.g., Fairmont Glass Works v. Cub Fork Coal Co., 287 U.S. 474,481-82 (1933);
Wilson v. Everett, 139 U.S. 616 (1891); Schuchardt v. Aliens, 68 U.S. 359, 371 (1863).
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has resulted in a virtual elimination of such remands. Neely needs to be
reformulated to require, at the least, that appellate courts must not au-
tomatically assume the responsibility for making that choice. Where an
appellate court identifies a defect in the evidence which was not per-
ceived by the trial judge, it should leave to the trial court the choice
between judgment n.o.v. and a new trial, unless special circumstances
make such a remand clearly inappropriate.284
The failure of the appellate courts to recognize the desirability of
such remands stems in part from the often repeated doctrine that the
issue of whether or not judgment n.o.v. should have been awarded is a
"question of law." Since in theory the record either is or is not legally
insufficient to support the verdict, these decisions seem to assume there
simply is no room for discretion and no reason for a remand. But appel-
late decisions regarding judgments n.o.v. bear absolutely no resem-
blance to an analysis of a question of law; these decisions are fact-
bound analyses which focus exclusively on the evidence in the case and
rarely if ever refer to any legal precedents in more than a perfunctory
manner. The courts act as though both the legal standards and the
weight of the evidence could be determined with precision, as if, for
example, a probability of jury error was to be tolerated from 0% to
75%, a new trial ordered if the chance of error was 75.1%-90.0%, and
judgment n.o.v. ordered if the likelihood of jury error were 90.1 % and
above. If such a standard existed, and the likelihood of jury error could
be determined to within a tenth of a percent, the attitudes and practices
of the appellate courts might make sense. But the disposition of real
appeals bears no resemblance to any such mathematically precise
model. Given the vagueness of the actual standards and the difficulty of
assessing the weight of the evidence, it is easy to imagine in almost any
of the decisions in which judgment n.o.v. was ordered that another
panel might have thought the verdict was merely against the weight of
the evidence, or even that the verdict was sound.
If there is a sharp distinction between judgments n.o.v. and orders
for new trials, it lies not so much in the legal standard for awarding each
as in the longstanding rule, still respected to a considerable degree in the
circuit courts, that a district court's decision to grant or deny a new trial
should only rarely be overturned on appeal. From this premise the ap-
284. An analogous procedural rule applies when an appellate court determines that some
legal error tainted a trial judge's findings of fact. Such an error precludes affirmance of the trial
court decision, but it does not authorize the appellate court to attempt to decide how the factual
issues should have been resolved had the error not occurred. Because Rule 52 limits the role of the
circuit courts to determining whether the trial judge's findings were clearly erroneous, an appellate
panel in such a situation must ordinarily remand the case so that the trial judge can make fresh
findings untainted by any legal defect. Pullman Standard Co. v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 291-92
(1982).
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pellate courts seem to have tacitly reasoned that they cannot order a
new trial and that the only correction they can give for a defect in the
evidence is judgment n.o.v. The bizarre result of this approach is that
the appellate courts, specifically because they are less capable of making
a precise evaluation of the evidence, are limited to ordering only the
most drastic remedy for the verdict loser. The different institutional ca-
pacities of the trial and appellate courts clearly militate in favor of pre-
cisely the opposite rule-that appellate courts, having less ability to
evaluate the evidence, can say no more than that there seems to be too
little evidence to support the verdict, and must ordinarily leave to the
more informed judgment of the trial judge the choice between a new
trial and judgment n.o.v.
The abandonment of Cone, Neely, and Johnson by the circuit
courts is closely related to the high rate of appellate reversal of jury
verdicts, although it is less obvious which phenomenon is the cause and
which is the effect. As a practical matter, however, when the Supreme
Court granted the appellate courts the theoretical authority to choose
between judgment n.o.v. and a new trial, it gave the circuit courts the de
facto power to make and implement their own determinations regard-
ing which party should win a lawsuit. Under Cone, Neely, and Johnson,
on the other hand, the pattern of appellate factfinding described in Part
II could not readily have occurred; if the appellate courts were deprived
in most instances of the authority to choose between new trials and
judgment n.o.v., those courts, lacking the power to decide which party
would actually win the lawsuit, might well be far less inclined to tamper
with the jury's verdict at all.
Revitalization of Cone, Neely, and Johnson is a practical necessity
if appellate compliance with the seventh amendment is to be reestab-
lished. The federal appellate courts, it must be recalled, are the trans-
gressors with which the seventh amendment is concerned. The seventh
amendment's "re-examination" clause is the only constitutional guar-
antee whose prohibitions are directed expressly, and almost exclusively,
at judges. When the Supreme Court enforces that amendment, it does
not trench upon the results of the political process, but vindicates the
constitutionally mandated right of the public to participate in the judi-
cial process. In the absence of Supreme Court action to enforce the
seventh amendment-and such enforcement has been utterly absent for
the last twenty years-circuit court compliance with the amendment
has become entirely voluntary. One would like to think that the appel-
late courts would not abuse that power, just as one would prefer to
believe that Congress would not exceed its constitutional powers if
Marbury v. Madison2 8 5 were overruled. But if the framers had been.
285. 5 U.S. (II Cranch) 137 (1803).
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willing to rely on the plighted faith of federal appellate judges, they
would not have bothered to adopt the seventh amendment at all.
Given the palpable inclination of the appellate courts to overturn
jury verdicts in situations in which the verdict loser would fairly be enti-
tled to no more than a new trial, it would be far easier for the Supreme
Court to restrict the remedial powers of the appellate courts than try to
actively police twelve circuits to bring their standards for ordering judg-
ment n.o.v. into line with constitutional principles. Some general pro-
tective rule or rules are an administrative necessity; although the
Supreme Court is the court of first resort when a circuit court overturns
a jury verdict, the high court simply cannot consider more than a hand-
ful of the scores of verdicts overturned each year by federal judges. Be-
cause it is impossible for the Supreme Court to review and correct every
seventh amendment violation occurring in the circuit courts, the Court
has a constitutional obligation to fashion administrative measures that
will minimize such abuses. At common law the one clearly accepted
method for reconsidering the factual findings of a jury was to submit
the issues to a second jury;2 8 6 because an order for a new trial, unlike
an order awarding judgment n.o.v., does not ordinarily raise any con-
stitutional questions, resort to the less drastic new trial alternative is
supported by the general rule that courts are to avoid constitutional
questions. A subsequent jury asked to reconsider the issues heard by the
first is unlikely to be handicapped by the narrow experience and abili-
ties which limit the factfinding competence of a judge. On the whole the
most reliable institution to reevaluate the sufficiency of the evidence to
support a jury's verdict is not an appellate court, or the trial judge, but
another jury. If a second jury arrives at a different verdict than the first,
286. Blackstone noted that the practice of granting new trials to reconsider a verdict
against the weight of the evidence had been accepted since the reign of Charles III. 3 W. BLACK-
STONE, COMMENTARIES 388-89 (1803). Blackstone, a staunch advocate ofjury trials in civil cases, id.
at 379-81, insisted that the ordering of new trials was consistent with the right to jury trial:
Causes of great importance, titles to land, and large questions of commercial property,
come often to be tried by a jury .. where the facts are complicated and intricate, the
evidence of great length and variety, and sometimes contradicting each other .... Grant-
ing new trial, under proper regulations, cures all these inconveniences, and at the same
time preserves entire and renders perfect that most excellent method of decision, which is
the glory of the English law. A new trial is a re-hearing of the cause before another jury;
but with as little prejudice to either party, as if it had never been heard before.
Id. at 390-91. See Fowler v. Rathbone, 79 U.S. 102, 119 (1871); Schuchardt v. Allens, 68 U.S. 359,
369-70 (1863); Barreda v. Stone, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 146, 167 (1858) ("[W]hen [evidence is] admit-
ted, the question whether it is sufficient or not is for the jury, and ... their finding is conclusive,
unless a new trial is awarded by the court in which the case is tried, or in the appellate tribunal, for
some error of law."); Zeller's Lessee v. Eckert, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 118, 122 (1846) ("We have no
concern, on a writ of error, with questions of fact, or whether the finding of the jury accords with
the weight of the evidence. The law has provided another remedy for errors of this description,
namely, a motion in the court below for a new trial .. "); Myra Foundation v. United States, 267
F.2d 612, 614 (8th Cir. 1959); Agnew v. Cox, 254 F.2d 263, 267 (8th Cir. 1958).
1989:237 Judges Against Juries
the result to which the courts were inclined is reached without the con-
stitutional difficulties entailed by the granting of a judgment n.o.v. 28 7
If, on the other hand, the second jury agrees with the verdict of the first,
an injustice of constitutional magnitude is avoided without the neces-
sity of Supreme Court intervention. The concurrent findings of fact of
two juries could not plausibly be set aside for want of evidence absent
proof of jury bias or other extraordinary circumstances. Since the aver-
age civil jury trial takes less than three days, compared to almost eleven
months for the typical appeal in a civil case,288 utilization of new trial
orders to resolve doubts about the sufficiency of evidence seems an effi-
cient use of judicial resources.
IV. APPELLATE REVIEW OF THE SIZE OF JURY VERDICTS
A. Appellate Decisions Overturning "Excessive" Verdicts
1. THE EMERGING MODERN PRACTICE
The large number of appellate decisions overturning jury verdicts
as excessive is the result of the radical alteration and expansion of a
form of appellate review which until sixty-five years ago did not exist at
all. For the first 130 years after the adoption of the seventh amendment,
there were only three narrow circumstances under which an appellate
court could even consider an objection to the size of a jury verdict.
First, a verdict could be overturned on appeal if the size of the verdict,
usually together with other circumstances, 28 9 demonstrated that the
287. See, e.g., Smith v. TransWorld Drilling, 773 F.2d 610, 612 (5th Cir. 1985).
288. 1986 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE
UNITED STATES COURTS 152 (average civil appeal 10.8 months), 223 (of 5,222 civil jury trials, 3,068
were completed in three days or less).
289. Barry v. Edmunds, 116 U.S. 550, 565 (1886); New York Central & Hudson R.R. v.
Fraloff, 100 U.S. 24, 31-32 (1879). This problem appears to have led to the original court practice
of granting new trials on the amount of damages. 3 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 286, at 388 ("the
chiefjustice, Glynn, in 1655, grounded the first precedent that is reported in our books for granting
a new trial upon account of excessive damages given by the jury: apprehending with reason, that
notorious partiality in the jurors was a principal species of misbehaviour"). The first Supreme
Court decisions clearly indicating that appellate courts could reverse jury verdicts on this basis are
Kennon v. Gilmer, 131 U.S. 22, 29 (1889) and Gila Valley, Globe & N. Ry. v. Hall, 232 U.S. 94
(1914). Prior to 1955 some circuit courts indicated that the only occasion on which they would
consider a claim of excessiveness was when an appellant urged that the size of the verdict demon-
strated improper jury bias or sympathy. Southern Pac. Co. v. Guthrie, 186 F.2d 926, 928-31 (9th
Cir. 1951) (en banc) (appellate authority to reverse for passion and prejudice exists, although
authority to reverse for excessiveness may not); Southern Pac. Co. v. Guthrie, 180 F.2d 295, 304
(9th Cir. 1949); Scott v. Baltimore & O. R.R., 151 F.2d 61,65 & n. I1 (3d Cir. 1945); Earl W. Baker
& Co. v. Lagaly, 144 F.2d 344, 347 (10th Cir. 1944) ("The verdict.., is challenged on the ground
of being excessive in amount.... When attacked on this ground, a verdict should not be disturbed
on appeal unless it is so plainly excessive as to suggest that it was the result of passion or prejudice
on the part of the jury."); Houston Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Kelley, 131 F.2d 627, 628 (5th Cir.
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jury had acted out of passion or prejudice; 290 where such bias was
shown, the tainted verdict could not be modified by a remittitur, but
required in every case a new trial.29 ' Second, the appellate courts
would overturn a verdict if the size of the verdict necessarily proved
that the jury had disregarded the instructions of the trial court; this
doctrine was most frequently applied where the size of the judgment
made clear that the jurors had improperly resorted to a compromise
verdict.292 Third, where a jury verdict was the sum of several discrete
1942); Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v. McKee, 121 F.2d 583, 586 (10th Cir. 1941) ("In the absence
of clear evidence in the record that the verdict was the result of passion and prejudice, this court is
without authority to review the amount of verdict in a tort action."); Washington Times Co. v.
Bonner, 86 F.2d 836, 849 (D.C. Cir. 1936); Larsen v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 171 F.2d 841, 845 (7th
Cir. 1948); Peitzman v. City of Illmo, 141 F.2d 956,963 (8th Cir. 1944); Kurn v. Stanfield, I I I F.2d
469,474 (8th Cir. 1940); Terminal R. Ass'n of St. Louis v. Farris, 69 F.2d 779, 786 (8th Cir. 1934).
Before 1955 there were less than a half dozen appellate decisions actually finding that the size of a
jury verdict demonstrated bias. Ford Motor Co. v. Mahone, 205 F.2d 267, 273-74 (4th Cir. 1953);
Missouri-K.-T. R.R. of Texas v. Ridgway, 191 F.2d 363, 367-68 (8th Cir. 1951); Brabham v. State
of Mississippi, 96 F.2d 210, 213-14 (5th Cir. 1938); cf. National Surety Co. v. Jean, 61 F.2d 197,
198 (6th Cir. 1932) (appellate decision imputing to trial judge finding of passion and prejudice).
290. See Gila Valley, Globe & N. Ry. v. Hall, 232 U.S. 94, 104 (1914):
[]f it is apparent to the trial court that the verdict was the result of passion or prejudice, a
remittitur should not be allowed, but the verdict should be set aside. In passing upon this
question the court should not look alone to the amount of the damages awarded, but to
the whole case.
Cf. Taliferro v. Augle, 757 F.2d 157, 161 (7th Cir. 1985) (upholding verdict because, inter alia,jury
was unlikely to have been influenced by any favoritism towards the unpopular plaintiff). In Mis-
souri-K.-T. R. Co. of Texas v. Ridgway, 191 F.2d 363 (8th Cir. 1951), the appellate panel, while
holding that the amount of the disputed verdict was "so excessive as to shock the conscience,"
declined to find on that basis alone that the jury acted out of passion and prejudice, but based that
conclusion on the fact that counsel for plaintiff, in his closing argument, had engaged in miscon-
duct deliberately intended "to arouse the passion and prejudice of the jury." Id. at 368-70. See also
Southern Pac. Co. v. Guthrie, 180 F.2d 295, 304 (9th Cir. 1949) ("Some authorities hold that
passion and prejudice may not be inferred from the mere excessiveness of the verdict, proof, of
appeals to passion and prejudice not appearing in the record.").
291. Minneapolis, St. Paul, & Sault Ste. Marie Ry. v. Moquin, 283 U.S. 520, 521-22
(1931). See Arkansas Valley Land & Cattle Co. v. Mann, 130 U.S. 69, 74-75 (1889); Southern Pac.
Co. v. Guthrie, 180 F.2d 295, 304 (9th Cir. 1949). A judge holding that a jury acted from improper
motives would not necessarily be asserting that the jury had reached the wrong verdict. In Craft v.
Metromedia, Inc., 766 F.2d 1205, 1210 (8th Cir. 1985), for example, the trial judge overturned on
the basis of possible bias the liability finding of the first jury, but upheld a similar verdict returned
by a second jury.
292. The appellate federal courts never doubted their power to order a new trial to correct
such jury misconduct. In Pugh v. Bluff City Excursion Co., 177 F.2d 399 (6th Cir. 1910), the
plaintiff sought to recover damages caused by the death of her adult son, upon whose earnings she
had been entirely dependent. Although the son had been earning $20 a week at the time of his
death, the jury returned a verdict of one dollar. The Sixth Circuit, noting that the trial judge had
expressly instructed the jury that it could not award only nominal damages, reversed and ordered a
new trial:
The charge of the court ... to ... the jury was unexceptionable .... It is the general rule
that the granting of a new trial is a matter of discretion, and will not be reviewed. But it is
not so where the verdict is inconsistent on its face and shows abuse of power on the part
of the jury. If the granting of the motion is a positive duty, it is not discretionary. If it is
necessary to correct a mistrial, it becomes a positive duty to set aside the erroneous pro-
1989:237 Judges Against Juries
and severable claims, one of which was held on appeal to be legally
defective, the appellate courts have long resolved the appeal by uphold-
ing the verdict in whatever amount remained after the deduction of the
insufficient or unfounded claim.29 3
If the appellate courts were still limited to these three types of re-
view, only a handful of jury verdicts in 1984-1985 would have been
overturned because of the amount of the award. Among the fifty-eight
appeals challenging the size of a jury verdict, there were only five in-
stances in which the defendant-appellant asserted that the size of the
verdict was the result of passion or prejudice, and in every instance the
appellate court rejected that argument.294 In only a single case did the
ceeding and grant a new trial. And such, we think, was the case here. The jury found the
plaintiff was entitled to recover. And if she was, it was absurd to say that she was entitled
to only nominal damages. The conclusion seems unavoidable that the verdict was simply
a compromise to prevent a disagreement.
Id. at 401. In the two decades that followed, the Second, Third, and Eighth Circuits agreed that a
new trial should be awarded by an appellate court if the size of the verdict indicated that there had
been an improper compromise verdict. Miller v. Maryland Casualty Co., 40 F.2d 463, 464-65 (2d
Cir. 1930); Stetson v. Stindt, 279 F. 209 (3d Cir. 1922); United Press Ass'ns v. National Newspaper
Ass'n, 254 F. 284 (8th Cir. 1918); Glenwood Irr. Co. v. Vallery, 248 F. 483 (8th Cir. 1918). The
Third Circuit in Stetson held that if a jury returned a verdict lower in amount than the plaintiff's
undisputed claim, the defendant was entitled to a new trial--even if the plaintiff were willing to
accept the lesser award-because the verdict indicated jury misconduct that might well have
prejudiced the defendant.
In 1933 the Supreme Court indicated approval of this line of decisions. In Fairmont Glass
Works v. Cub Fork Coal Co., 287 U.S. 474 (1933), after a jury awarded the plaintiff only $1.00 in
damages, the court of appeals directed a new trial, reasoning that there was no dispute that the
plaintiff's financial losses, after consideration of a counterclaim, were at least $18,250. The defen-
dant sought certiorari, arguing that the appellate court had "re-examined the verdict of the jury ...
in violation of the Seventh amendment." Id. at 479-80. The Supreme Court, citing several of the
circuit court cases referred to above, noted that the plaintiff contended the verdict was "compara-
ble to one in which the award of damages.., was less than an amount undisputed.., or was in
clear contravention of the instructions of the trial court." Id. at 484. Although the majority refused
to conclude that there had been any such violation of the instructions, it expressed no doubt that
such a violation would provide a basis for a new trial and might be inferred from the amount of the
damage award. An inference of disobedience is only possible where the parties do not dispute the
size, or the upper or lower limits, of the financial injury. Conversely, a jury verdict inconsistent
with some undisputed amount, floor or ceiling, would at least ordinarily violate the court's instruc-
tions regarding the appropriate method for calculating damages.
293. See infra text accompanying notes 453-63.
294. Arceneaux v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner& Smith, Inc., 767 F.2d 1498, 1502 (1 lth
Cir. 1985); Borough v. Duluth, Missabe & Iron Range Ry., 726 F.2d 66 (8th Cir. 1985); Dabney v.
Montgomery Ward, 761 F.2d 494, 501 (8th Cir. 1985); Goldstein v. Manhattan Industries, Inc.,
758 F.2d 1435, 1447 (5th Cir. 1985); Dixon v. International Harvester Co., 754 F.2d 573, 588 (5th
Cir. 1985). In Dixon the defendant urged that the damages demonstrated passion and prejudice;
the Fifth Circuit agreed that the damages were excessive, but made no finding of jury bias, choos-
ing instead to order a remittitur. Dixon, 754 F.2d at 590. In five other cases the appellate opinions
indicated that an appeal based on a claim of excessiveness could be upheld only if the amount of
the verdict was so great as to demonstrate improper jury bias or sympathy. Each of these opinions
concluded that the size of the verdict was not sufficient to justify such an inference. Molex, Inc. v.
Nolen, 759 F.2d 474, 479-80 (5th Cir. 1985); Ramsey v. American Air Filter Co., Inc., 772 F.2d
1303, 1313-14 (7th Cir. 1985); Rock v. McCoy, 763 F.2d 394, 398 (10th Cir. 1985); T.D.S. Inc. v.
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size of the verdict indicate that the jury had disregarded the trial court's
instructions, evidently resorting to a compromise verdict.295 There
were but three instances in which an appellant successfully challenged
the propriety of any compensatory award for a discrete part of the
plaintiff's claims.296 Today, as in the past, application of these three
longstanding types of appellate review are relatively rare. The major
controversy in this area of the law concerns whether, if a jury has
obeyed the instructions and arrived at a verdict in a fair and unbiased
manner, an appellate court can nevertheless direct a new trial merely
because the judges believe the jurors made a factual mistake. Today the
vast majority of appellate decisions overturning jury verdicts are made
on the ground that the jury purportedly made such a good faith error.
The number and rationale of recent decisions overturning "exces-
sive" jury verdicts marks a drastic departure from past practice. The
authority of federal trial judges to direct a new trial, or a remittitur,
because of excessive damages dates from Justice Story's decision in
Blunt v. Little; but Story warned that a trial judge's evaluation of a
claim of excessiveness was "an exercise of discretion full of delicacy and
difficulty," and that, even if excessiveness "should clearly appear," any
interference with the size of the jury's verdict would "go to the very
limits of the law." '2 9 7 Prior to 1933 the Supreme Court had insisted on
at least a dozen different occasions that neither the appellate courts nor
the Supreme Court itself had any authority to overturn a jury verdict
because it appeared either too large or inadequate.29 In most cases this
rule was largely unexplained, although in at least one instance the
Court suggested that such appellate review would violate the seventh
amendment. 299 During the early decades of the twentieth century, the
circuit courts generally agreed that they had no authority to consider a
Shelby Mutual Ins. Co., 760 F.2d 1520, 1530 n.8 (I Ith Cir. 1985); Transgo, Inc. v. Ajac Transmis-
sion Parts Corp., 768 F.2d 1001, 1024-25 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1059 (1986).
295. Worthen Bank & Trust Co., N.A. v. Utley, 748 F.2d 1269, 1273 (8th Cir. 1984). This
was an action on several promissory notes. The principal and interest due on the loans was conced-
edly $3,473,100.37. The jury returned a verdict in the amount of $2,500,000.
296. See infra text accompanying notes 465-67.
297. Blunt v. Little, 3 Fed. Cas. 760, 761-62 (C.C.D. Mass. 1822).
298. Eastman Kodak Co. of New York v. Southern Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359,
379 (1927) (jury verdict on amount of damages "is conclusive"); Texas & Pacific R.R. v. Hill, 237
U.S. 208, 215 (1915); Phoenix R.R. v. Landis, 231 U.S. 578, 581 (1913); Southern R.R. - Carolina
Division v. Bennett, 233 U.S. 80, 87 (1914); Herencia v. Guzman, 219 U.S. 44, 45 (1910); City of
Lincoln v. Power, 151 U.S. 436, 437-38 (1894); New York, Lake Erie & W. R.R. v. Winter's
Administrator, 143 U.S. 60, 75 (1892); Fitzgerald & Mallory Construction Co. v. Fitzgerald, 137
U.S. 98, 113 (1890); Metropolitan R.R. v. Moore, 121 U.S. 558, 573-75 (1887); Wabash R.R. v.
McDaniels, 107 U.S. 454, 456 (1883); New York Central & Hudson River R.R. v. Fraloff, 100
U.S. 24, 31-32 (1879); see Arkansas Valley Land & Cattle Co. v. Mann, 130 U.S. 69, 75 (1889).
299. Metropolitan R.R., 121 U.S. at 573 (although in some states appellate courts may
overturn a verdict as excessive, "[sluch a practice in the appellate courts of the United States is
perhaps forbidden by the Seventh Amendment").
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challenge to the size of a jury verdict.30 A number of lower court opin-
ions, including one written by then Judge Blackmun, recognized that
any appellate review of the size of a jury verdict would pose serious
seventh amendment problems because questions regarding the magni-
tude and value of a plaintiff's injuries raised essentially factual is-
sues.3 ' This longstanding insistence that appellate courts could not
reconsider a jury's findings regarding the amount of damages weighs
heavily against any conclusion that such appellate review was a tradi-
tional common law practice. 3
0 2
Between 1924 and 1932, however, six circuit court decisions held
that, because the granting of a new trial based on the excessiveness or
inadequacy of a verdict was a matter of district court discretion, an
appellate court could itself order such a new trial if the trial court's
refusal to do so was an "abuse of discretion." 30 3 In Fairmont Glass
Works, decided in 1933, the Supreme Court expressly declined to decide
whether a trial court's refusal to set aside an allegedly excessive verdict
could be reversed on appeal as an "abuse of discretion" ;314 that opin-
ion, however, signaled a willingness to at least consider the permissibil-
ity of an appellate practice which until then the Supreme Court had
repeatedly forbidden. In 1955 in Neese v. Southern Railroad Co. the
Court again avoided deciding whether appellate courts could review the
size of jury verdicts, explaining that a resolution of that constitutional
issue was unnecessary since the action of the trial judge in upholding
300. Ford Motor Co. v. Hotel Woodward Co., 271 F. 625, 630 (2d Cir. 1921); United
Press Ass'ns v. National Newspaper Ass'n, 254 F. 284, 285-86 (8th Cir. 1918); Chesapeake & 0.
Ry. v. Proffitt, 218 F. 23, 28 (4th Cir. 1914); Sun Printing & Publishing Ass'n v. Schenck, 98 F. 925,
930 (2d Cir. 1900); Grand Trunk W. Ry. v. Gilpin, 208 F. 126, 130 (7th Cir. 1913).
301. Solomon Dehydrating Co. v. Guyton, 294 F.2d 439,446 (8th Cir. 1961); McDonnell
v. Timmerman, 269 F.2d 54, 62 (8th Cir. 1959); Myra Foundation v. United States, 267 F.2d 612,
614 (8th Cir. 1959); Agnew v. Cox, 254 F.2d 263, 267 (8th Cir. 1958). In Solomon then Judge
Blackmun wrote:
[This court has] ... stated that the excessiveness of a verdict "is not a question for our
consideration" but is a matter directed "solely to the judgment and conscience of the trial
judge on a motion for a new trial."... In reaching this result we have referred at times to
the Seventh Amendment and to the common law as it existed in 1791 upon the Amend-
ment's adoption .... [I]n our opinion inadequacy or excessiveness of a verdict is basi-
cally, and should be, a matter for the trial court which has had the benefit of hearing the
testimony and of observing the demeanor of the witnesses and which knows the commu-
nity and its standards.
Solomon, 294 F.2d at 446.
302. Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 483-85 (1935).
303. W.T. Rawleigh Co. v. Shoultz, 56 F.2d 148, 149 (3d Cir. 1932); Grand Trunk W. Ry.
v. Heatlie, 48 F.2d 759, 761 (9th Cir. 1931); Miller v. Maryland Casualty Co., 40 F.2d 463, 465 (2d
Cir. 1930); Kos v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., 28 F.2d 872, 872-73 (6th Cir. 1928); Cobb v. Lepisto, 6
F.2d 128, 129 (9th Cir. 1925); Detroit Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Pratt, 2 F.2d 193, 193 (6th Cir.
1924).
304. 287 U.S. 474, 485-86 (1933).
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the disputed verdict in that case was not an "abuse of discretion.- 30 5
Implicit in this analysis was an assumption that such appellate review, if
constitutional, would be limited to determining whether the trial judge
had abused his or her discretion in denying a new trial on the amount of
damages. Similarly, in avoiding the same constitutional question in
Grunenthal v. Long Island Railroad Co. in 1968 the Supreme Court con-
cluded that the disputed verdict in that case had to be upheld even if the
appellate courts were at liberty to utilize an abuse of discretion
standard.30 6
In the wake of Fairmont Glass Works the abuse of discretion stan-
dard gradually won general acceptance among the appellate courts.30 7
By the time of Grunenthal eleven circuits agreed that the appellate
courts had such limited authority to review the size of a jury verdict. 08
The circuit courts repeatedly noted the severe restrictions constraining
such appellate review. The Second Circuit indicated that an abuse of
discretion could virtually never be found except where the verdict dif-
fered from the undisputed amount of the damages.30 9 One panel, in
upholding an "undoubtedly large" verdict for the severely burned vic-
tims of a fire, stressed that the trial judge had "observed the injuries of
305. 350 U.S. 77, 77 (1955).
306. 393 U.S. 156, 159-61 (1968). At the oral argument in Grunenthal, one member of the
Supreme Court commented: "Presumably trial judges see a lot of these cases and have some sense
of what sort of a going rate is for pain and suffering, to put it in those horrible terms, which we
have to." Oral Argument, No. 35, October Term 1968, p. 24; see also id. at 28 ("I gather only one
of this [lower appellate] panel had any trial experience.").
307. Gault v. Poor Sisters of St. Frances, 375 F.2d 539, 551 (6th Cir. 1967); Glazer v.
Glazer, 374 F.2d 390, 413 (5th Cir. 1967); Springfield Crusher, Inc. v. Transcontinental Ins. Co.,
372 F.2d 125, 127 (3d Cir. 1967); Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Kirtley, 307 F.2d 418, 423 (8th
Cir. 1962); Barnes v. Smith, 305 F.2d 226, 228 (10th Cir. 1962); Merritt-Chapman & Scott Corp. v.
Frazier, 289 F.2d 849, 858 (9th Cir. 1961); Silverman v. Travelers Ins. Co., 277 F.2d 257, 264 (5th
Cir. 1960); Hulett v. Brinson, 229 F.2d 22, 25 & n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1955) (citing Fairmont Glass);
Whiteman v. Pitrie, 220 F.2d 914, 919 (5th Cir. 1955); Kilmer v. Gustason, 211 F.2d 781, 783 (5th
Cir. 1954); Fort Worth & Denver Ry. v. Roach, 219 F.2d 351, 352 (5th Cir. 1955); Chicago, Rock
Island & Pacific Ry. v. Kifer, 216 F.2d 753,756-57 (10th Cir. 1954) (citing Fairmont Glass); Brest v.
Philadelphia Transp. Co., 216 F.2d 331, 332 (3d Cir. 1954); Southern Ry. Co. v. Neese, 216 F.2d
772, 774 (4th Cir. 1954); Baldwin v. Warwick, 213 F.2d 485,486 (9th Cir. 1954); Bucher v. Krause,
200 F.2d 576, 586-88 (7th Cir. 1952); Trowbridge v. Abrasive Co. of Philadelphia, 190 F.2d 825,
830 (3d Cir. 1951); Smith v. Welch, 189 F.2d 832, 837 (10th Cir. 1951) (citing Fairmont Glass);
Sebring Trucking Co. v. White, 187 F.2d 486, 486 (6th Cir. 1951); Southern Pac. Co. v. Guthrie,
186 F.2d 926, 927-31 (9th Cir. 1951) (en banc) (citing Fairmont Glass); Chicago & N.W. Ry. v.
Curl, 178 F.2d 497, 502 (8th Cir. 1949); Spero-Nelson v. Brown, 175 F.2d 86, 89-90 (6th Cir. 1949);
Virginian Ry. v. Armentrout, 166 F.2d 400, 407-08 (4th Cir. 1948) (citing Fairmont Glass); Con-
sumers Power Co. v. Nash, 164 F.2d 657, 660 (6th Cir. 1947); Dubrock v. Interstate Motor Freight
System, 143 F.2d 304, 307 (3d Cir. 1944); Houston Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Kelley, 131 F.2d
627, 628 (5th Cir. 1942) (citing Fairmont Glass); McCoy v. Cate, 117 F.2d 194, 194 (1st Cir. 1941)
(citing Fairmont Glass); Dept. of Water & Power v. Anderson, 95 F.2d 577, 586 (9th Cir. 1938)
(citing Fairmont Glass).
308. Grunenthal, 393 U.S. at 157 n.3.
309. Miller v. Maryland Casualty Co., 40 F.2d at 465.
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those who survived." 3 ' Other opinions permitted appellate interven-
tion only if the abuse of discretion were "manifest" or "grave." 3 1 This
language was consistent with the manner in which appellate courts ac-
tually evaluated claims that particular verdicts were inadequate or ex-
cessive. Prior to Grunenthal the appellate courts had purported to find
an abuse of discretion in only a handful of cases.3 1 2
Deference to the views of the trial judge is particularly important
because a substantial portion of modem appeals involve challenges to
the size of verdicts awarded to the survivors of painful or disfiguring
injuries," 3 to the families of those fatally injured,31 4 or to plaintiffs
claiming emotional harms.31 ' The evaluation of the emotional or phys-
ical harms suffered by such plaintiffs ordinarily depends upon the op-
portunity afforded the jury, and trial judge, to actually see the physical
injuries or to observe the demeanor of those claiming emotional inju-
ries. The magnitude of the suffering and loss caused by the death of a
husband, for example, will vary as widely as does the nature of individ-
ual marriages and the degrees of affection, dependence, and compan-
ionship involved in each. In ordinary life no sensible person would un-
dertake to assess the intensity of the grief of a widow whom he or she
had never met. Personal observation of the testimony of the victim
would be equally vital in evaluating the degree of humiliation suffered
310. Consumer Power Co. v. Nash, 164 F.2d at 660. See also Grand Trunk W. R. Co. v.
Heatlie, 48 F.2d at 761 ("The trial court saw the man...").
311. Smith v. Welch, 189 F.2d at 837 ("manifest"); Dubrock v. Interstate Motor Freight
System, 143 F.2d at 307 ("manifest"); Houston Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Kelley, 131 F.2d at 628
("grave").
312. Among the decisions cited in notes 303 and 307, supra, the appellate courts over-
turned the jury verdicts only in Virginian Ry. v. Armentrout and Cobb v. Lepisto.
313. Dabney v. Montgomery Ward, 761 F.2d 494 (8th Cir. 1985); Dixon v. International
Harvester Co., 754 F.2d 573 (5th Cir. 1985); Herold v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 761 F.2d 1241
(8th Cir. 1985); Hintz v. Jamison, 743 F.2d 535 (7th Cir. 1984); Klein v. Sears Roebuck Co., 773
F.2d 1421 (4th Cir. 1985); Kokesh v. American Steamship Co., 747 F.2d 1092 (6th Cir. 1984);
Martell v. Boardwalk Enters., Inc., 748 F.2d 740 (2d Cir. 1984); Prageant v. Pan Am. World
Airways, 762 F.2d 1245 (5th Cir. 1985); Rocco v. Johns-Manville Corp., 754 F.2d 110 (3d Cir.
1985); Rymer v. Davis, 754 F.2d 198 (6th Cir. 1985); Stissi v. Interstate & Ocean Transport Co.,
765 F.2d 370 (2d Cir. 1985); Woods v. Burlington N. R.R., 768 F.2d 1287 (11th Cir. 1985); Young
v. City of New Orleans, 751 F.2d 794 (5th Cir. 1985). The appellate courts overturned the verdicts
in only 2 of these 13 cases, Dixon and Martell.
314. In re Air Crash Disaster Near New Orleans, La., 767 F.2d 1151 (5th Cir. 1982) (ver-
dict held excessive); Gutierrez v. Exxon Corp., 764 F.2d 399 (5th Cir. 1985) (excessiveness claim
rejected); Haley v. Pan Am. World Airways, 746 F.2d 311 (5th Cir. 1984) (verdict held excessive);
Klein v. Sears Roebuck Co., 773 F.2d 1421 (4th Cir. 1985) (excessiveness claim rejected); Rocco v.
Johns-Manville Corp., 754 F.2d 110 (3d Cir. 1985) (excessiveness claim rejected); Stissi v. Inter-
state Ocean & Transport Co., 765 F.2d 370 (2d Cir. 1985) (excessiveness claim rejected); Walters v.
Mintec/Int'l, 758 F.2d 73 (3d Cir. 1985) (verdict held excessive).
315. E.g., Ramsey v. American Air Filter Co., 772 F.2d 1303 (7th Cir. 1985); Joan W. v.
City of Chicago, 771 F.2d 1020 (7th Cir. 1985); Douglass v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 769 F.2d 1128
(7th Cir. 1985).
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by a black victim of racial discrimination 316 or the female victim of an
unconstitutional strip search. 317 Deference to the views of the trial
judge is also important because he or she is particularly able to evaluate
the size of the verdict in the context of the trial court contentions of the
parties. 3 1 8
The great frequency with which appellate courts today overturn
jury verdicts is a direct result of a decisive change in the legal standard
applied in these cases. In 1984-1985, out of sixty-eight appeals involving
a challenge to the size of a verdict, the original "abuse of discretion"
standard was applied in only seven cases a.3 9 Among the thirty-four
cases overturning a verdict as excessive, there is not a single instance in
which a panel purporting to apply an abuse of discretion standard actu-
ally found that such an abuse had occurred.32 ° This abandonment of
316. Ramsey, 772 F.2d 1303.
317. Joan W., 771 F.2d 1020.
318. In upholding the verdict in Joan W. for emotional injuries caused by a strip search,
the district judge explained:
The matrons testified at trial and the jury could see that two of the matrons were aggres-
sive and hostile. The plaintiff is a physically frail person .... The jury well understood
what happened in that cell because the plaintiff had a remarkable ability to communicate
her feelings and the events that occurred .... The jury's reaction to the testimony of the
plaintiff was not noticed by the defendant's attorneys. One of the City's attorneys cross-
examined the plaintiff in a highly insulting and antagonistic manner. His goal clearly was
to make the plaintiff out to be a liar and a "sick" person. He only succeeded in antagoniz-
ing the jury. The court has seen two strip search cases tried by members of the Corpora-
tion Counsel's office and in both cases the same aggressive, hostile cross-examination
tactics were used. While in some cases they may succeed in revealing a plaintiff as a
malingerer or worse, they run an enormous risk of focusing the jury's sympathy on the
plaintiff. That happened in this case. It would be a mistake to reduce the plaintiff's ver-
dict under these circumstances. A reduction would allow the City's attorneys to continue
their use of very aggressive trial tactics in an effort to get low verdicts, without risking a
high verdict when those tactics backfire.
Memorandum Opinion and Order, May 22, 1984, No. 83 C 327 (N.D. Ill.). These are indicative of
the types of circumstances which may not be apparent from reading a cold record. In Joan W., of
course, these critical facts were set out in a written district court opinion; the Seventh Circuit, in
overturning the verdict which had been sustained by the trial judge, inexplicably made no reference
to any of the circumstances described in the quoted passage. Joan W., 771 F.2d 1020 (7th Cir.
1985).
319. Klein v. Sears Roebuck Co., 773 F.2d 1421, 1428 (4th Cir. 1985); Rymer v. Davis,
754 F.2d 198, 201 (6th Cir. 1985); Michaels v. Michaels, 767 F.2d 1185, 1202 (7th Cir. 1985);
Goldstein v. Manhattan Industries, Inc., 758 F.2d 1435, 1447-48 (11 th Cir. 1985); Fields v. Wash-
ington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 743 F.2d 890, 895 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Katch v. Speidel, 746 F.2d
1136, 1143 (6th Cir. 1984); Joan W. v. City of Chicago, 771 F.2d 1020, 1023 (7th Cir. 1985).
320. In Walters v. Mintec/lnt'l, 758 F.2d 73 (3d Cir. 1985), the panel held that the denial
of a new trial "was not consistent with the sound exercise of discretion." Id. at 82. That holding,
however, was unrelated to the standard of review actually applied in the opinion. Id. at 80 (whether
"the verdict is 'so grossly excessive as to shock the judicial conscience' "). The panel in Joan W.
overturned the disputed verdict, but did not purport to find any abuse of discretion. In Katch v.
Speidel the Sixth Circuit held that the trial judge had abused his discretion in denying a larger
remittitur, but based that decision on defects in the instructions and on its conclusion that the jury
"did not understand" the instructions. Katch, 746 F.2d at 1142.
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the abuse of discretion standard is all the more striking because the
same circuits consistently use an abuse of discretion standard to evalu-
ate other requests for new trials.32 1 In Springborn v. American Commer-
cial Barge Lines3 2 2 the Fifth Circuit applied an abuse of discretion stan-
dard in rejecting the plaintiff's request for a new trial on a claim that the
jury had rejected, but made no reference to that standard in ordering, at
the defendant's behest, a new trial on the amount of damages awarded
by the jury on a second claim.
The practice of deferring to the trial court's views regarding the
reasonableness of the verdict-a practice implicit in the original abuse
of discretion standard and in past years expressly articulated by the
circuit courts-has now largely disappeared. In In re Air Crash Disaster
Near New Orleans, La.,32 a after a jury awarded $1,500,000 to the wife
of an air crash victim, the trial judge ordered a remittitur to $1,000,000,
which the plaintiff accepted. The court of appeals ruled that even a ver-
dict of $1,000,000 was excessive, and directed a new trial unless the
plaintiff agreed to remittitur reducing the verdict to $500,000. The ap-
pellate panel, in holding that the lost love, affection, and companion-
ship were worth no more than $500,000, made no reference to the trial
judge's view of the evidence in the case, but relied instead on the level of
awards which other federal and state appellate judges had been willing
to sustain in other cases.324 Judge Tate, in a dissenting opinion,
objected:
This able and experienced district judge saw and heard the
witnesses; unlike appellate judges secluded in their appellate
chambers from the ongoing realities of everyday life, he is fa-
miliar with the every day monetary evaluation jurors drawn
from the community place on varied losses in the multitude of
cases tried before him . . .- the multitude of pragmatic jury
evaluations of monetary worth appropriate to compensate
victims in the ongoing twentieth century world of (what we
from yesterday's active law-practice may regard as) inflated
values of food, shelters, automobiles, appliances, and, yes,
personal injures or losses. Here, the district court did not rub-
ber stamp the jury award; carefully considering the conten-
321. Dixon v. International Harvester Co., 754 F.2d 573, 586 (5th Cir. 1985); Craft v.
Metromedia, Inc., 766 F.2d 1205, 1221 (8th Cir. 1985); Abasiekong v. City of Shelby, 744 F.2d
1055, 1059 (4th Cir. 1984); Eyre v. McDonough Power Equip., Inc., 755 F.2d 416, 420 (5th Cir.
1985); Grogan v. General Maintenance Serv. Co., 763 F.2d 444, 447 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
322. 767 F.2d 89 (5th Cir. 1985). See also Dixon v. International Harvester Co., 754 F.2d
573 (5th Cir. 1985) (applying abuse of discretion standard to request for new trial on liability, but
not to request for new trial on damages.)
323. 767 F.2d 1151 (5th Cir. 1985).
324. Id. at 1156-57.
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tions of excessiveness, it reduced by remittitur the jury award
... to $1,000,000....
Our jurisprudence recognizes the better ability of district
judges to evaluate excessiveness and requires great deference
to the district court's actions with regard to requests for
remittitur....
The majority does not discuss the application of this
principle to the present appeal.325
No comparable account of the importance of deferring to views of the
trial judge can be found in any other opinion during the 1984-1985 per-
iod. 326 Although most appellate opinions simply ignore the decision of
the trial judge, at least one decision expressly asserts that a circuit court
is to resolve the matter de novo.3 2 7
In place of the original abuse of discretion standard, a majority of
the circuit decisions now hold that a verdict must be overturned if the
appellate courts finds the size of the verdict "shocking" ' 328 or "grossly
excessive."3129 It would be a rather considerable exaggeration to char-
325. Id. at 1162-63 (Tate, J., dissenting).
326. None of the majority opinions holding jury verdicts excessive purport to give weight
to the trial judge's finding to the contrary. Among the appellate decisions upholding challenged
jury verdicts, four based that conclusion in part on the views of the district court. Dabney v.
Montgomery Ward, 761 F.2d 494, 501 (8th Cir. 1985) ("Excessiveness of a verdict is ... a matter
for the trial court which has had the benefit of hearing the testimony and of observing the de-
meanor of the witnesses and which knows the community and its standards .... ); Fishman v.
Clancy, 763 F.2d 485,489-90 (1st Cir. 1985) (in resolving a claim that the verdict was excessive, the
appellate court "must accord broad discretion to the trial court's determination because it 'has had
the benefit of hearing the testimony, of observing the demeanor of the witnesses and also knows
the community and its standards' "); Klein v. Sears Roebuck Co., 773 F.2d 1421, 1428 (4th Cir.
1985) ("As a reviewing court, we cannot say that this evidence was so deficient that the trial judge,
intimately familiar with it, abused his discretion by not setting aside the verdict as excessive.");
Sprague v. Boston & Maine Corp., 769 F.2d 26, 28 (1st Cir. 1985) ("The trial judge is afforded
broad latitude to review jury awards that are asserted to be either excessive or inadequate, for he
has both seen the witnesses and heard the testimony .... ) (footnotes omitted).
327. Deakle v. John Graham & Sons, 756 F.2d 821, 827 (11 th Cir. 1985) ("As must a trial
court in considering a motion for remittitur, in an appeal from the denial of such a motion we must
independently determine the maximum possible award that is reasonably supported by the evidence
in the record. Any excess must be remitted.") (emphasis added).
328. Approximately one third of the 1984-1985 opinions use this formulation. E.g., Fish-
man v. Clancy, 763 F.2d 485,489 (1st Cir. 1985); Martell v. Boardwalk Enters., Inc., 748 F.2d 740,
750 (2d Cir. 1984); Rocco v. Johns-Manville Corp., 754 F.2d 110, 113-14 (3d Cir. 1985); In re Air
Crash Disaster Near New Orleans, La., 767 F.2d 1151, 1155 (5th Cir. 1985); Kokesh v. American
Steamship Co., 747 F.2d 1092, 1095-96 (6th Cir. 1984); Knapp v. Whitaker, 757 F.2d 827, 846-47
(7th Cir. 1985); Dabney v. Montgomery Ward, 761 F.2d 494, 501 (8th Cir. 1985); Chalmers v. City
of Los Angeles, 762 F.2d 753, 760-61 (9th Cir. 1985); Rock v. McCoy, 763 F.2d 394, 398 (10th Cir.
1985); Goldstein v. Manhattan Industries, Inc., 758 F.2d 1435, 1447-48 (1I1th Cir. 1985).
329. E.g., Fishman v. Clancy, 763 F.2d 485, 489 (1st Cir. 1985); Stissi v. Interstate &
Ocean Transport Co., 765 F.2d 370, 377 (2d Cir. 1985); Rocco v. Johns-Manville Corp., 754 F.2d
110, 113-14 (3d Cir. 1985); Gutierrez v. Exxon Corp., 764 F.2d 399, 402 (5th Cir. 1985); Taliferro
v. Augle, 757 F.2d 157, 161 (7th Cir. 1985); Chalmers v. City of Los Angeles, 762 F.2d 753, 760-61
(9th Cir. 1985); Fields v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 743 F.2d 890, 895 (D.C. Cir.
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acterize these formulations as legal standards. None of the appellate
decisions provide any guidance for distinguishing a "shockingly" high
verdict from one that is merely "stunningly," "surprisingly," or "very"
high. One Fifth Circuit decision acknowledged that an appellate deci-
sion applying this formulation could not "be supported entirely by ra-
tional analysis. It is inherently subjective in large part, involving the
interplay of experience and emotions as well as calculation." 330 This
seems an apt description of the process by which a jury sets the size of a
damage award, but it would be absurd to suggest that federal judges
have more diverse experiences, or more astute emotions, than do fed-
eral juries or trial judges. This very formulation cogently demonstrates
the wisdom of the original rule severely limiting appellate scrutiny of
the size of damage awards. The unavoidably subjective nature of these
judgments virtually guarantees a substantial degree of overreaching if
the appellate courts attempt to make their own evaluations. It is hardly
to be believed that, confronted with a given record, any two judges
would pick the same dollar figure as marking the limit beyond which
any additional award would be "gross" or "shocking." Some judges are
more readily shocked than others; whether a judge regards an award as
gross would necessarily turn on the particular value which he or she
attached to family relations, physical abilities, or individual self-re-
spect. The question of whether $100,000 for the loss of a leg or of a
husband is inadequate, reasonable, or excessive cannot plausibly be
characterized as an issue of law. To the extent, as is often the case, that
the evaluation of damages turns on such subjective judgments, an ap-
pellate court could undertake to consider claims that a jury was biased
or failed to obey the instructions of the trial court. But surely appellate
judges have no special competence to determine whether a properly in-
structed, fair-minded jury had misvalued the lost limb or spouse.
A second, somewhat more intelligible group of appellate decisions
apply to damage awards a standard similar to that utilized in disposing
of requests for judgments n.o.v. These decisions inquire whether the
size of the award is "reasonable," '331 is supported by "substantial" evi-
1984). Fishman, Rocco, and Chalmers apply both the "shocking" and "grossly excessive" formula-
tions. Whether these are two alternative standards, or alternative terms for the same standard, is
unclear.
330. In re Air Crash Disaster Near New Orleans, La., 767 F.2d 1151, 1156 (5th Cir. 1985).
See also Dixon v. International Harvester Co., 754 F.2d 573, 590 (5th Cir. 1985).
331. U.C. Castings Co. v. Knight, 754 F.2d 1363, 1369 (7th Cir. 1985); Cincinnati Fluid
Power, Inc. v. Rexnord, Inc., 773 F.2d 92, 97 (6th Cir. 1985); Gutierrez v. Exxon Corp., 764 F.2d
399, 402 (5th Cir. 1985); Pierce v. Ramsey Winch Co., 753 F.2d 416, 434 (5th Cir. 1985); Deakle v.
John Graham and Sons, 756 F.2d 821, 827 (11 th Cir. 1985); Dixon v. International Harvester Co.,
754 F.2d 573, 590 (5th Cir. 1985); Springborn v. American Commercial Barge Lines, 767 F.2d 89,
94 (5th Cir. 1985). The formulation in Deakle most clearly resembles the standard utilized in ap-
peals seeking judgment n.o.v.
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dence, 3 2 or is merely "speculative."'3 3 3 Aside from the problems dis-
cussed above regarding appellate review of liability determinations, this
approach would raise no constitutional problems if the defendant in-
volved had filed a motion for a partial directed verdict, and judgment
n.o.v., setting a ceiling on the level of permissible damages. Among the
1984-1985 appeals, however, there is not a single case in which a litigant
presented and preserved in this manner an argument as to whether the
evidence was sufficient as a matter of law to support a verdict in excess
of a given amount. Most appellate opinions proceed as if Rule 50, the
seventh amendment, and Slocum v. New York Life Insurance Co. 34
were somehow inapplicable when an appellate court was asked to re-
consider the findings of a jury regarding the amount of damage suffered
by plaintiff.335
Where appellate courts evaluate excessiveness claims under a judg-
ment n.o.v. standard, the analyses, as might be expected, are tainted by
the same types of overreaching present in ordinary judgment n.o.v. ap-
peals. Juries are at times forbidden to draw inferences absent proof of
332. Erebia v. Chrysler Plastic Prods. Corp., 772 F.2d 1250, 1260 (6th Cir. 1985); Pierce v.
Ramsey Winch Co., 753 F.2d 416,437-38 (5th Cir. 1985); Transgo, Inc. v. Ajac Transmission Parts
Corp., 768 F.2d 1001, 1023 (9th Cir. 1985). See also Electro-Miniatures Corp. v. Wendon Co.,
Inc., 771 F.2d 23, 26-27 (2d Cir. 1985) (whether evidence "inadequately" supports the size of the
verdict); Pesaplastic, C.A. v. Cincinnati Milacron Co., 750 F.2d 1516, 1527 (11th Cir. 1985) (does
evidence provide "adequate" support for the size of the verdict); Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746
F.2d 1205, 1266-68 (7th Cir. 1984) (is evidence "sufficient" to support size of the verdict); Ponder-
osa System, Inc. v. Brandt, 767 F.2d 668,670 (10th Cir. 1985) (evidence "sufficient" to support size
of the verdict).
333. Abeshouse v. Ultragraphics, Inc., 754 F.2d 467,470-71 (2d Cir. 1985); U.C. Castings
Co. v. Knight, 754 F.2d 1363, 1372-74 (7th Cir. 1985); Collier v. Housing & Portable Engineers
Local 101, 761 F.2d 600, 603 (10th Cir. 1985). See also Deakle v. John Graham & Sons, 756 F.2d
821, 831 (1 1th Cir. 1985) ("conjectural"); Taliferro v. Augle, 757 F.2d 157, 162 (7th Cir. 1985)
("fanciful").
334. 228 U.S. 364 (1913).
335. The most striking illustration of this practice is Klein v. Sears Roebuck Co., 773 F.2d
1421 (4th Cir. 1985), in which the court of appeals, acting on a claim of excessiveness, ordered
entry of judgment for defendant on the disputed element of damages:
Sears contends that the trial court committed reversible error by failing to set aside as
excessive the jury's award of ... $104,000 to Claudia [Klein] for loss of consortium....
The only evidence pertaining to Claudia's claim of loss of consortium ... was her testi-
mony about household and personal grooming activities that Steven [Klein] could no
longer perform as a result of the accident.... While loss of consortium may be inferred in
some instances .... the Kleins did not offer sufficient evidence upon which that inference
could be made. We therefore reverse that portion of the award and instruct the court to
enter a judgment for Sears on the consortium claim.
Id. at 1428-29. Nothing in the opinion suggests Sears had moved for a directed verdict or judgment
n.o.v. on this element of the damage claim. Compare Fishman v. Clancy, 763 F.2d 485, 489 (1st
Cir. 1985) ("defendants failed to object to the submission of the punitive damages issue to the jury
and... this omission in itself is ordinarily enough to preclude an argument on appeal that plaintiff
produced insufficient evidence to justify punitive damages"); Voekel v. Bennett, 115 F.2d 102, 104
(3d Cir. 1940) (an "element of speculation" is no bar to jury award; "what the deceased might have
earned after his death is, of course, to some extent, speculative").
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additional facts which jurors might well regard as self-evident. In Klein
v. Sears Roebuck and Co.,3 3 6 for example, the Fourth Circuit held that
a wife had not suffered any loss of consortium as a result of an accident
which severed two fingers of her husband's hand and largely disabled
his right arm; the appellate court held the record insufficient to sustain
any award for the wife because there was no evidence regarding how, if
at all, those injuries might adversely affect the wife. A life-long hermit
who had been raised by wolves might have needed such evidence to
figure out whether and in what manner such injuries to a husband
might affect a wife, but jurors who had lived with other human beings
would well understand the consequences of the disability at issue. In
Taliferro v. Augle3 3 7 the defendant police officers had, without justifica-
tion, arrested and beaten the plaintiff and destroyed the only copies of
several manuscripts he had written; the plaintiff sought $25,000 for
physical injury, $100,000 for emotional distress, and $50,000 for the
lost manuscripts, and the jury awarded a total of $47,000. The Seventh
Circuit denounced all of these figures as "fanciful," arguing that the
plaintiff had failed to offer evidence "to establish an objective basis for
quantifying the loss." The appellate court did not deign to explain what
type of evidence could be found that would "quantify" the injury
caused by a beating. Other appellate opinions expressly rely on factual
assumptions the jury might well have disagreed with. In Walters v.
Mintec/Internationa33 s the Third Circuit expressly presumed that the
emotional pain suffered by the ten-and twelve-year-old children of a
deceased accident victim "would tend to dissipate over time"; a rational
jury could certainly have concluded, on the other hand, that a child
might feel more acutely the loss of a parent as he or she grew older and
better able to understand the significance of the death.
The Eleventh Circuit decision in Deakle v. John Graham & Sons3 39
illustrates the lengths to which appellate courts can go in refinding sub-
sidiary facts in order to overturn a jury award as excessive. The plaintiff
in Deakle, a twenty-nine year-old ship captain, had been seriously in-
jured on the job; on appeal his employer challenged as excessive the jury
award of $400,000 for lost future wages. 340 The Eleventh Circuit opin-
ion was, in that panel's own words, "a careful and detailed comparison
of Deakle's income before and after ' 34 1 the injury. The appellate court,
noting that Deakle's pre-injury salary was $21,560, expressly assumed
336. 773 F.2d 1421 (4th Cir. 1985).
337. 757 F.2d 157 (7th Cir. 1985).
338. 758 F.2d 73, 82 (3d Cir. 1985).
339. 756 F.2d 821 (11th Cir. 1985).
340. The actual award was discounted to present value by the clerk of the district court.
Id. at 832.
341. Id. at 827.
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that the relatively young plaintiff would never have received any merit
or seniority-based raises during the rest of this career as a ship captain,
explaining that "the evidence in the record fails to establish with any
degree of precision the actual monetary gains that would have re-
sulted." '34 2 During the three years following the injury, Deakle had
earned $5,044, $15,142 and $19,141. 343 Without any consideration of
the reasons for these variations in his income, the appellate panel in-
sisted on using the highest of these figures, rather than Deakle's average
post-injury wage, explaining, "[w]e can safely presume that the injured
Deakle will earn, at a minimum, $19,141 in each year ...since he
earned precisely this amount in 1983." 344 Although Deakle had offered
evidence that his life expectancy was forty-four additional years, the
court of appeals held that the lost wages should be calculated on the
assumption that Deakle would have retired at age sixty-five after work-
ing only thirty-six additional years. 34 5 The court of appeals, in compar-
ing plaintiff's 1980 pre-injury salary with his 1983 post-injury salary,
refused to make any adjustment for the intervening inflation. 346 It
seemed of no consequence to the appellate judges in Deakle that the
trial jury, with the acquiescence of the district judge, might well have
resolved some or all of these subsidiary factual issues differently.
The Eleventh Circuit decision in Deakle bears a decided resem-
blance to the Fourth Circuit decision summarily overturned by the
Supreme Court in Neese v. Southern Railway.347 The action in Neese
was brought on behalf of the parents of a twenty-two year-old railroad
worker killed in an accident. The decedent prior to his death had lived
with and provided substantial financial support to his parents, and the
parents had expected to rely heavily on his support after his father re-
tired. The jury returned a verdict of $50,000, which the trial judge up-
held. In declaring that verdict excessive, the Fourth Circuit made its
own findings and assumptions about the subsidiary facts. Neese's
mother testified that she expected her son would contribute $2,500 per
year after her husband retired; the Fourth Circuit curtly dismissed that
testimony: "In view of the circumstances was this expectation reason-
able? We think not. ' ,34 ' The court of appeals made its own calculations
342. Id. at 829 n.4.
343. Id. at 828.
344. Id. at 831 (emphasis added).
345. Id. at 832.
346. Id. at 832 n. 15. The court's footnote asserts that inflation-based wage changes in the
years used for comparisons "have already been accounted for," citing notes 4, 8, and 11. Those
notes, however, expressly refused to account for such adjustments, terming them speculative. Be-
tween 1980 and 1983 prices rose approximately 19%. 20 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATES 468 (1985).
347. 350 U.S. 77 (1955), rev'g Southern Ry. v. Neese, 216 F.2d 772 (4th Cir. 1954).
348. Neese, 216 F.2d at 775.
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"on an assumption that Neese would have contributed.., one-fourth
... of the ... salary he could have reasonably expected to make in the
future."'349 The court also assumed that [i]f he continued in his present
work, he would probably have attained a salary of $4,300.00 per year,
the gross salary his father received for the same position at the age of
sixty."'35 Proceeding from the premise that Neese would have worked
until at least the year 2000 and would never earn more than $4,300 a
year, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the $50,000 award was "far
beyond the pale of any reasonable probability and entirely without sup-
port in the record."35 The appellate panel's assumption that there
would be no changes in wage rates during the decades after 1954 was
indefensible when posited, and completely wrong in retrospect. The
jury, which was undoubtedly familiar with inflation rates that had aver-
aged over seven percent annually in the years after World War 11,352
arrived at an award which was an entirely reasonable estimate of what
Neese would have contributed to his parents' support had he sur-
vived.353 The Fourth Circuit's finding of excessiveness, which the
Supreme Court properly reversed, was based on reassessment of the
subsidiary facts which not only intruded on the province of the jury, but
also proved far less accurate than the jury's own evaluation of the
evidence.
Even the sort of appellate factfinding utilized in Deakle, and im-
plicitly condemned by the Supreme Court in Neese, could not provide a
basis for overturning jury awards for injuries which cannot readily be
quantified or calculated, such as pain, suffering, and physical and emo-
tional injuries. The extremely subjective nature of damage assessments
for such injuries prompted the appellate courts in the past to be espe-
cially reluctant to review such awards at all.354 More recently, however,
a number of appellate panels have attempted to review such awards by
349. Id.
350. Id.
351. Id. at 776.
352. 20 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 468 (1985).
353. Between 1960 and 1975 median individual income rose from $4,080 to $11,845. Id. at
452. Since Neese's mother was only 47 when he died, she could have expected to live well into the
1980s. See id. at 69.
354. Scott v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., 151 F.2d 61, 64-65 (3d Cir. 1945) ("Insofar as the
award of damages.., consists of compensation for pain and suffering it is, obviously, nothing that
an appellate court can, or a trial court for that matter, measure by a yardstick as to whether the
jury has given too much or too little."); Dubrock v. Interstate Motor Freight Sys., 143 F.2d 304,
308 (3d Cir. 1944) ("Courts in general are reluctant to disturb a jury's verdict on the ground of
excessiveness where the damages are unliquidated and there is no fixed measure of mathematical
certainty.... This is particularly significant with respect to damages in tort actions for personal
injuries."); Zarek v. Fredericks, 138 F.2d 689, 691 (3d Cir. 1943) ("It must be borne in mind that
the injuries were non-pecuniary in their nature and to measure them by a yardstick of dollars is a
difficult task at best. That is the jury's function."). This approach is still accepted by some modern
decisions. See, e.g., Dabney v. Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc., 761 F.2d 494, 501 (8th Cir. 1985)
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comparing the size of the disputed verdict with verdicts returned, or
upheld, in other cases.35 5 This approach, which evidently has been re-
jected by the Eighth Circuit,3 56 poses a number of serious and ulti-
mately unsolvable problems.
The Fifth Circuit practice is to compare the challenged verdict with
verdicts returned by federal and state courts in the state in which the
case was originally tried. This apparently plausible approach has led to
some fairly bizarre results. On July 1, 1985, a Fifth Circuit panel upheld
a verdict of one million dollars for mental anguish and loss of compan-
ionship to the parents of an adult worker killed in a Texas drilling acci-
dent.3 57 The court relied on a Texas verdict of equal size several years
earlier, and indicated that large verdicts for the parents of a minor child
would be even more readily sustainable.315  On August 12, 1985, an-
other panel of the same circuit overturned as excessive an award of
$400,000 for the loss of a minor child in a Louisiana air crash, holding
that $250,000 was the maximum amount that could be sustained.35 9
The second decision turned primarily on the fact that the largest Louisi-
ana court award to the parent of a deceased child was $150,000.360 The
death of a child somehow causes four times as much harm to his or her
parents if the child dies west of the Louisiana-Texas state line. The os-
tensible Fifth Circuit rule is that a disputed verdict is to be compared
with what other juries have awarded, not with what verdicts have been
upheld on appeal.36' In the Louisiana plane crash case, however, the
panel suggested that its $250,000 ceiling was justified by a prior Fifth
Circuit decision reducing a jury verdict in favor of the parent of a de-
ceased child from $350,000 to $200,000.362 The Second Circuit, at least
in diversity cases, deems excessive any verdict which exceeds "that
which could be sustained were the case before the highest court of the
("An appellate court should be extremely hesitant to overturn a verdict which includes damages
for pain and suffering.").
355. In re Air Crash Disaster Near New Orleans, La., 767 F.2d 1151, 1155-58 (5th Cir.
1985); Dixon v. International Harvester Co., 754 F.2d 573, 588-90 (5th Cir. 1985); Douglass v.
Hustler Magazine, Inc., 769 F.2d 1128, 1144 (7th Cir. 1985); Haley v. Pan Am. World Airways,
746 F.2d 311, 317-18 (5th Cir. 1984); Joan W. v. City of Chicago, 771 F.2d 1020, 1023-25 (7th Cir.
1985); Martell v. Boardwalk Enters., Inc., 748 F.2d 740, 750-53 (2d Cir. 1984); Ramsey v. Ameri-
can Air Filter Co., Inc., 772 F.2d 1303, 1313-14 (7th Cir. 1985).
356. Herold v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 761 F.2d 1241, 1248 (8th Cir. 1985) ("Defen-
dant argues that juries in similar cases have awarded significantly lower amounts. But comparisons
are not particularly helpful. Each case must be evaluated on its own merits.").
357. Gutierrez v. Exxon Corp., 764 F.2d 399 (5th Cir. 1985).
358. Id. at 403.
359. In re Air Crash Disaster Near New Orleans, La., 767 F.2d 1151 (5th Cir. 1985).
360. Id. at 1156. See also Haley v. Pan Am. World Airways, 746 F.2d 311, 317-19 (5th Cir.
1984) (reducing a verdict for the death of child from $350,000 to $200,000 based on comparison
with Louisiana jury verdicts).
361. Air Crash Disaster, 767 F.2d at 1155.
362. Id. at 1157.
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state whose substantive law gives rise to the claim," '363 and thus consid-
ers the levels to which state jury verdicts have been reduced by state
judges.364 It is, at the least, difficult to understand how federal judges
can assess the extent of their authority under the seventh amendment by
looking to the practices of state judges, who, so far as the federal consti-
tution is concerned, are free to re-examine any fact found by a state
jury.
This comparative approach poses considerable difficulties when a
plaintiff has suffered injuries which are clearly different in kind from
those involved in prior verdicts. In Dixon v. International Harvester
Co. 36 5 the jury awarded $2.8 million to a plaintiff who had suffered
[loss of] both testicles, complete avulsion of his femoral artery
and vein, avulsion of the majority of the skin on his penis,
severing of his femoral nerve, tearing away of entire skin on
his abdomen from his groin to his navel, extensive pain and
suffering . . . immediately following the accident ... and...
following surgery, arterial replacement and grafting of
skin.366
The Fifth Circuit compared this award to a state jury verdict of $1 mil-
lion for burns covering thirty-eight percent of the plaintiff's body, held
the $2.8 million award excessive, and reduced it to $892,000.367 How
the appellate panel arrived at the latter figure, and gauged the compara-
tive level of pain and anguish caused by the two quite different injuries,
was not explained. In Douglass v. Hustler Magazine, Inc.368 the defen-
dant magazine published without permission several nude photographs
that had been taken of the plaintiff for Playboy magazine; the Hustler
publication depicted Douglass as a lesbian, wrecked her modeling ca-
reer in Chicago, and triggered a series of obscene phone calls. The jury
returned.a verdict of $300,000 for emotional distress. Breezily denounc-
ing that verdict as "absurd" and "ridiculous," Judge Posner explained:
In Time Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448... (1976), a libel case
... in which the plaintiff sought damages for emotional dis-
tress ... the Supreme Court upheld an award of $100,000 in
compensatory damages .... [A] false accusation of adultery
363. Martell v. Boardwalk Enters., Inc., 748 F.2d 740, 750 (2d Cir. 1984) (quoting Hysell
v. Iowa Pub. Serv. Co., 559 F.2d 468, 472 (8th Cir. 1977)).
364. Id. at 752-54.
365. 754 F.2d 573 (5th Cir. 1985).
366. Id. at 588.
367. Id. at 589-90.
368. 769 F.2d 1128 (7th Cir. 1985).
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made in a reputable national magazine is more likely to cause
distress than what Hustler did to Douglass. 6 9
Judge Posner did not explain how he knew that a woman would be
more distressed by being called an adulteress than by being depicted as
a lesbian; this does not seem to be an issue about which middle-aged
male federal judges would have any particular expertise.
Even when the injuries in a given appeal are similar in type to those
in prior cases, differences in the details of the harms and the circum-
stances of the victims inevitably make a comparison of the verdicts diffi-
cult if not impossible. The problems inherent in such comparisons were
sharply illustrated by Joan W. v. City of Chicago,3 T° one of a series of
cases arising out of the practice of the Chicago police of strip searching
women arrested for minor offenses. The particular circumstances of
Joan W. were described by the court of appeals as follows:
Joan, a physician in her mid-thirties practicing in Chi-
cago, was arrested for a traffic violation on January 28, 1978.
Pursuant to a City policy that was subsequently declared un-
constitutional .. .five female police department employees
("the matrons"), strip searched her.
During the search, Joan was forced to remove her cloth-
ing and to expose the vaginal and anal areas of her body. The
matrons threatened her when she initially refused to comply,
used vulgar language, and laughed at her. Joan testified that
the incident caused her emotional distress that manifested it-
self in reduced socializing, poor work performance, paranoia,
suicidal feelings, depression, and an inability to disrobe in any
place other than a closet. She introduced evidence tending to
show that she was peculiarly sensitive to the kind of physical
violation she had endured because she was a private person
who even during high school gym classes could not com-
pletely disrobe in front of others and was conscious of her
physical disabilities caused by her chronic arthritis.3 7 1
The six member jury, which included one woman, 72 awarded $112,000
in damages. An all male panel of the Seventh Circuit reversed the award
as "flagrantly extravagant."-37 3
The Seventh Circuit opinion made a serious attempt to explain
why the verdict in previous cases could bear on the propriety of a larger
369. Id. at 1144.
370. 771 F.2d 1020 (7th Cir. 1985).
371. Id. at 1021-22.
372. Interview with R. Peter Carey, attorney for the plaintiff (Dec. 18, 1987).
373. Joan W., 771 F.2d at 1025.
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verdict in a later case; that effort demonstrated the indefensibility of the
entire practice. After observing that verdicts in previous strip search
cases had not exceeded $60,000, the panel explained:
The emotional distress and trauma claimed by Joan W. was
not qualitatively more severe than that claimed by the [prior]
plaintiffs .... In other words, when the evidence of the injuries
suffered by those other women is compared to that claimed by
Joan, there is no difference in kind among them.... [T]he jury
award of $112,000 for damages is flagrantly extravagant and
out of line with the other strip search cases .... [W]here the
award is not rationally proportionate to awards asserted in
similar cases for injuries that are no different in kind from
those suffered by the plaintiff, then the award is excessive.374
The panel's analysis proceeds through four equally implausible steps.
First, the court started with a presumption that the size of the verdicts
in the previous cases were correct and binding on Joan W., an unusual
use of offensive collateral estoppel since Joan W. was not a party in any
of those earlier proceedings. Second, the panel made a factual compari-
son of the injuries in Joan W. and the earlier cases to see if they were
"different in kind."37 5 The circuit court's analysis of this factual issue
ignored the views of the trial judge regarding the factual differences
between the searches and the resulting injuries in Joan W. and in earlier
cases, and disregarded the fact that the jury in Joan WI. itself was not, of
course, told about the size of earlier verdicts or asked to make any deci-
sion as to whether those other searches were factually distinguishable.
The Seventh Circuit's description of the search in Joan W. omits a
number of key circumstances that undoubtedly influenced both the jury
and the trial judge. 376 The ease with which comparisons of cases can be
374. Id.
375. Id. at 1023-25.
376. In upholding the jury verdict in Joan W., the trial judge explained:
The search was conducted in a highly degrading way-well beyond the so-called visual
search which was expressly permitted by the City's policy .... The matrons testified at
trial and the jury could see that two of the matrons were aggressive and hostile. The
plaintiff.., told the matrons that she was a doctor. That resulted in increased jeering and
insults. It appeared that the matrons had a single goal: to force the doctor to comply with
their will, by ridiculing, shouting, taunting, threatening. They used demeaning language,
for example, using vulgar terms for parts of the plaintiff's body. The matrons forced her
repeatedly to squat and push her fingers into her vagina and rectum, all the time yelling
to her that she was not doing it good enough, forcing her to weep and bend to their will.
Memorandum Opinion and Order, Joan W., No. 83-C-327 (May 22, 1984). The Seventh Circuit
opinion contains no reference to the insertion of fingers into Joan W.'s vagina and rectum, but
suggests that she was required only to "bend over and spread her buttocks and vagina," appar-
ently on only a single occasion. Joan W., 771 F.2d at 1024. The appellate opinion makes no men-
tion of the shouting or weeping described by the trial judge, and omits the fact that the vulgar
language used referred to the plaintiff's body parts.
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manipulated is illustrated by the panel's insistence in Joan W. that the
circumstances of that case were "not different in kind" from the search
earlier at issue in Levka v. City of Chicago.3 7 7 In Levka itself the same
city defendant had successfully argued that the search and injuries in
Joan W. were more egregious than in Levka, emphasizing that Joan W.,
but not Levka, had been forced to insert her fingers into her own vagina
and rectum.3 7 8 The Seventh Circuit decision in Joan W. on the other
hand, quite deliberately omitted any mention of the body cavity search
that had occurred in that case. The panel members in Joan W., none of
whom had witnessed the testimony of any of the strip search victims,
proclaimed that "[tlhe emotional distress and trauma claimed by Joan
W. was not qualitatively more severe than that claimed by the four [ear-
lier] plaintiffs.",379 Third, the panel in Joan W. denounced the jury for
having returned a verdict "not rationally proportionate" to the verdict
in those prior cases. The proportionality requirement was evidently
quite precise, for the court of appeals held excessive any verdict more
than twenty-five percent above the highest comparison verdict. It does
not appear to have occurred to the Seventh Circuit that "rational" ju-
ries might differ widely as to the proper monetary evaluation of a par-
ticular emotional or physical injury.3 80 Fourth, having overturned the
$112,000 verdict because it was disproportionate to the verdicts in ear-
lier similar cases, the Seventh Circuit calculated the appropriate remitti-
tur; at this stage the court of appeals acknowledged that the circum-
stances of Joan W.-"the taunting of Joan" and "Joan's particular
sensitivities to this kind of abuse"-would "rationally" justify "some
differences" in the verdicts. The court of appeals proceeded to make its
own determination of the magnitude of the additional injury involved,
and ordered a remittitur to reduce the award to $75,000.3' 1
The Seventh Circuit's treatment of the remittitur in Joan W. dem-
onstrates what should have been obvious in any event-that there will
often be significant differences, except in wrongful death cases, in what
was done to the plaintiff, and there will virtually always be differences in
the degree of physical or emotional injuries that resulted. Prior to the
377. Joan W., 771 F.2d at 1024 (citing Levka v. City of Chicago, 748 F.2d 421 (7th Cir.
1983)).
378. Brief for Appellant, Maria Levka v. City of Chicago, No. 84-1055.
379. Joan W., 771 F.2d at 1025.
380. In Dabney v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 761 F.2d 494 (8th Cir. 1985), the first jury to
hear the case awarded the plaintiff $1,000,000 for severe burns caused by a defective heater; at a
second trial the subsequent jury evaluated those injuries at $2,000,000. Id. at 497. The Eighth
Circuit rejected the defendant's argument that the second verdict was excessive because it was
twice as large as the first. "We must expect substantial disparities among juries as to what consti-
tutes adequate compensation for certain types of pain and suffering." Id. at 501 (quoting Vansike
v. Union Pac. R.R., 725 F.2d 1146, 1150 (8th Cir. 1984)).
381. Joan W., 771 F.2d at 1025.
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appeal in Joan W. there had been nine other jury verdicts in strip search
cases. All of these involved an intrusive and indefensible search of a
particularly demeaning sort, but the verdicts varied enormously in size:
$3,300, $15,000, $15,000, $25,000, $25,000, $30,000, $45,000, $50,000,
and $60,000.382 The largest of these verdicts was eighteen times higher
than the lowest figure; if one assumes that all these verdicts were cor-
rect, and that differences in the details of each strip search could justify
disparities of that magnitude, it is entirely possible that other differ-
ences could warrant a verdict of $112,000, slightly less than twice as
high as the $60,000 verdict.
In overturning the appellate verdict in Joan W., the panel empha-
sized that, "Joan... never sought psychiatric experience or other coun-
seling .... Subsequent to the strip search, Joan became the chief resi-
dent at the hospital where she was employed and is now successfully
practicing medicine."3 ' These facts might weigh heavily against the
$112,000 if a trier of fact assumed that sexual mistreatment does no
serious harm to a woman except in those cases where the victim is so
emotionally devastated that she needs psychiatric help, or that pursuing
a successful career is such an extraordinary feat for a woman that no
woman could do so if she had suffered any serious emotional injuries. A
reasonable jury, on the other hand, might well have proceeded on very
different assumptions and have regarded Joan W.'s professional success
and lack of psychiatric treatment as largely irrelevant to the magnitude
of the emotional injuries which she had suffered.
Joan W. also illustrates once again the danger that appellate judges
will lack the experience and sensitivity necessary to resolve the factual
issues presented by these cases. If one indulges in the Seventh Circuit's
assumption that prior decisions establish some sort of a base-line figure,
the critical problem is to determine how much more Joan W. was in-
jured because of her particular sensitivity to this sort of outrageous
treatment and because in her case the search was accompanied by vari-
ous aggravating factors. The jury in Joan W., which included several
male jurors and which actually heard and saw Joan W. testify, con-
cluded that her injuries were $52,000 greater than the previous $60,000
verdict; the three appellate judges, all of whom were men and none of
whom had witnessed the critical testimony, thought the difference in
injuries equaled $15,000. Two of the judges in Joan W. also participated
in Douglass v. Hustler Magazine, where they noted with approval the
award of $100,000 (in 1976 dollars) to a society matron because of a
news account suggesting she had committed adultery. Joan W. and
Douglass were decided within two months of one another. The implicit
382. Id. at 1023-24.
383. Id. at 1025.
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conclusion of Judges Posner and Eschbach that a woman would suffer
far greater emotional harm from a printed suggestion of adultery than
from a strip search by a pack of jeering police matrons, is one with
which, to say the least, a rational jury could surely disagree.
Although most appellate findings of excessiveness are based either
on this sort of comparative analysis or on a redetermination of critical
subsidiary facts, the courts use a number of other approaches as well.
Several decisions determine whether a verdict is excessive by calculating
the award to which a verdict would have to be reduced by remittitur,
and then comparing that "maximum recovery" to the actual jury ver-
dict;. 84 calculating the remittitur in order to determine if a verdict is
excessive bears a certain resemblance to the Queen of Hearts' predilec-
tion for conducting the trial after the execution. In Martell v. Board-
walk Enterprises, Inc. 1 5 the Second Circuit held the evidence "woefully
insufficient to support any substantial portion of an award of
$2,000,000" and then reduced the award by remittitur to $1.2 mil-
lion.38 6 The court did not explain how $1.2 million could be character-
ized as less than a "substantial portion" of $2 million. In Douglass v.
Hustler Magazine, Inc., 387 Judge Posner found the jury's calculation of
lost income fatally flawed because of the jury's apparent failure to dis-
count the plaintiff's actual lost earnings to take into account the risk
aversion of "most people";1 8 in the Seventh Circuit the Constitution
evidently now incorporates at least some of the doctrines of the Chi-
cago school of economics.
In disposing of challenges to particular punitive damage awards,
the appellate courts use a number of drastically different standards de-
pending, it appears, on whether the panel intends to overturn or uphold
the awards. In the opinions overturning punitive awards, the circuit
courts simply make their own de novo determination regarding the size
of the award needed to punish and deter the misconduct involved, and
384. E.g., Deakle v. John Graham & Sons, 756 F.2d 821, 827 (1 th Cir. 1985).
385. 748 F.2d 740 (2d Cir. 1984).
386. Id. at 754.
387. 769 F.2d 1128 (7th Cir. 1985).
388. Id. at 1143:
An award of damages is a sum certain. If it is intended to replace a stream of earnings
that is highly uncertain-surely an understatement in discussing earnings in the field of
entertainment-then risk aversion should be taken into account in computing the dis-
count (interest) rate .... This adjustment is needed to reflect the preference of a risk-
averse individual for a smaller amount, received with certainty, to a larger expected
amount that is subject to great uncertainty. (Most people are risk averse in relation to
substantial financial matters, though many people drawn to economically risky occupa-
tions such as entertainment must be less so.) The expert and the jury ignored this point.
Id. at 1143.
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order a remittitur to that level;3" 9 there is generally no suggestion that
the district court abused its discretion, or that the trial judge had any
discretion to exercise.39 ° Opinions sustaining punitive awards, on the
other hand, insist that juries enjoy considerable discretion in determin-
ing the size of such verdicts, 391 :or hold that punitive awards may only
be reversed if the jury acted out of passion and prejudice. 92 In Fishman
v. Clancy3 9 3 the First Circuit reasoned that variations in the amount of
punitive damages awarded in that case against various defendants dem-
onstrated the jury "had carefully considered the question of punitive
damages";3 94 in Bell v. City of Milwaukee,395 on the other hand, the
Seventh Circuit held that such differences were a fatal "disparity," and
ordered a remittitur to bring the awards into "rough conformity."'3 96
Fishman also held that a large punitive award was appropriate because
the compensatory damages were too small to discourage future viola-
tions;3 97 Hollins v. Powell,398 on the other hand, directed a reduction of
the punitive award precisely because it was high in comparison to the
quite modest compensatory award. The only pattern in these cases sug-
gests the existence of an unspoken per se rule, based solely on the status
of the parties, as to the maximum size of an acceptable punitive damage
award. In non-commercial cases, all punitive awards under $100,000
were upheld,39 9 and all such awards over $100,000 were held exces-
389. Aldrich v. Thomson McKinnon Sec., Inc., 756 F.2d 243, 249 (2d Cir. 1985) ("[W]e
are convinced, on this record, that $3 million goes considerably beyond what may fairly be justified
in order to discourage repetition of Thomson McKinnon's... conduct, or instances of such con-
duct by other brokerage firms."); Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205, 1267 (7th Cir. 1984)
("We hold that a punitive damage award against Shaffer of $50,000 will fulfill the punitive damage
policies of punishment and deterrence."); Hollins v. Powell, 773 F.2d 191, 198 (8th Cir. 1985)
("We believe an award of $2,000 would serve the purpose of punishing Powell for his callous
indifference to the plaintiffs constitutional rights, and also satisfy the deterrent purpose of puni-
tive damages .. "); Ramsey v. American Air Filter Co., 772 F.2d 1303, 1314 (7th Cir. 1985)
("[This court concludes that the $150,000.00 punitive damage award should be reduced to
$20,000.00.").
390. But see Morrill v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 747 F.2d 1217, 1224-25 (8th Cir. 1984)
(noting role of jury and trial court, but reducing punitive award from $20 million to $3 million
without any accompanying explanation).
391. Arceneaux v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner& Smith, Inc., 767 F.2d 1498, 1503 (11 th
Cir. 1985); Fishman v. Clancy, 763 F.2d 485,489-90 (1st Cir. 1985); Molex, Inc. v. Nolen, 759 F.2d
474, 480 (5th Cir. 1985); Rymer v. Davis, 754 F.2d 198, 201 (6th Cir. 1985).
392. T.D.S. Inc. v. Shelby Mutual Ins. Co., 760 F.2d 1520, 1530 (11th Cir. 1985);
Transgo, Inc. v. Ajac Transmission Parts Corp., 768 F.2d 1001, 1024 (9th Cir. 1985).
393. 763 F.2d 485 (1st Cir. 1985).
394. Id. at 490.
395. 746 F.2d 1205 (7th Cir. 1984).
396. Id. at 1267.
397. Fishman, 763 F.2d at 489-90.
398. 773 F.2d 191, 197-98 (8th Cir. 1985).
399. Fishman, 763 F.2d 485; Rymer, 754 F.2d 1303; Taliferro v. Augle, 757 F.2d 157, 162-
63 (7th Cir 1985).
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sive.4 In commercial cases, all awards above $2.5 million were over-
turned,4" 1 while the awards below that figure were all sustained. 0 2
There seems general agreement only on the principle that the punitive
award should not be so large as to destroy a defendant economically.
2. THE ABUSE OF DISCRETION STANDARD
The frequency and manner in which jury verdicts were held "exces-
sive" in 1984-1985 demonstrate the ease with which an appellate power
to review jury verdicts can be abused. At best these abuses turn on judi-
cial redeterminations of subsidiary facts found by the jury; at worst
judges have become embroiled in the decidedly non-legal task of decid-
ing the monetary value of a lost limb or loved one. If it were necessary
to choose between no appellate review of claims of excessiveness and
the type of review now in vogue, a return to the pre-1930 absolute bar
to such review would probably reduce the number of unjust results and
certainly would reduce the number of constitutional transgressions.
The problem with the abuse of discretion standard-the standard con-
sidered in Neese and Grunenthal-is not that it was applied and found
wanting, but that it simply is not being applied at all.
Appellate decisions merely announcing the adoption of, or a re-
turn to, the abuse of discretion standard would not necessarily bring
about a substantial change in current practice. If, as has been seen, the
circuit courts can so massage the facts and legal standards as to declare
that there is "no evidence" of liability in a case replete with relevant
evidence, it would be no great task to label as an "abuse of discretion"
virtually any district court decision with which an appellate panel hap-
pened to disagree. In order to effectively delineate a type of review less
sweeping than exists today, the abuse of discretion standard must be
given sufficiently definite and principled content to constrain appellate
courts from routinely overturning any verdicts that they may happen to
think are too high.
a. Financial injuries
The evaluation of evidence regarding the magnitude of a financial
injury often, perhaps ordinarily, involves judgments similar to those
which a jury makes in determining liability. A jury may be asked to
resolve a question of historical fact (for example, how much was Smith
earning a year?), to decide what would have happened but for certain
400. Bell, 746 F.2d 1205; Hollins, 773 F.2d 191; Ramsey, 772 F.2d 1303.
401. Arceneaux, 767 F.2d 1498; Molex, 759 F.2d 474; Transgo, 768 F.2d 1001; T.D.S.,
760 F.2d 1520.
402. Aldrich, 756 F.2d 243; Morrill, 747 F.2d 1217.
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events (for example, how much would Smith have earned next year?), to
resolve disputes between experts (for example, how much was Smith's
building worth?),4" 3 or to perform certain mathematical calculations
based on these subsidiary findings. The factual determinations may be
difficult, but at least some of the underlying evidence will ordinarily
involve specific dollar amounts. Deciding how much income Smith lost
in 1985, or Will lose in 1990, is a qualitatively different and easier task
than deciding the value of Smith's leg or Smith's child.
Faced with a series of financial injury cases requiring both the find-
ing of subsidiary facts and the performance of mathematical calcula-
tions, many appellate courts have blithely undertaken to revisit and
redecide those subsidiary factual issues, thereby engaging in many of
the same improper practices common in evaluating requests for judg-
ment n.o.v. But if, as the seventh amendment clearly requires, judgment
n.o.v. standards (liberal or otherwise) cannot be applied on appeal ab-
sent the requisite motions before and after the jury verdict, the appel-
late courts must not, under the guise of searching for an abuse of discre-
tion, engage in the same type of review that would be constitutionally
permissible only in evaluating denials of motions for a directed verdict
and judgment n.o-v.
It might be theoretically possible, having delineated the degree of
review permissible regarding a judgment n.o.v., to formulate a standard
for abuse of discretion review which, while permitting reversal of some
erroneous factual findings, is considerably more stringent. One could
hypothesize, for example, that on a judgment n.o.v. appeal, a verdict
would require "substantial" evidence, whereas in an abuse of discretion
appeal merely "significant" evidence or a "scintilla" would suffice. But
given the enormous difficulties already encountered in defining just
when a verdict can be overturned on a judgment n.o.v. appeal, it is
implausible in the extreme to suggest that a clear and manageable addi-
tional standard could be formulated which lay somewhere between no
review and judgment n.o.v. review. The gossamer distinctions between
such standards, even if intelligible to an academic, would be wholly in-
adequate to constrain or inhibit appellate judges intent upon redeter-
mining the size of a jury verdict.
In the absence of motions for both a directed verdict and judgment
n.o.v., therefore, the appellate courts should be flatly forbidden to re-
consider the subsidiary factual findings underlying a jury's determina-
tion regarding the appropriate size of a verdict. This rule, which effec-
tively conforms modern practice to eighteenth-century common law
procedure, does not carry an unreasonable risk of excessive verdicts.
Where a defendant believes that the evidence entitles it as a matter of
403. E.g., Morton Butler Timber Co. v. United States, 91 F.2d 884, 890 (6th Cir. 1937).
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law to prevail on some subsidiary question bearing on the size of the
verdict, the defendant is free to offer motions for a partial directed ver-
dict and judgment n.o.v.4 °4 Thus in a case involving a claim for lost
salary, a defendant could ask for a partial directed verdict instructing
the jury, for example, that the plaintiff made $200 a week prior to the
injury at issue, that the plaintiff would never have received any raises,
that the plaintiff can now earn $100 a week, or that the plaintiff must be
assumed to retire in ten years. The formulation of such motions will not
only preserve for appeal any arguments the defendant has regarding the
subsidiary factual issues, but will often help to focus the trial court and
jury on the specific factual issues in need of resolution.
The task of the jury, the trial court, and the circuit court could all
be rationalized and simplified if, in a case involving the application of
mathematical calculations to subsidiary facts, the jury were asked to
make distinct factual findings regarding each of the relevant facts-for
example, what Smith made in the past? what he can earn now? how
long he will work? and so forth. Faced with the need to make such
distinct findings, a jury is more likely to understand clearly its responsi-
bilities, and the very structure of the required findings could provide a
safeguard against a verdict colored by improper bias or sympathy. If, in
a judgment n.o.v. appeal, an appellate court overturns some subsidiary
finding, the existence of the remaining findings may make it possible to
recalculate the award without need for a new jury (for example, if the
jury found Smith would have worked ten more years, but Smith and all
the other witnesses agreed he would have retired in five), simplify the
calculation of a remittitur (for example, based on the largest number of
work years for which there is any evidentiary support), or limit the is-
sues that must be referred to a new jury (for example, how much longer
would Smith have worked?).
Absent appropriate motions for a directed verdict and judgment
n.o.v., however, an appellate court should not inquire into the suffi-
ciency of the evidence to support the plaintiffs contentions regarding
any subsidiary facts. So long as there was a genuine dispute between the
parties regarding a subsidiary factual question bearing on the size of the
award, an appellate court should not be permitted to re-examine the
jury's disposition of that dispute. An appellate court could, however,
re-examine any mathematical calculations; whether two plus two
equals three is not a question of fact, at common law or otherwise. The
ability of the appellate courts to perform such computations will in
some instances enable them to discern, and correct, other types of er-
rors. An appellate court utilizing such calculations will at times be able
404. Such a motion was filed, for example, in Springfield Crusher, Inc. v. Transcontinen-
tal Ins. Co., 372 F.2d 125, 125 (3d Cir, 1967).
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to ascertain what subsidiary facts were found, or would have to have
been found, in order to arrive at the jury's verdict. In Springborn v.
American Commercial Barge Lines,40 5 for example, a jury awarded the
plaintiff seaman, who had been injured on a barge, $75,000 for mainte-
nance and cure. The cure claim encompassed necessary medical treat-
ment, and maintenance was to include a reasonable amount for food
and lodging until the seaman reached the point of maximum recovery.
The Fifth Circuit noted that the amount of the cure, $13,000, was not in
dispute,4 °6 leaving an award of $62,000 for maintenance. The only wit-
ness regarding the period of recovery, plaintiff's own doctor, testified
that it would end by September 1983. The court of appeals, noting that
the plaintiff claimed 598 total days of maintenance, calculated that the
jury award amounted to $103 a day for food and lodging, or over
$35,000 a year. The plaintiff, understandably, had never asserted that
he needed $103 a day and had in fact claimed no more than $28.59 a
day.4" 7 These calculations in Springborn demonstrated that the jury ei-
ther did not understand or had chosen to disregard the relevant instruc-
tions. In such a case the failure to obey the instructions-not an appel-
late finding of excessiveness-would be the appropriate basis for
overturning the verdict.40 8
405. 767 F.2d 89 (5th Cir. 1985).
406. Id. at 94 n. 13.
407. Id. at 95-96 n.18.
408. In Martell v. Boardwalk Enters., 748 F.2d 740 (2d Cir. 1984), the jury awarded
$489,000 to the father of a teenage boy who lost his leg in an accident. The award was to cover
both expenses incurred as a result of the injury and the reduced value of the child's services to the
parent. The Second Circuit, accepting the father's claim of $265,000 in expenditures, calculated the
award for lost services at $224,000. Since the boy was 17 at the time of the injury, and the jury had
been charged that the father was entitled to his services until he was 21, the court of appeals
concluded that the award was the equivalent of $56,000 a year. It is inconceivable that the plaintiff
seriously claimed, or that the jury actually believed, that the chores performed by a teenage boy
were worth $56,000 a year; here, as in Springborn, the calculation shows that the jury could not
have arrived at its verdict in compliance with the instructions, but must have based its verdicts on
some other unauthorized theory.
In Springfield Crusher, Inc. v. Transcontinental Ins. Co., 372 F.2d 125 (3d Cir. 1967), the
plaintiff sued on an indemnification policy covering a damaged piece of machinery. The agreed
upon original value of the machinery was $25,800, and the plaintiff conceded that it had depreci-
ated in value by at least $860. The jury nonetheless awarded $25,700, the limit of liability under the
insurance policy. In ordering a new trial on damages, the Third Circuit explained:
mhe damage award.., exceeded the maximum amount recoverable under the evidence
viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff.... It seems reasonable to presume that the
jury's decision resulted from either a disregard of the testimony as to the cash value of the
equipment at the time of the accident or a misunderstanding as to the legal principles
applicable in the determination of the issue of damages.
Id. at 126.
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b. Non-financial injuries
Recent experience has demonstrated with great force the wisdom
of judges of an earlier generation who were unwilling to attempt to
reevaluate a jury's award for physical and emotional injuries.4 °9 In
1984-1985 appellate panels, having undertaken that task, held that fed-
eral juries had overestimated the value of a father, 410 a son,4 11 a leg,4 12
and two testicles, 4 13 and had incorrectly assessed the emotional injury
caused by a strip search, 41 4 by racial discrimination, 41 '5 by being de-
picted as a lesbian,4 16 and by retaliation against an employee for engag-
ing in unpopular speech. 41 7 The process of evaluating such injury
claims poses problems totally unlike the calculation of lost wages.
There is no standard by which to measure degrees of physical suffering
or mental anguish, and no rate of exchange to convert such misery into
dollars and cents. Insurance companies write policies setting specific
values on some claims of this sort, but it is impossible to imagine any
sort of objective, rule-bound criteria for determining the value of such
losses.
The inherently subjective nature of the assessment of damages in
these cases requires the exercise of considerable discretion on the part
of the jury; as the Eighth Circuit has noted, reasonable juries might well
award quite different verdicts for the same injuries.41 8 Where the liti-
gants disagree about the size of a claim for lost wages, however, there is
at least in theory a correct answer; judges should defer to the jury's
verdict in a financial injury case because common sense-and the sev-
enth amendment-compel the conclusion that the jury is the most reli-
able institution for finding that answer. But where the value of a lost
limb must be put in monetary terms, there simply is no one "correct"
value. The jury itself must exercise considerable discretion in fixing the
amount of the verdict; the trial judge in turn exercises broad discretion
in approving or rejecting the jury's action. This double exercise of dis-
cretion seems inconsistent with virtually any direct appellate review of
these verdicts. An appellate court asked to overturn a verdict previously
409. See, e.g., Armit v. Loveland, 115 F.2d 308, 314 (3d Cir. 1940); Larsen v. Chicago &
N.W. Ry., 171 F.2d 841, 845 (7th Cir. 1948); Fritz v. Pennsylvania R.R., 185 F.2d 31, 36-37 (7th
Cir. 1950).
410. In re Air Crash Disaster Near New Orleans, La., 767 F.2d 1151 (5th Cir. 1985);
Walters v. Mintec/Int'l, 758 F.2d 73 (3d Cir. 1985).
411. Haley v. Pan Am. World Airways, 746 F.2d 311 (5th Cir. 1984).
412. Martell v. Boardwalk Enters., 748 F.2d 740 (2d Cir. 1984).
413. Dixon v. International Harvester Co., 754 F.2d 573 (5th Cir. 1985).
414. Joan W. v. City of Chicago, 771 F.2d 1020 (7th Cir. 1985).
415. Ramsey v. American Air Filter Co., 772 F.2d 1303 (7th Cir. 1985).
416. Douglass v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 769 F.2d 1128 (7th Cir. 1985).
417. Knapp v. Whitaker, 757 F.2d 827 (7th Cir. 1985).
418. See supra note 356.
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accepted by the trial judge would have to find that the trial court abused
its discretion when it failed to hold that the jury abused its discretion.
A generation ago Judge Stephens of the Ninth Circuit, arguing for
appellate scrutiny of awards such as these, urged that appellate reversal
would surely be warranted if a jury returned "a million dollar judgment
for the loss of a little finger." '4 19 None of the verdicts reviewed or over-
turned in 1984-1985, however, involved such manifestly absurd figures;
on the whole the appellate courts are simply fine tuning verdicts which,
given the subjective nature of the decisions involved, were not self-evi-
dently unreasonable. In Joan W. v. City of Chicago, for example, the
Seventh Circuit reduced the jury verdict thirty-three percent, from
$112,000 to $75,000.420 In most instances in which the appellate courts
fixed the amount of the remittitur, the verdict deemed appropriate by
the appellate panel was at least half the size of the. original verdict.4 21
Given the wide degree of latitude necessarily involved in the evaluation
of these damage claims, it is hard to see how a double abuse of discre-
tion could be involved if the original jury was that close to what the
appellate court thought was the maximum permissible verdict.422
The inclination of modern judges to tamper with such verdicts is at
odds with the broad degree of deference that was accorded to jury ver-
dicts in the eighteenth century. In Beardmore v. Carrington423 an
English jury awarded one thousand pounds to a printer who had been
improperly imprisoned for six days and whose private papers had been
seized and examined by royal officials. In 1764, when Beardmore was
decided, a thousand pounds had a value equal to more than $1 million
in 1988 dollars.424 In upholding that award, Chief Justice Pratt
explained:
Can we say £1,000 are monstrous damages as against him
who has granted an illegal warrant to [an arresting officer]
who enters into a man's house and prys into all his secret and
private affairs, and carries him from his house and business
and imprisons him for six days; .. can anybody say that a
guinea per diem is sufficient damages in this extraordinary
case, which concerns the liberty of every one of the King's
419. Southern Pac. Co. v. Guthrie, 186 F.2d 926, 934 (9th Cir. 1951) (Stephens, J.,
dissenting).
420. Joan W. v. City of Chicago, 771 F.2d 1020 (7th Cir. 1985).
421. See the table of remittiturs set out at the end of this article.
422. "[To reverse the judgment we must conclude that the trial court abused its discretion
in failing to conclude that the jury abused its discretion in returning a verdict of the magnitude of
the one here involved." Bucher v. Krause, 200 F.2d 576, 587 (7th Cir. 1952).
423. 2 Wils. K.B. 244, 95 Eng. Rep. 790 (1764).
424. In this era the annual wage of a coachman or other servant was approximately ten
pounds. See Cormack, The Ledgers of Sir Joshua Reynolds, 42 WALPOLE SOC'Y 105 (1968-1970).
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subjects; we cannot say the damages of £1,000 are
enormous.
425
If, as the historical element of the seventh amendment requires,
Beardmore is accepted as indicative of the range of verdicts which can-
not be overturned by a judge, none of the verdicts deemed excessive in
1984-1985 would be even close to the extraordinary amounts that an
appellate court could disapprove as excessive.
The clearest indication of how far present standards depart from
eighteenth-century practice is the appeal in Taliferro v. Augle, 4 2 6 the
facts of which bear a considerable resemblance to Beardmore itself. The
plaintiff in Taliferro, a political dissident, was arrested, beaten by the
police, and held in jail for "several days"; the police seized and subse-
quently destroyed several manuscripts which Taliferro was carrying at
the time of his arrest.42 7 The jury returned a verdict of $47,000 in dam-
ages, but the Seventh Circuit held that $25,000 was "the highest com-
pensatory damages that can be justified on this record.",42 Judge Pos-
ner reasoned that the papers seized and destroyed by the police were
primarily of "sentimental value," rather than being financially valu-
able, publishable manuscripts, and that Taliferro had failed "to estab-
lish an objective basis for quantifying" the injuries caused by the beat-
ing, imprisonment, and seizure. 4 29 Although precisely the same things
could have been said of Beardmore's claims, Judge Posner overturned
as excessive in Taliferro a verdict less than one-twentieth the size of the
verdict upheld two centuries earlier by Chief Justice Pratt in Beardmore.
Measured against the award sustained in Beardmore, none of the
1984-1985 verdicts could be deemed excessive. There might be some
justification in theory for leaving open the possibility that an appellate
court, finding a double abuse of discretion, could hold a verdict exces-
sive in some bizarre hypothetical case such as that imagined by Judge
Stephens. There is, however, little indication that such indefensible ver-
dicts are being returned by juries or accepted by trial judges, and con-
siderable evidence that appellate judges will abuse any power to over-
turn as excessive jury verdicts for non-financial injuries. This appellate
authority has proved, on the whole, to be a constitutionally dangerous
solution to a problem that does not appear to exist. The best course of
action at this juncture would be to abandon altogether the appellate
425. 2 Wils. K.B. at 250, 95 Eng. Rep. at 793-94. The Supreme Court quoted this passage
with approval in Barry v. Edmunds, 116 U.S. 550, 566 (1886).
426. 757 F.2d 157 (7th Cir. 1985).
427. Id. at 159. The status of the criminal charges on which Tallifero had been arrested
was unclear. Id.
428. Id. at 162.
429. Id.
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practice of entertaining claims that verdicts for non-financial injuries
were excessive.
The appellate courts should limit their scrutiny of such verdicts to
inquiring whether the size of the verdict, especially in conjunction with
other factors, indicates improper conduct on the part of the jury.
Douglass v. Hustler Magazine, Inc. might well be such a case; although
the size of the verdict itself in Douglass seems unobjectionable by
Beardmore standards, the magnitude of the award may well have been
affected by the improper decision of the trial judge to permit the plain-
tiffs to show the jury slides of 128 particularly vile photographs and
cartoons that had appeared in various issues of the defendant maga-
zine.43 ° In Hollins v. Powell431 the plaintiffs were awarded $75,000 each
for false arrest and imprisonment lasting one to four hours; again the
size of the verdict is not troublesome in light of Beardmore; since there
was evidence the arrests had caused medical and employment problems
and had been ordered by a mayor to prevent members of a city agency
from conducting a meeting.43 2 The Eighth Circuit's opinion, however,
indicates it may have been concerned that the jury was influenced by the
fact that the mayor was black.433 In such a case it would be preferable
for the appellate court to squarely address the question of jury bias,
rather than attempt, as the Eighth Circuit did in Hollins, to make its
own determination as to the monetary value of. the essentially non-fi-
nancial injuries involved.
c. Punitive damages
It is almost impossible to make a reasoned assessment of whether
juries are awarding excessive punitive damages, or of whether appellate
courts are overreaching in reducing such awards. These two difficulties
both stem from the absence of any meaningful legal standards by which
to determine the amount of a punitive award. The general formulation
found in the appellate decisions-that punitive damages should be suffi-
cient to punish or deter the misconduct at issue-is as devoid of sub-
stantive content as would be a similar standard for fixing criminal
sentences would be, and is at least equally dangerous. In the absence of
more specific guidance, this vague formulation confers upon both juries
and judges the sort of standardless discretion condemned in Furman v.
Georgia,43 4 virtually inviting juries to punish unpopular defendants,
430. Douglass, 769 F.2d at 1141-42.
431. 773 F.2d 191 (8th Cir. 1985).
432. Id. at 193.
433. Id. at 197.
434. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
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and extending an equally tempting invitation to judges43 5 anxious to
protect some particular group of defendants. The problem is one which
federal judges cannot solve in some instances, since in diversity cases
the standard for punitive awards is governed by state law. Nonetheless,
federal courts ought to begin to formulate more specific guidelines for
federal claims, in part, at least, in the hope that this action will prompt
state courts to adopt similar standards, or at least some standards.
Judicial guidelines for assessing punitive damages might sensibly
proceed along the following lines. A jury ought first determine whether
the purpose of the defendant's misconduct was to injure the plaintiff, or
to obtain benefits for the defendant, or both. The size of the award
should, in turn, be proportionate to the profit the defendant sought to
realize, or the harm the defendant sought to inflict. To be meaningful,
the standard must include some specific ratio, to be contained in the
jury instructions, between the contemplated benefit or profit and the
punitive award. A plausible figure might be a ratio of two to one, the
formula utilized by Congress in the antitrust laws. 436 A jury would be
free to award a lower amount if the degree of culpability were modest,
and forbidden to impose punitive damages so great that they would
destroy the defendant financially.43 7 Conversely, a larger award would
be appropriate if the ordinary calculation would yield a verdict so mod-
est that it could not affect the conduct of the defendant or others simi-
larly situated, or if the misconduct at issue entailed such a small risk of
detection that any future wrongdoer would likely discount substantially
the danger of any punitive award.438
d. Remittiturs
A generation ago, when appellate scrutiny of the size of jury ver-
dicts was first seriously proposed, the general practice of defendants
was to ask only that the appellate courts award a new trial. 43 9 The
435. Bucher v. Krause, 200 F.2d 576 (7th Cir. 1952), noted that this lack of standards
made it difficult to find any legitimate basis for ruling excessive an award of punitive damages:
"[Tihere is no rule prescribing a proportion, ratio or relationship between [punitive damages] and
actual compensatory damages .... There being no yardstick, no definite unit of measure, which
can be applied to punitive damages, we may not arbitrarily declare the verdict excessive." Id. at
587-88 (footnote omitted).
436. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982). Similar suggestions can be found in K. Geller & M. Levy, The
Constitutionality of Punitive Damages. A.B.A. J., Dec. 1, 1987, at 88.
437. See, e.g., Hollins v. Powell, 773 F.2d 191 (8th Cir. 1985) (overturning $500,000 puni-
tive award against individual already in financial difficulty).
438. See, e.g., Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205 (7th Cir, 1984) (police coverup of
unconstitutional killing); Ramsey v. American Air Filter Co., Inc., 772 F.2d 1303 (7th Cir. 1985)
(intentional racial discrimination in employment).
439. See, e.g., Chicago Rock Island & Pac. Ry. v. Kifer, 216 F.2d 753, 756 (10th Cir.
1954); Brest v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 216 F.2d 331, 331 (3d Cir. 1954); Glendenning Motor-
1989:237 Judges Against Juries 345
Fourth Circuit decision in Neese v. Southern Railway,44 ° the first case in
which the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of appellate
review of the size of jury verdicts, had merely ordered a new trial.44 1
Other appellate decisions of this era provided the same relief from the
disputed verdict. 44 ' The reluctance of defendants to seek, and of appel-
late courts to order, remittiturs was doubtless the result of the strong
language in the 1935 decision in Dimick v. Schiedt.443 That case ex-
pressed grave constitutional reservations about any proposal to extend
the use of remittitur beyond the contours of that practice as it existed in
the nineteenth century, an era when only trial judges, not appellate
judges, ordered remittiturs to correct excessive verdicts.
Today appellate courts which find a jury verdict excessive virtually
always fix the amount of the remittitur themselves, without affording
the trial court any authority to consider that issue. Among the 1984-
1985 appeals there are only three instances in which the district court
was authorized to determine the amount of the remittitur, and in each
case the appellate opinion made specific findings which largely deter-
mined what the remittitur would have to be.444 Indeed, the issue on
these appeals often seems to be not whether there ought to be a new
trial on damages, but simply whether the defendant is entitled to an
order of remittitur. Frequently the defendant appears to have appealed
for the sole and express purpose of winning a remittitur order from the
circuit court.445 In the opinions themselves the discussion of whether
the original award was excessive, and of the level to which the award
should be reduced by remittitur, are inextricably intertwined.
ways, Inc. v. Anderson, 213 F.2d 432,437 (8th Cir. 1954); Bucher v. Krause, 200 F.2d 576, 585 (7th
Cir. 1953).
440. 216 F.2d 772 (4th Cir. 1954).
441. The facts in Neese are discussed supra at notes 347-53 and accompanying text.
442. Glazer v. Glazer, 374 F.2d 390, 414 (5th Cir. 1967) (district court to consider possible
remittitur or retrial); Springfield Crusher, Inc. v. Transcontinental Ins. Co., 372 F.2d 125, 126-27
(3d Cir. 1967); Compania Trasatlantica Espanola, S.A. v. Melendez Torres, 358 F.2d 209, 214 (1st
Cir. 1966); Plumbers & Steamfitters Union Local No. 598 v. Dillon, 255 F.2d 820, 824 (9th Cir.
1958); Whiteman v. Pitrie, 220 F.2d 914, 919 (4th Cir. 1955); Missouri-K.-T.-Ry. of Texas v.
Ridgway, 191 F.2d 363, 370 (8th Cir. 1951); Virginian Ry. v. Armentrout, 166 F.2d 400, 409 (4th
Cir. 1948); but cf. Cobb v. Lepisto, 6 F.2d 128, 130 (9th Cir. 1925).
443. 293 U.S. 474 (1935). -[T]his court.., must be alert to see that a doubtful precedent
not be extended by mere analogy to a different case if the result will be to weaken or subvert what it
conceives to be a principle of the fundamental law of the land." Id. at 485.
444. Deakle v. John E. Graham & Sons, 756 F.2d 821, 832-34 (11th Cir. 1985) (fixing lost
wages at $2,419 per year for 36 years, remanding for calculation of discount to present value);
Knapp v. Whitaker, 757 F.2d 827, 847 (7th Cir. 1985) (ordering district court to set remittitur
between $200,000 and $400,000); Springborn v. American Commercial Barge Lines, Inc., 767 F.2d
89, 96 (5th Cir. 1985) (fixing maintenance at $14 a day, reducing days for which maintenance
payable, remanding for. determination of remittitur).
445. Taliferro v. Augle, 757 F.2d 157, 161 (7th Cir. 1985); T.D.S. Inc. v. Shelby Mutual
Ins. Co., 760 F.2d 1520, 1529 (11 th Cir. 1985); Strobl v. New York Mercantile Exch., 768 F.2d 22,
24 (2d Cir. 1985).
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In Grunenthal v. Long Island R.R.446 the Second Circuit held ex-
cessive a jury verdict of $305,000 to a railroad employee whose foot was
crushed in a job-related accident, and ordered a new trial unless the
plaintiff agreed to a remittitur reducing the award to $200,000. After
summarizing the evidence regarding Grunenthal's pain and suffering
and lost wages, the court of appeals sustained the claim of excessiveness
and simultaneously fixed the amount of the remittitur in a single con-
clusory sentence:
[G]iving Grunenthal the benefit of every doubt, and weighing
the evidence precisely in the same manner as we did in
Dagnello [v. Long Island R.R., 289 F.2d 797 (2d Cir. 1961)],
where the large sum allowed was found not to be excessive, we
cannot in any rational manner consistent with the evidence
arrive at a sum in excess of $200,000. 4" 7
The Supreme Court reversed, finding no abuse of discretion by the trial
judge in accepting the $305,000 verdict; the Court did not address the
issues of whether and how an appellate court might correct any such
abuse of discretion by itself ordering a remittitur. At the oral argument
in Grunethal, however, members of the Supreme Court expressed grave
concern about how an appellate judge could go about calculating the
amount of a remittitur.44 a
The problem which concerned the Court in Grunenthal arises in
any case in which an appellate court attempts to fix the amount of a
remittitur, especially for non-financial injuries. It is one thing to sug-
gest, as Judge Stephens did a generation ago, that a plaintiff's finger is
not worth $1 million, and quite another to decide how much the lost
finger was worth or what precise dollar amount marks the boundary
between sustainable and excessive awards for a given loss. In the years
since Grunenthal the appellate courts, perhaps understandably, have
made little progress in explaining how they arrived at particular remitti-
tur figures. In some instances the figure is entirely unexplained;449 in
other cases, as in Grunenthal, the size of the remittitur follows a sum-
446. 388 F.2d 480 (2d Cir.), rev'd, 393 U.S. 156 (1968).
447. Id. at 484. Judge Hays, in a dissenting opinion, treated the question of excessiveness
and of the authority of the appellate court to direct a remittitur as if they were the same issue. Id. at
485 (Hays, J., dissenting).
448. Oral argument, No. 35, October Term 1968, at 21-22:
There was no attempt at analysis in the Court of Appeals. I do not know how you would
go about it ... how you would go about saying that this man's suffering is figured at
$5.00 a second or something like that, and would have been entitled to so much and no
more. I do not know how you do it. But the Court of Appeals here made no attempt to
do it, as I see it, they just said that is too much.
Id. at 27. "1 don't know what they meant to do. They took a figure of $200,000. They didn't justify
it one way or the other."
449. Air Crash, 767 F.2d 740; Aldrich, 756 F.2d 243; Morrill, 747 F.2d 1217.
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mary of the evidence without any serious effort to relate the evidence to
the remittitur. In Dixon v. International Harvester Co.45 ° the Fifth Cir-
cuit held that $500,000 was the highest award that would be "reason-
able" for the plaintiff's physical injuries and then added fifty percent
out of deference to the jury. In Haley v. Pan American World Air-
ways451 another Fifth Circuit panel identified the highest previous state
jury award for the death of a son and then increased that figure by one
third. Neither panel explained how it had arrived at the particular per-
centage modification.
If the abuse of discretion standard once again became the rule of
decision in these cases, the appellate practice of directing a specific re-
mittitur would of necessity come to an end. If the determination
whether to order a new trial on grounds of excessiveness is a matter of
trial court discretion, surely the calculation of the appropriate amount
of a remittitur, indeed the decision whether to attempt to fix a remittitur
at all, is equally discretionary. In resolving the new trial motion, the
trial judge decides whether the jury's verdict was against the weight of
the evidence; in determining the size of any remittitur, the judge decides
what hypothetical verdict would be low enough that it would not be
against the weight of the evidence. It cannot conceivably be the case
that the first issue is a matter of discretion, while the second issue is
entirely a question of law which an appellate court can address nisi
prius. Once an appellate court finds that the trial judge abused his or her
discretion in denying a new trial on damages, the role of the circuit
court should ordinarily come to an end. The question of what remittitur
to order ought to be remanded to the district court so that the trial
judge, enlightened by the appellate panel's analysis of the new trial is-
sue, can exercise his or her discretion in determining the size of the ap-
propriate remittitur or in deciding whether the amount of the damages
is too indefinite to permit the fixing of a remittitur at all.
B. Appellate Review of Multi-Part Damage Awards
A claim for a particular item of damages, like a specific cause of
action, may be insufficient as a matter of law, or may be tried in such a
way that the resulting verdict is tainted by reversible legal error. When a
single jury returns a verdict for two types of damages or on two causes
of action, one proper and the other unsound, the resulting verdict will
ordinarily452 be too high to sustain. If, for example, the victim of an
assault won damages for both lost wages and medical expenses, and the
450. 754 F.2d 573, 590 (5th Cir. 1985).
451. 746 F.2d 311,319 (5th Cir. 1984).
452. The verdict would not be too high if the two causes of action provided alternative
liability theories on which a plaintiff based his or her claim for redress for thesame resulting injury.
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award for medical expenses was held improper as a matter of law, the
total amount of damages awarded by the jury would be too great to
uphold on appeal. There would, on the other hand, be no defect in the
jury's award of damages for lost wages. Thus, there would be no reason
to overturn the damages awarded for the lost wages if that award could
be separated from the award for medical expenses.
The Supreme Court first recognized in 1829 that this problem
could be resolved by directing the verdict winner, as a condition of
avoiding a retrial, to remit that specific part of the total damage award
that was improper as a matter of law. In Bank of Kentucky v. Ashley 453
the jury returned a verdict of $6,350 in favor of the plaintiffs based on
sixty-eight unpaid bank notes; on appeal it was shown that the plaintiffs
had only alleged that there were sixty-seven unpaid notes. The plaintiffs
offered to remit the $50 amount of the sixty-eighth bank note in order
to preserve their verdict, and the Supreme Court permitted them to do
so. Although the jury had returned a single verdict encompassing both
the well pled sixty-seven claims and the defective sixty-eighth claim, it
was possible to ascertain what portion of the verdict was based on the
sixty-seven notes since the general verdict was simply a sum of the face
value of each of the notes.454
In New Orleans Insurance Association v. Piaggo455 the Supreme
Court ordered such a remittitur on its own initiative, rather than at the
request of the verdict winner. The jury in that case, on a claim by the
ship owner against the insurer of the vessel, had awarded a three-part
verdict: $7,000 for the lost vessel, $5,700 for its contents, and $5,000 in
special damages for the unjustified refusal of the insurer to make pay-
ment on the policy, together with interest on the first two items.456 The
Court held that as a matter of law the plaintiff was not entitled to re-
cover any special damages, his only redress for the delay in payment
being interest, but the Court rejected the defendant's request for a new
trial. The Supreme Court reasoned that the separate portions of the
verdict were like special or distinct verdicts, and that an appellate court
could reverse one such verdict while affirming the others; the Court
453. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 127 (1829).
454.
[Ihe ... judgment for $6,350... is error; but the plaintiffs now move for leave to cure it,
by entering a remittitur of the debt so omitted and damages pro tanto.... That the party
would have had a right to remit in the court below cannot be questioned .... [Tihe right
extends ... to several causes of action, distinct debts, distinct acres of land, and distinct
pleas .... This court, therefore, thinks itself authorized to make a precedent in further-
ance of justice .... The ... [plaintiffs] will be permitted to enter the remittitur, and upon
such entry the judgment will be affirmed.
Id. at 127-28.
455. 83 U.S. 378 (1873).
456. Id. at 385-86.
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therefore modified the judgment "by disallowing the sum of $5,000
damages ... and the interest allowed on the same." '457 In Phillips and
Colby Construction Co. v. Seymour4 5 the jury returned a general ver-
dict of $107,353.44 and a special verdict, on a separate claim, of
$11,708. The Supreme Court, finding the claim underlying the special
verdict to be outside of the scope of the original complaint, directed the
lower court to "set aside" the special verdict and "to enter a judgment
in favor of plaintiffs on the general verdict.",45 9
In the Supreme Court decisions applying this principle it was pos-
sible, on the face of either the pleadings or verdict, to distinguish that
portion of the judgment which the verdict winner was entitled to retain.
The lower courts in the first half of this century sensibly recognized that
a remittitur would be equally appropriate in any case in which some
other portion of the record in a case provided a means of distinguishing
the unsound claim or damage element from the balance of the award.
In United States Potash Co. v. McNutt460 the plaintiff sought payment
for services he had rendered to a mining company. The plaintiff ad-
vanced two distinct claims, one seeking the fair value of his services and
the other based on the terms of a written agreement with the firm; the
trial court instructed the jury that the plaintiff was not limited to the fee
provided for by the terms of the agreement, and the jury awarded him
$238,666.66. The court of appeals held, however, that plaintiff's com-
pensation was limited by the terms of the agreement; under that agree-
ment plaintiff's compensation would have been no more than
$60,653.98.461 The Tenth Circuit noted that, in ordering a remittitur to
the lower amount, it had not undertaken to reconsider any factual ques-
tion resolved by the jury:
After one fair trial on the controlling issue... we are reluctant
to send the cause back for another trial of the same issue. The
Seventh Amendment requires one jury trial and not two. [W]e
are not barred from an order of remittitur ... if the excess of
457. Id. at 389.
458. 91 U.S. 646 (1876).
459. Id. at 656. The Court gave the plaintiffs a "reasonable time" to remit the amount of
the special verdict and thus avoid the award of costs in the Supreme Court. Id. See also Kennon v.
Gilmer, 131 U.S. 22 (1889):
[1]f the pleadings and the verdict afforded ... the means of distinguishing part of the
plaintiff's claim from the rest, this court might affirm the judgment on the plaintiff's now
remitting that part.... But this court has no authority to pass upon any question of fact
involved in the consideration of the motion for a new trial.
Id. at 29.
460. 70 F.2d 126 (10th Cir. 1934).
461. The agreement provided for a fee of 10% of the funds raised from certain investors; a
total of $606,539.80 was raised. Id. at 128.
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the judgment is merely a matter of computation, and does not
involve a determination of a disputed question of fact.4 6 2
Other circuit court opinions ordered such remittiturs after concluding
that the trial court should have granted a motion for a directed verdict
on one of several distinct claims on which the jury subsequently ruled
for the plaintiff.463
Although these decisions raised no substantial constitutional
problems, by the mid-1980s the appellate courts had developed a hy-
brid practice combining elements of the principles of Bank of Kentucky
and of the standard of review utilized in evaluating a request for judg-
ment n.o.v. 4 6 4 In three similar cases, the Second Circuit ,465 the Tenth
462. Id. at 132. The panel added: "The Seventh Amendment prohibits a court from sub-
stituting its judgment on a question of fact for that ofajury; computing 10 per cent. of $606,653.98
involves no question of judgment, and a jury need not be impaneled to make the calculation."Id.
463. See, e.g., Texas Co. v. Christian, 177 F.2d 759 (5th Cir. 1949); St. Paul Fire & Marine
Ins. Co. v. Eldracher, 33 F.2d 675, 683 (8th Cir. 1929); Becker Bros. v. United States, 7 F.2d 3, 8-9
(2d Cir. 1925); cf. Hulett v. Brinson, 229 F.2d 22, 24 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
464. In Southern Pac. Co. v. Guthrie, 186 F.2d 926 (9th Cir. 1951) (en banc), the court of
appeals distinguished a claim of excessiveness, which might fall outside the authority of an appel-
late court to consider, from an appeal
in which it can be demonstrated that the verdict includes amounts allowed for items of
claimed damage of which no evidence whatever was produced. Such total want of evi-
dence upon a portion of the case would give rise to a question of law in the same manner
in which a question of law is presented when, upon motion for a directed verdict, there
appears an insufficiency of evidence as to the whole case.
Id. at 931.
It is unclear whether the Ninth Circuit believed an appellate court could address such a
"question of law" ifthe defendant had failed to seek a directed verdict regarding the damage claim
that allegedly lacked any evidentiary support.
465. In Abeshouse v. Ultragraphics, Inc., 754 F.2d 467 (2d Cir. 1985), a copyright in-
fringement action, the jury awarded the plaintiffs $55,368 against Ultragraphics, of which approxi-
mately $37,268 represented profits illicitly gained by the defendant and $18,100 represented profits
lost by the plaintiffs. The Second Circuit overturned the award for lost profits. The plaintiffs-
appellees, creators of a poster solution to Rubik's Cube, had licensed Ultragraphics to distribute
the poster in North America; Ultragraphics illicitly produced and sold 21,000 copies of a modified
poster of its own and sold rights to it to an English publisher. In overturning the lost profits award,
the court of appeals explained:
Appellees argue that the jury's award .. .represents actual damages, in the form of
compensation for profits appellees would have earned by selling 20,000 of their own
posters directly to the public for between $4.50 and $5.50. However, during the period in
which Ultragraphics sold most of the infringing posters, appellees were bound by the
agreement making Ultragraphics the exclusive distributor of "The Cube Solution"
poster in North America. Furthermore, upon the expiration of this agreement, appellees
granted Ideal Toy Co. a two-year license to produce and market the poster. Appellees
failed to present any evidence that under these two agreements they would have been
allowed to make direct sales themselves or that, even if permitted, they would have been
equipped to do so. Similarly, appellees failed to offer any evidence suggesting they might
actually have done business in foreign markets .... Appellees also contend that the jury
awarded them actual damages, by compensating them for "damage to the reputation of
the posters resulting from the inferior quality of the infringing posters." ... However,
appellees did not offer any proof that the terms of their two-year exclusive license to Ideal
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Circuit466 and the Eleventh467 Circuit, resolving defense challenges to
Toy had been affected by Ultragraphics' conduct.... These claims were thus too specula-
tive to support any award of actual damages."
Id. at 470-71.
This analysis involves many of the problems discussed in Part III. A jury that actually com-
pared the original and infringing poster might have inferred from that direct evidence that the
inferior quality of the latter poster would have undermined consumer interest generally in posters
of this sort. A jury that included one or more Rubik's Cube afficionados would certainly have been
better able to make that judgment than a panel of judges none of whom had ever tried to solve the
puzzle. Similarly, a jury's assessment of the value of the poster to Cube owners would necessarily
have colored its judgment about the ease with which the plaintiffs-appellees could themselves have
marketed the poster in North America or abroad. The Second Circuit opinion is based in part on
an after-the-fact creation of rules requiring the plaintiff to have proved directly facts which the jury
might have inferred from circumstantial evidence in the record. It is particularly difficult to under-
stand the appellate court's argument that the plaintiffs had failed to prove that direct sales by the
plaintiffs were permitted under the agreement with Ideal Toy. If the agreement were in the record,
this argument is almost certainly unsound, since the permissibility of such sales would presumably
be clear on the face of the agreement. If the agreement were not in the record, it seems unreason-
able for the appellate panel to fashion after the fact an absolute rule that the plaintiff had to prove
direct sales were permitted, rather than requiring the defendant to prove that such sales were
forbidden. The argument that the jury's verdict was "speculative" is discussed supra at text accom-
panying notes 207-I1.
466. In Collier v. Hoisting & Portable Engineers Local Union No. 101, 761 F.2d 600
(10th Cir. 1985), the plaintiff, a contractor doing work at an Owens-Corning plant, was the target
of illegal secondary picketing. When the picketing caused difficulties with its own employees,
Owens-Corning terminated plaintiff's contract and allegedly refused to award him any further
contracts. "There was evidence that the officials of Owens-Corning responded to threats that their
plant would be shut down if plaintiff's work was not stopped." Id. at 603. The Tenth Circuit
upheld the award for profits lost on the terminated contract, but overturned a portion of the jury
verdict that reflected profits lost because of Owens-Corning's permanent refusal to use plaintiff's
services:
Owens-Coming told [plaintiff] shortly after the incident... that there would be no
more jobs for plaintiff until plaintiff had his problems with the union straightened
out.... [Pilaintiff made no inquiries as to available jobs after the conversations shortly
after the incident and made no other attempts to work for the Company. There was a
lapse of time of 52 months from the incident until the suit and plaintiff claimed $1,200 per
month for this period. This was his average monthly profit on Owens-Corning's jobs
before the incident. The jury awarded approximately such an amount. We must hold that
the proof of damages after the completion of the job in progress was "speculative and
uncertain".... The only damages established were the loss on the job in progress. The
unlawful acts of Local 1290 had an adverse effect on the relationship plaintiff had estab-
lished with Owens-Coming. But the proof of damages was speculative at best in the
absence of any effort on the part of plaintiff to obtain any jobs.
Id. at 603.
There seems nothing the least bit speculative about the jury's award. Owens-Corning told
plaintiff unequivocally that it would not do business with him until his labor problems were
"straightened out," and the union made it equally clear that those problems would continue until
he agreed to unionize the disputed position at issue. Id. Under these circumstances, it was fairly
certain that Owens-Corning's ban on plaintiff would continue unless he agreed to the union's
demands and that further application by him for work at Owens-Coming would have been entirely
pointless.
467. In T.D.S. Inc. v. Shelby Mut. Ins. Co., 760 F.2d 1520 (11 th Cir. 1985), a jury found
that the defendant had wrongfully refused to pay out the proceeds of a fire insurance policy on a
restaurant. The restaurant business was owned by the plaintiff, T.D.S. Inc., which held title to
personal property in the building; the building in which the restaurant was located was owned by a
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the size of jury verdicts, held that a distinct portion of each verdict had
to be overturned because that part of the verdict was not reasonably
supported by the evidence. These decisions would have been unexcep-
tionable if the defendant had sought a directed verdict to forbid the jury
to consider the defective damage claim, and had submitted a motion for
judgment n.o.v. on that issue following the verdict. But in each instance
the defendants had not filed such motions, but had simply moved, after
the juries returned their verdicts, for new trials on the grounds that the
verdicts were excessive.
This hybrid practice is tainted by two distinct, but equally fatal,
constitutional flaws. First, these decisions disregard the different sub-
stantive standard appropriate when an appellate court is asked to direct
entry of a judgment n.o.v. and when it is asked to order a new trial. For
the reasons explained above, where judgment n.o.v. is sought on ap-
peal, the circuit court is theoretically considering whether the trial judge
should have granted a directed verdict prior to jury consideration of the
evidence. A district court could, of course, grant a partial directed ver-
dict, ordering the jury to make no monetary award on a particular dam-
age or liability claim. In such a situation, the appellate court has the
same authority as the trial court to assess what facts the evidence fairly
conduced to prove, bearing in mind the constraints discussed in Part
III. As the Supreme Court repeatedly has emphasized,46 8 however, in
the absence of motions for a directed verdict and judgment n.o.v., the
circuit courts may only consider whether the district judge should have
granted a motion for a new trial. The appellate court is not authorized
to make its own assessment of the evidence, not even the narrow assess-
third party. Mr. and Mrs. Starr, the sole shareholders in T.D.S. Inc., had an option allowing them,
at an apparently attractive price, to purchase the building in which the restaurant was located.
T.D.S. was awarded $88,000 in damages for lost personal property and $12,000 for damages
to leasehold improvements; neither of these awards was disputed on appeal. The jury also awarded
$420,000 in special compensatory damages for lost business opportunities; this award was based
on three distinct claims-the value of the restaurant business itself, the value of the option to
purchase the building involved, and the injury to the credit reputation of T.D.S. The Eleventh
Circuit held that only the first claim could be sustained. The appellate panel explained:
[Tihe special damage award could not properly be predicated on the option to purchase
the . . . building, even though there was much testimony concerning the value of the
option itself as well as the value of the real estate which it secured. The option was owned
by the Starrs individually, not by TDS, the only party-plaintiff in this action. We thus
cannot hold that the Starrs' loss of the ability to exercise the option is equivalent to
TDS's loss of a valuable business opportunity.
Id. at 1533 (emphasis omitted). While the evidence might not have compelled an inference that the
option represented a business opportunity for T.D.S., a jury surely could have inferred that was
the substance of the option; since the Starrs had chosen to hold through T.D.S. title to the personal
property involved in the restaurant business, it would have been reasonable to infer that real prop-
erty would have been acquired and held in the same manner.
468. Johnson v. New York, New Haven & Hartford R.R., 344 U.S. 48, 50 (1952) (and
cases cited).
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ment appropriate on a motion for judgment n.o.v., but may consider
only whether the trial judge abused his or her discretion in denying the
requested new trial. Although it is far from clear what constitutes an
abuse of discretion, the appellate courts have generally469 agreed that
the circumstances in which a circuit court can find an abuse of discre-
tion, and order a new trial, are far narrower than the circumstances in
which a circuit court can order judgment n.o.v. In 1984-1985, district
court orders granting or denying new trials were overturned on appeal
far less frequently than district court orders granting or denying mo-
tions for judgment n.o.v.4 70
The second difficulty derives from the fact that in two of the three
cases at issue, the appellate courts, having found defects in the evidence
supporting one claim, directed by way of remedy that the entire case be
retried unless the plaintiff agreed to remit the award for the disputed
claim.4 71 Because these appeals were not premised on motions for di-
rected verdicts and judgments n.o.v., the appellate courts could not or-
der judgments n.o.v. on the defective claims, but rather were limited to
directing new trials on those issues. Thus the plaintiffs were entitled
both to new trials on the disputed claims and to affirmance of the other
claims. The effect of the remittitur order, however, is to force plaintiffs
to forfeit one of these rights. If the plaintiffs wanted an affirmance of the
undisputed claims, they had to agree to the remittitur and a forfeiture
of their rights to new trials on the disputed claims, effectively con-
verting new trial orders into judgments n.o.v., a consequence the appel-
late courts could not constitutionally have ordered directly. If plaintiffs
exercised their right to new trials on the disputed claims and thus re-
jected remittiturs, the appellate courts would reverse and remand the
undisputed claims for new trials, even though there was no pretense
that any independent constitutional bases existed for overturning those
portions of the juries' verdicts. Thus the use of remittitur orders in cases
of this sort departs substantially from past practice and involves two
distinct violations of the seventh amendment.
V. CONCLUSION
The last twenty years have been, deliberately or inadvertently, a
unique constitutional experiment demonstrating the practical signifi-
cance and legal importance of the seventh admendment. In the absence
of any Supreme Court scrutiny or intervention, the circuit courts have
been free to work their will on civil jury verdicts. This protracted sus-
469. See supra text accompanying notes 280-83.
470. See supra text accompanying notes 53-55.
471. Abeshouse v. Ultragraphics, Inc., 754 F.2d at 471; T.D.S. Inc. v. Shelby Mut. Ins.
Co., 760 F.2d at 1533.
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pension of enforcement of the seventh amendment has tested the extent
of the inherent self-restraint on the part of judges given the raw power
to overrule any jury verdict with which they happened to disagree. The
experiment, and the result, bear a decided resemblance to William
Golding's Lord of the Flies.
We now know, at considerable cost to the litigants of the last two
decades, something we did not know in 1968-that left to their own
devices, a large number of appellate judges simply cannot resist acting
like superjurors, reviewing and revising civil verdicts to assure that the
result is precisely the verdict they would have returned had they been in
the jury box. We also have today a substantial body of evidence demon-
strating that appellate judges are in important ways less competent
factfinders than ordinary jurors, and that judicial superjuries are, on the
whole, significantly more pro-government and pro-defendant than the
juries selected from the populace as a whole. The original concerns of
the framers of the seventh amendment may, to a significant degree, be
shrouded in the mists of time, or impossible to translate readily into
modern terms, but the practical importance of the amendment is now
clear beyond peradventure.
The twenty year de facto suspension of the seventh amendment,
regrettable though it was, has been an event of singular importance in
constitutional history, a development which, like the Sedition Act of
1798 or the abuses of the McCarthy years, may ultimately serve to rein-
vigorate the fundamental principles temporarily trampled underfoot.
Recent experience has demonstrated with considerable force the wis-
dom of Justice Douglas' insistence in Harris v. Pennsylvania Railroad
Co.4" 2 that the Supreme Court make liberal use of its discretionary ju-
risdiction to enforce on the circuit courts the restrictions of the seventh
amendment. Two centuries ago Blackstone warned that the right to
jury trial, and the freedoms which it protected, were imperiled by
[e]very new tribunal, erected for the decision of facts, without
the intervention of a jury .... It is therefore ... a duty which
every man owes to his country, his friends, his posterity, and
himself, to maintain to the utmost of his power this valuable
constitution in all its rights; to restore it to its ancient dignity
if at all impaired ... and above all, to guard with the most
jealous circumspection against the introduction of new and
arbitrary methods of trial, which, under a variety of plausible
preferences, may in time imperceptibly undermine this best
preservative of English liberty.4 73
472. 361 U.S. 15, 17 (1959) (concurring opinion).
473. 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 379-80 (1803 ed.).
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The evisceration of the right to jury trial which has become common-
place in the circuit courts is now entirely perceptible; the need for
Supreme Court action to restore the vitality of the seventh amendment
is equally clear.
Respect for the constitutionally protected right of trial by jury
need not, indeed could not, be premised on the view that juries are
never unreasonable or unfair, or that there is thus simply no need to
accord to judges the authority to correct such mistakes. Clearly juries
are capable of error and may at times tip the scales of justice to favor
the party or legal principle they prefer. But to give judges the ability to
"correct" such mistakes is necessarily to give judges the power to over-
ride sound jury decisions in order to obtain a result preferred by the
judiciary. In framing the rules regarding appellate review of jury ver-
dicts, we must choose to run either the risk of misjudgment by juries or
the risk of overreaching by judges. The seventh amendment mandates
that that choice be made in favor of trusting to the decisions of juries.
REMITTITUR ORDERS 1984-1985
Case Award for
Abeshouse v. Lost profits
Ultragraphics,
754 F.2d 467
(2d Cir. 1985)
In re Air Crash Lost love and
Disaster Near companionship
New Orleans, from wrongful
La., 767 F.2d death of wife
1151 (5th Cir.
1985)
Aldrich v.
Thomson Mc-
Kinnon Securi-
ties, Inc., 756
F.2d 243 (2d
Cir. 1985)
Bell v. City of
Milwaukee, 746
F.2d 1205 (7th
Cir. 1984)
Lost love and
compansion-
ship for each of
three sons
Punitive dam-
ages for stock
fraud and
churning
Punitive dam-
ages for
coverup of un-
constitutional
killing
Court of
Jury District Court Appeals
$ 18,100 $ 18,100 $ 11,395
1,500,000
400,000
1,000,000
400,000
500,000
250,000
$3,000,000 $3,000,000 $1,500,000
350,000 350,000 50,000
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Case
Dixon v. Inter-
national Har-
vester Co., 754
F.2d 573 (5th
Cir. 1985)
Haley v. Pan
Am. Airways,
Inc., 746 F.2d
311 (5th Cir.
1984)
Hollins v.
Powell, 773
F.2d 191 (8th
Cir. 1985)
Joan W. v. City
of Chicago, 771
F.2d 1020 (7th
Cir. 1985)
Award for
Husband's pain
and suffering,
wife's loss of
consortium
Loss of love
and compan-
ionship of de-
ceased son
False arrest
Punitive dam-
ages
Emotional in-
jury caused by
strip search
Katch v. Spei- Lost wages
del, 746 F.2d
1136 (6th Cir.
1984)
K-B Trucking Loss due to
Co. v. Riss In- commercial
ternational fraud
Corp., 763
F.2d 1148
(10th Cir. 1985)
Martell v.
Boardwalk En-
terprises, Inc.,
748 F.2d 740
(2d Cir. 1984)
Morrill v. Bec-
ton, Dickinson
& Co., 747
F.2d 1217 (8th
Cir. 1984)
Ramsey v.
American Air
Filter Co., 772
F.2d 1303 (7th
Cir. 1985)
Stewart & Ste-
vens Services,
Inc. v. Pickard,
749 F.2d 635
(IIth Cir. 1984)
Loss of leg
Loss of services
of 16-year-old
son
Damages for
commercial
fraud
Punitive dam-
ages
Emotional dis-
tress
Punitive dam-
ages
Cost of repairs
to defective en-
gines
Jury District Court
$2,821,871 $2,821,871
350,000
75,000
500,000
112,000
1,534,000
48,724
2,000,000
224,000
3,000,000
350,000
75,000
500,000
112,000
1,190,789
48,724
2,000,000
24,000
3,000,000
20,000,000 20,000,000
75,000
150,000
500,000
75,000
150,000
500,000
Court of
Appeals
$ 892,139
200,000
10,000
2,000
75,000
389,000
29,000
800,000
40,000
2,125,000
3,000,000
35,000
20,000
295,000
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Case
Taliferro v.
Augle, 757
F.2d 157 (7th
Cir. 1985)
T.D.S. Inc. v.
Shelby Mutual
Ins. Co., 760
F.2d 1520
(I Ith Cir. 1985)
Walters v.
Mintec/Inter-
national, 758
F.2d 73 (3d
Cir. 1985)
Award for
Pain and suf-
fering, physical
injury, medical
expenses and
lost property
Special finan-
cial damages
Lost support,
guidance, and
companionship
of deceased fa-
ther
Jury District Court
47,000 47,000
420,000
250,000
420,000
250,000
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25,000
225,000
25,000

